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 In 2009, five avatar-themed films were released, one of which became the highest 
grossing film to date, signaling that, in addition to their popularity in videogames and virtual 
worlds, avatars are culturally salient figures which demand scholarly attention. Avatars, virtual 
environments, and user behavior have evolved significantly since virtual reality captured public 
and academic attention at the close of the twentieth century, and this dissertation is an attempt to 
theorize the avatar in contemporary digital culture. By interlacing new media philosophy and 
analyses of cinematic texts I situate the avatar at the nexus between digital images and 
interactive bodies, with implications for both cinema and virtual environments. Avatarial 
interfaces position users in an embodiment of connections which in some ways evokes the 
cyborg body, but the avatar as a theoretical figure places greater stress on the relation between 
human embodiment and (digital) images, as well as suggesting a move from cyborg 
fragmentation toward an avatarial gestalt. Avatars are also fruitful bodies for thinking through 
agency and gender in contemporary society, and engaging the lost ‘body’ of the picture as film 
has been supplanted by digital imagery. In this regard, virtuality, as a conceptual state pertaining 
to images, embodiment, technology, and philosophy, serves as the connective theoretical tissue 
linking bodies and images. Ultimately, in this dissertation I employ the avatar in an exploration 
of the ways in which we are already virtual, and how we have become avatarial in our own skin. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Ever get the feeling you’re playing some vast and useless game whose goal you don’t 
know and whose rules you can’t remember? … Welcome to gamespace. You are a gamer 
whether you like it or not, now that we all live in a gamespace that is everywhere and 
nowhere. 
McKenzie Wark1 
 
The color is the first thing you notice. Orange-tinted, high-contrast monochrome – the 
color of a dirty creamsicle. Peasants flee past Polish apartment blocks as tanks cut them down 
with machine gun fire – cut, literally fissured, breaking apart as the hits suspend them in 
individual anguished freeze frames before they explode into pixel clods and flitter away. Bombs 
burst into neat layers as slices of frozen fireballs that hang in midair, while a cloaked and masked 
woman, Ash, materializes and aims a sniper rifle at a hovering plane to finish off the level. This 
illegal and addictive virtual reality game set in the near future hauntingly echoes a past of Nazi 
and Soviet invasion, the battles repeating themselves as levels and missions, building toward the 
mysterious ‘Class Real’ at which the game ends – though Ash wonders to herself whether it 
really does end at all. She takes down the plane, and while ‘Mission Complete’ flashes across the 
suspended explosions, we withdraw from the game. Back in the real world, Ash removes the 
heavy interface helmet and cashes in her points while denizens of an underground club stoically 
watch her performance played back on a large screen. She exits the club into a world not so 
different from the one she just left: high-contrast monochrome, a hint of sepia (or is that the 
orange bleeding through?), rough-hewn clothing, in a nearly sunless environment – an eternally 
occupied Poland, darkly rendered. A gamespace for foreign military powers and the occasional 
virtual warrior that can stand up to a tank. 
                                                
1 McKenzie Wark, Gamer Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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 Videogame theorist McKenzie Wark could have been writing about Mamoru Oshii’s 
2001 film Avalon when he wrote “The fruit of the digital is the expulsion of reality from the 
world. That’s gamespace. The consolation of the game is that at least this expulsion is absolute”; 
as it happens, he was writing about The Sims, the highly popular life simulation franchise in 
which players function essentially as ‘gods’, in Wark’s view, controlling the lives of their sims.2 
Players can become heavily invested in in their sims, personally as well as in terms of hours 
spent facilitating sim progression within the game world. At other times, the iconoclastic impulse 
can be equally compelling: “They are images. They are images in a world that appears as a vast 
accumulation of images. Hence the pleasure in destroying images, to demonstrate again and 
again their worthlessness.”3 The game offers up the possibility for seemingly conflicting 
approaches to the sims, caring for them as if they were real, as a child nurtures a doll, or 
destroying them because they are not real, despite their many familiar aspects in appearance, 
behavior, and suburban lifestyles (or perhaps because of the familiarity, in which ordinary life as 
videogame becomes uncannily iterative). Indeed, in Avalon it is not always clear whether Ash 
(Malgorzata Foremniak) is playing the game or fighting the war, or whether she sees her 
opponents as players, soldiers, or images; the film presents them to us as all three, letting the 
flattened image linger at the moment of destruction – still an image of the soldier, still indexed to 
the player, but one that has become more of an image or a different kind of image, hung briefly 
like a picture to emphasize the point. Meanwhile, Ash’s success in the game depends on her 
ability to prevent her own avatar (Foremniak plays both) from being similarly rendered – from 
becoming too much an image. 
                                                
2 Ibid., 38.  
3 Ibid., 33. 
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 Avalon turns on the underlying mechanism of the videogame to manage images for 
maximum visceral and affective impact, to make them relatable on proprioceptive and emotional 
levels for the embodied player, and to create contingent hierarchies of ‘image bodies’ (that is, 
one preserves one’s own image as if it were a body, and destroys other bodies as if they were 
images) – not unlike the mechanism of cinema itself. The pleasure of playing with bodies and 
objects in videogames is the compound of the simultaneous force of their presence (as enemies, 
co-players, objects, obstacles, tools, power-ups – visual objects in videogames are eminently 
functional) and their utter disposability; or, as depicted in Avalon, soldiers and battle vehicles 
that enter with overwhelming power and disintegrate with a good shot. The sophisticated 
graphics in contemporary games become both lush images to interact with and be immersed in 
and at the same time richer, even photorealistic, images to destroy. 
 Wark’s outlook on contemporary society bears some of the same cynicism expressed by 
Baudrillard in his critiques of simulacral culture, but Wark’s allegory emphasizes algorithm over 
sign. Baudrillard portrays a society not only disconnected from reality but producing a 
hyperreality to replace it, with a fantasy space like Disneyland serving as a “deterrence machine 
set up in order to rejuvenate the fiction of the real in the opposite camp,” the ‘real’ America.4 In a 
similar comparison, Wark posits the videogame as an almost requisite adjunct to a society that 
has become gamespace: “Games redeem gamespace by offering a perfect unfreedom, a 
consistent set of constraints.”5 Games offer logic without real stakes; the world as gamespace 
defies clear logic, but has much at stake, and thus becomes a losing battle. Whereas for 
Baudrillard the terms are set – “illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer 
                                                
4 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1994), 13. 
5 Wark, Gamer Theory, 40. 
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possible” – the notion of gamespace implies a space available for navigation and ‘play’ (if one, 
in this case, that necessitates appropriating the violence of the system).6 
 Avalon offers a paradigmatic vision for ludic navigation through gamespace as Ash 
battles her way into Class Real, the final level that promises great insight. Given a gun, an 
evening gown, and little sense of direction, she makes her way out of her dismal apartment 
building and steps into what appears to be the ‘real’ world. The picture suddenly transforms to 
full color, and she is taken aback to find instead of soldiers and mercenaries, casual shoppers and 
pedestrians on a street full of contemporary shops. After wandering for a while she eventually 
succeeds in her mission – terminating one of the ‘unreturned’ who never left the game while his 
physical body lay vegetative in a hospital – but her fate is left unclear, as the film ends with her 
in Class Real and its quotidian (now uncanny) scenes of urban life and main street capitalism. A 
choir sings the praises of Avalon, the paradisal haven for fallen heroes in Arthurian legend, here 
presented ironically as a Westernized economy. While Ash seems uncertain about its meaning, 
the implication is clear to us that she has not escaped the real world by going too deeply in the 
game, but rather that she has come around to the real world by following the game to its depths. 
While the film had previously drawn at least superficial distinctions between the online world of 
Avalon and the offline world in which Ash lives, in the end they are both situated as virtual 
realities relative to the real world – or, rather, the real world is part of the game, or a gamespace 
with clear activities (shopping, for instance) but no clear rules. And while Ash is initially 
disoriented, she has a clear advantage over the occupants of this world who have no idea that 
they are part of a ‘game’ or virtual reality; Ash, having come to the real through the game – and 
now fully embodying her avatar – can see it for the gamespace it is. 
 
                                                
6 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 19. 
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Figure 1. Ash in the virtual reality game Avalon (top) and in Class Real (bottom). 
 
 
 Wark’s notion of gamespace is a potent, if occasionally sardonic, approach to greater 
issues of virtuality. The virtual as an aspect or dimension of material reality is a manifold 
concept that has been developed by numerous theorists and philosophers, and while gamespace 
is not synonymous with the virtual, it does represent a certain approach to virtuality that accords 
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with my own, which is why it has served here as an introduction. First, while the concept of the 
virtual has a history predating the digital era, and has been theorized to be an inherent quality of 
human experience and culture, the idea of gamespace is more specifically situated in our 
contemporary mediascape, and I wish to emphasize the intensification of virtualization that has 
attended not only the explosion of digital technologies, but also the exponentially expanded 
production and distibution of images. Also, gamespace, I feel, reflects the tensions between the 
‘disembodied’ images, avatar ontologies, strained semiotics (Wark’s ‘allegorithms’), and 
material effects that I wish to draw out in the virtual. Gamespace is cyncial, a white flag of defeat 
at the prospect that we have been virtualized beyond our capacity to function within a digital 
culture that is no longer emblematic of machine logic but has fully adopted the abstraction of the 
image. Ash might serve for the moment as our avatar in an exploration of a world which we can 
no longer conceptualize apart from its mediation. She is wary at first, not trusting her eyes, but 
she acclimates quickly, figuring out how to play the game that has no rules. “This world is where 
you belong,” says the character she has been sent to kill as he lay dying, and it soon becomes 
evident why. “Reality is what we choose to believe,” she says, gun in hand, “As for who controls 
the game, I believe it is me.” She is not a fugitive or a bleary-eyed wanderer in this world that is 
simultaneously real and virtual, quotidian reality and gamespace, but on the contrary, right at 
home – and this is where the film leaves her. 
 Thinking virtuality through gaming also introduces the avatar as a key figure for 
conceptualizing our relationship to the virtual in terms of bodies. While avatars are not virtual7 
                                                
7 While scholarship post-dating the enthusiasm for virtual reality in the nineties has sought to demarcate the virtual 
from its association with virtual technologies (including avatars), it is clear, as I discuss further below, that these 
reclamations of the term are yet associated, sometimes obliquely or generally but in other instances quite directly, 
with an understanding that reflects recent usage relative to virtual technologies. I suggest that contemporary notions 
of virtuality in terms of computer use and simulation have not only indelibly influenced our understanding of the 
virtual, but that the resurgence of the term cannot be disassociated from the culture that produced these technologies. 
In other words, the concept of the virtual is quite distinct from virtual reality and other computer operations termed 
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simply because they are produced within virtual technologies, it is one hypothesis of this 
dissertation that avatar use, by virtue of its proximity to embodiment (i.e. the ‘virtualized’ 
experience of the body), opens the possibility for ‘touching’ the virtual where the interface 
apparatus coincides with phenomenological disjunction. I use ‘disjunction’ here meaning not 
separation, as in disembodiment, but as a lack of correspondence or consistency – the slippage 
inherent in any construction of subjectivity relative to the body, though my focus here is on the 
technological and cultural implications which the avatar as a theoretical model illuminates. 
Avatar use has been much more often theorized in terms of effects and aesthetics, largely taking 
the processes involved in operating avatars for granted.8 However, a deeper acknowledgement of 
the interface apparatus is essential in understanding our relationship to digital media, and I apply 
this strategy to avatar use in order to draw out those elements that are instrumental for 
contextualizing digital media technologies in terms of human experience. 
 The relation between user and avatar bodies, as well as the interstitial ontology of avatars 
as embodied ‘images’ representing their users within spatialized, imagistic environments, 
underwrites a second hypothesis regarding the representation of avatars within the conventions 
and technologies of cinema and other narrative media. In their appropriation of the avatar, these 
texts represent, and occasionally express, the virtual in their strata of doubles and interfaces, 
analogs of the digital in performance and embodiment, image hierarchies, naturalized 
technologies, and narratives of control. In seeking contact with the virtual – to ‘render’ it – I am 
not trying to make the virtual tangible, but to articulate or give substance to those processual 
                                                                                                                                                       
‘virtual’, but it would not have the viability and salience that it currently does were it not for the development and 
cultural profusion of these operations. 
8 One of the best treatments of avatar use that integrates process and effects is Julian Dibbell’s first-person account 
of his experiences in LambdaMOO. With lucid prose befitting the literary nature of his subject, Dibbell describes the 
complex interactions between various users in a text-based environment, bringing out especially the tactility of 
sexual encounters transacted through wordplay. Julian Dibbell, My Tiny Life: Crime and Passion in a Virtual World 
(New York: Holt, 1998).  
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moments and medial embodiments in which virtuality is reflected. That is, following Mark 
Hansen, I understand virtuality in phenomenological terms, in the intersection between bodies 
and images or bodies and information; as these relationships are colored and inflected in the 
evolving mediascape of digital culture, I investigate a few of these texts, both for the ways in 
which they pass through the virtual in their representation of these relationships, as well as the 
ways they fail to do so.  
 In artistic practice, ‘render’ connotes expression or representation, while in CG imaging 
‘render’ refers to the process of making a wireframe model appear solid and dimensional; more 
generally the term means ‘to cause to be or become, to make’.9 Virtuality is not a thing, nor is it 
simply a state of mind, but, as I explicate in the following section, can be understood as a 
relation between perceiving bodies and the material world. Intervening in this relation are those 
instruments that incorporate a perceptual mode with a material object – a photograph, for 
instance, or panoramic painting, or a virtual environment encountered through a computer 
(although these forms do not ‘picture’ the virtual as such). These encounters may generate an 
affective or cognitive dissonance that troubles, if only obliquely and ephemerally, the ontological 
status of both the perceiving body and the representational object. The virtual is not in what the 
picture shows, but in the relationship it embodies. I see it not as simply illusionistic, in the way 
that a naturalistic painting or photographic image looks ‘real’, or in the way that a viewer of a 
panorama or participant in a virtual world might feel like they are ‘there’; the virtual is 
deconstructive and disarticulating, challenging one’s sense of embodiment and the material 
world even as it is so integral to the fabric of our embodiment and materiality. That is to say that 
we are indeed virtual, but disavow it as a condition of lived reality; encountering the virtual is 
                                                
9 "render, v.". OED Online. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com (accessed July 07, 2012). 
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thus at the same time a revelation of certain actualities, and the threat of disintegration when it 
exposes too much. 
 Virtuality is not static or fixed, but contingent upon specific forms, unique instantiations, 
individual perceivers, cultural conditions, and, as I seek to explore in this study, an evolving 
topography of interstitial objects and medial spaces. ‘Rendering the virtual’ can be understood as 
the development and use of forms and objects by which the vectors between perception and 
materiality are redrawn, as well as my rhetorical attempt here to catch glimpses of the virtual as 
it flickers peripherally, always just out of sight. This dissertation is about our relation to digital 
images and information. I invoke the virtual as that which gives form, as abstract as it may be, to 
this relation, focusing on a digital culture that privileges the visual over the informational, and 
thus this study has much to do with the image. As images are divested of their traditional 
material substrates, our relation to them, as embodied beings in the material world, changes – as 
does our sense of the virtual. 
 Rendering the virtual, at least within the context of this dissertation, also necessitates a 
critical acknowledgement of the gendering of the virtual. As I attempt to locate intersections 
between the virtual as a relation and virtuality in representation, I find them most saliently in the 
experience and form of the body. Bodies are raced and gendered, and I explore the ways in 
which different kinds of bodies are positioned antithetically relative to the virtual, with male 
characters in avatar films opposed to and usually achieving some kind of victory over an 
encroaching virtuality, and female characters typically ensnared within it; I will argue, however, 
that the feminine position ultimately suggests a model for compatibility with the virtual, in 
contrast with the empty victories of male characters. 
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 I am interested in avatar films for their imbrication of images and bodies within the 
technological, cultural, and aesthetic registers of the digital. The phenomenological work of 
Mark Hansen situates the body as the primary means for ‘framing’ digital information for human 
experience. I attempt to integrate this emphasis on the body with a consideration of the 
movement of digital culture away from the machine and information aesthetics, toward screens 
and images. Another cinematic figure emerges in respect to image and embodiment, akin to the 
avatar in its process of one body controlling another and in a certain conflation of body and 
image, and that is the CG character. We have seen a number of these in recent years, from Jar Jar 
Binks and Gollum (in the Star Wars and Lord of the Rings series, respectively) to the advances 
recently made in James Cameron’s Avatar (2009) – which, as an avatar film as well, will be of 
special interest in this study. In certain respects the digital avatar and CG character go hand in 
hand; in viewing documentary footage of Avatar’s production, for instance, one gets a definite 
sense of the motion-capture stage as an enormous videogame apparatus with human controllers. 
However, in film CG characters and avatars tend to be inverted: whereas the avatar is most often 
a body (the actor’s) playing an image (the avatar, the double), with the CG character an image 
(the effect on the screen) plays a body (a character, the movements of the actor). I use the terms 
‘body’ and ‘image’ a bit loosely here to give a sense of the difference between avatar and CG 
character in film, but my project is ultimately to draw body and image together, and these two 
figures  these ‘image bodies’, are a means to this end.  
 While image bodies, for the purposes of this project, denote avatars and CG characters 
specifically, the juxtaposition of these two potent and laden terms produces resonances far in 
excess of anything this dissertation could encompass. I can only hope here to piggyback on some 
of the tensions this dyad generates as I draw from the greater discursive flows amidst which this 
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study is set. I do intend allusions to the disappearing ‘body’ of film, as digital imaging practices 
have altered filmmaking and other imaging practices, as well as to the ways in which we 
experience embodiment increasingly in terms of images – not just specific images, but, as I hope 
to show, within a more abstract sense of ‘imageness’, extracted by the digital, luminescing with 
virtuality. With the second part of my title, ‘avatar ontologies’, I intend to explore the situation 
of avatars relative to their users, as bodies in service of other bodies, as well as the inflection of 
the avatar on our own ontology – in the ways in which we have also become avatarial. 
 
The Avatar as Theoretical Model 
I became interested in avatar-themed films when five of them, along with a television 
series, were released in 2009, a clear trend in the mainstreaming of the avatar I was already 
exploring in Second Life. This cycle of films treated avatarism from a variety of perspectives: 
Surrogates (Jonathan Mostow) contemplates a society living vicariously through robots; Gamer 
(Mark Neveldine and Brian Taylor) bleakly imposes virtual sex and videogame violence on real 
bodies, while exploiting their cinematic elements; Sleep Dealer (Alex Rivera) explores 
immigrant labor and the Mexican-American border through the lens of virtuality; and Avatar 
situates race and environmental concerns within a dialectic of photographic and digital imagery. 
An anime film, Summer Wars (Mamoru Hosada), juxtaposes family and the household with an 
all-consuming virtual environment, and the SyFy drama Caprica drew connections between 
virtuality, religion, and robotics, making 2009 seemingly the year of the avatar in popular 
media.10   
                                                
10 Sleep Dealer, an independent film, debuted at the 2008 Sundance Film Festival but was released commercially in 
April 2009. The Caprica pilot first aired the same month, with the series following in January 2010 (on what had by 
then become the SyFy channel). 
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 This recent influx begs a return to the avatar as a subject of study, and particularly as a 
prominent figure within digital culture. Prior treatments of avatars in film have lumped them in 
with works on cyborgs, where the avatar is at best a subset. This is perhaps to be expected, as 
book-length publications on cyborgs in film trailed off as avatars began appearing in cinema and 
other media more frequently; over a dozen avatar films have been released, for instance, since 
the 1996 publication of Claudia Springer’s Electronic Eros. Springer’s work addresses the 
seminal avatar film The Lawnmower Man (1992, Brett Leonard), as well as the literary work of 
cyberpunk pioneer William Gibson, within a larger framework of eroticism and gender in 
cyborg-themed media. A later work, Sue Short’s Cyborg Cinema and Contemporary Subjectivity 
from 2005, has served provisionally as the last word on the subject, coalescing the numerous 
theoretical approaches that have been applied to the cyborg, as well as filling in a few gaping 
holes in its treatment. Avatars remain largely absent, however (not even warranting an entry in 
the index), while Short has little to say about The Lawnmower Man and David Cronenberg’s 
avatar thriller eXistenZ (1999), nothing about Avalon or the mind-bending The Thirteenth Floor 
(1999, Josef Rusnak), and bears only ill sentiment for The Matrix (1999, Andy and Larry 
Wachowski).11 Not only have avatars been underrepresented, then, but I further question whether 
the subsumption of the avatar within the cyborg model adequately addresses its unique qualities.  
 Although to some extent avatars began drifting off scholarly radar screens at the turn of 
the millennium, avatar use as we are familiar with it today was was just about to explode.12 
Sony’s PlayStation 2, the best-selling console to date, was released in 2000, while Second Life 
launched in 2003 and World of Warcraft the following year. Venues for avatar use have 
                                                
11 This brief list makes clear that 1999 was another year of particular popularity for avatars (unnoticed by Short), 
with a fourth installment, the soft-core Sexual Matrix (Udo Blass) completing the picture. 
12 Following a surge of critical attention in the nineties, avatars (as well as cyborgs) became less frequent topics in 
the following decade. 
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proliferated, with dozens of variations on social and gaming platforms boasting millions of users 
(ten million alone in World of Warcraft). Many of these users are producing avatar-themed 
media, including popular web series The Guild created by avid gamer Felicia Day in 2007, as 
well as thousands of machinima videos that not only use avatars in their production, but 
frequently address issues surrounding online interaction in virtual environments.13 Recent 
cinematic treatment of avatars has emerged out of this surge in use and the exponential growth of 
videogaming, and while social science research in the area of avatar use has mushroomed, 
scholarly attention to avatars in film has been slow to catch up; my project here addresses the 
underserved phenomenon of cinematic avatars, and explores the implications of their recent 
appearances. 
 As such, we must consider the usefulness of the avatar as a theoretical model. The 
potency of the cyborg as a figure for study has been attributable to its cultural relevance as well 
as its broad applicability across real-world and fictional forms. I suggest that, like the cyborg, the 
avatar can be a useful model for thinking through issues of subjectivity, but one particularly 
apropos of an image culture concerned with virtuality and materiality. 
The figure of the cyborg functions on multiple planes, and thus the cyborg as a theoretical 
entity, like the cyborg body, exists in tension with itself. The cyborg is a conceptual image and 
subject of representation, well known from films such as The Terminator (1984, James 
Cameron) and RoboCop (1987, Paul Verhoeven); an object for theoretical consideration of 
postwar subjectivity, aligned with feminism by writers such as Donna Haraway; and a term 
applied to certain bodies in social reality, from people with mechanical implants and prostheses 
                                                
13 Machinima – a neologism from ‘machine’ and ‘cinema’ – refers to movies made with game engines, at first 
employing the avatars and sets of a game for purposes not intended by designers and then editing captured scenes 
into a narrative or demo, or hacking the game engine to create new materials in order to realize creative vision. 
Initially machinima was viewed by the industry as inapt or subversive, but distributors soon catered to players’ 
insistence on greater control for both game design and machinima opportunities; games like The Sims now include 
machinima features as part of the software. 
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to workers within Fordist systems of production, incorporating also the possibility that we, as 
members of industrial societies, are cyborg by virtue of our heavy reliance on machines and 
technology.   
 The term ‘cyborg’, short for ‘cybernetic organism’, was coined in papers by Manfred 
Clynes and Nathan Kline in 1960, speculating on the possibilities of self-regulating human-
machine systems for space travel, but visions of human-machine hybridity in literary fiction are 
older, concomitant with the rise of industrialism that provides the basis for later representations 
in film.14 These representations have foregrounded the machine, often in the context of 
masculinity and domination; however, the cyborg as theoretical construct is generally antithetical 
to the masculine and the implicit subjectivity of the liberal human, privileging instead 
fragmentation, multiplicity, miscegenation, transgression, and the disruption of cultural binaries. 
 In its etymology, ‘avatar’ is a threshold word. The Sanskrit root tarati denotes a ‘crossing 
over’ through descent, a transcending of the ether that separates the heavens and the earth – or, in 
new media jargon, something along the lines of telepresence. More correctly translated 
‘appearance’ rather than ‘incarnation’, the term denotes the physical but leaves room for the 
spectral. Vishnu is the deity most associated with avatars in Hinduism, and though frequently 
represented iconographically as embodied, Vishnu is described in scripture as being omnipresent 
and shapeless; therefore his avatars – fish, boar, priest, sage, and innumerable others – are the 
bodies assumed by his bodiless form, which, as a collective of alts, so to speak, comprise the 
‘body’ of Vishnu. Thus the avatar in Hindu mythology is not merely a disguise, as we find in the 
                                                
14 Examples of the work of Clynes and Kline can be found in Chris Hables Gray, ed., The Cyborg Handbook (New 
York: Routledge, 1995). Older instances of cyborgs in literature include Edgar Allan Poe’s short story of a man with 
extensive prostheses, “The Man That Was Used Up” (1843) and C. L. Moore’s “No Woman Born” (1944) in which 
a woman’s brain is placed in a mechanical body. 
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godly machinations in Greek mythology; through avatars is Vishnu made manifest, and through 
these bodies is the unknowable known, the invisible seen. 
 An avatar in computer use is the graphical representation of a user in computer or online 
space. In its contemporary function the term was first used by Chip Morningstar and Randy 
Farmer for the graphical virtual world Habitat in 1985 and further popularized in Neal 
Stephenson’s cyberpunk novel Snow Crash, published in1992. Like ‘virtual’, ‘avatar’ is another 
term that has been used rather loosely, referring to chat icons, MUD characters, blips, ships, and 
cartoon characters in videogames, and even screen names. To my mind, however, the term is 
best suited for those representations that are closer to the historical and mythological 
implications of the term, by which a measure of essential being (or at least some expression of 
personality) is manifest in a figure whose representative and simulative embodiment engenders 
certain types of identifications and social interactions – i.e. closer to the way one approaches a 
body rather than a picture.  
 This view is consonant with the historical development of the term in contemporary use, 
as it was first used to refer to graphical, human figures in a shared environment. While the 
graphics in Habitat were subpar, lagging behind videogames at the time (in order to 
accommodate sluggish network speeds), presence was attached to a user-defined visible body, 
and the body in turn benefited from a measure of ‘depth’ that resulted from the combination of 
imagistic forms that concealed their technological structure, (bodily) movement in response to 
user commands, and the temporal ‘liveness’ of presence in shared virtual space. While by this 
definition single-player videogames technically don’t include ‘avatars’ (the term ‘player 
character’ is frequently used in gaming), the high degree of immersion produced by sophisticated 
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technologies in contemporary games, as well as the realistic bodies and, increasingly, the 
potential for networked play and personalized avatars, encourage me to include such usage here. 
 Avatars are a significant part of social reality, as well as subjects of representation, 
appearing in a number of films and other media texts, and objects with which to think through 
contemporary subjectivity. While cyborgs are certainly part of the information age, avatars 
specifically connect cyborg subjectivity to virtuality, in which information takes on new bodies, 
moves in images, and changes the face of the hardware in which it is instantiated. The avatar in 
terms of the cyborg might be thought of as the cyborg of screen or image culture, but this implies 
a very different kind of cyborg; while it is essential to carry forward issues relating to the cyborg 
in any consideration of the avatar, I avoid seeing the avatar as simply a modified cyborg and 
instead inquire as to what the avatar as an idiosyncratic entity can bring to some of the same 
issues of embodiment that the cyborg once spoke to with more frequency. 
 The body of films I focus on are distinguished not only from cyborg films but also from 
other films dealing with computers and virtual reality. In fact, a number of the avatar films I take 
as my subjects do not diegetically include virtual environments, and when they do they are more 
often depicted cinematically (through metaphor and representation) rather than digitally (with a 
clear digital or informational aesthetic).15 A key criterion that distinguishes avatar films for my 
purposes is dualism and avatarial embodiment – films with characters that exist across two 
                                                
15 An important distinction in avatar films can be drawn between those that use CG graphics extensively to 
differentiate bodies and spaces (such as Avatar), those that use them selectively (The Matrix), and those that don’t 
use them at all (Gamer); another distinction can be made between films with avatars in a digital virtual environment 
(The Lawnmower Man) or a ‘cinematic’ environment (using filmic devices to represent the virtual) (The Thirteenth 
Floor), or in which the environment is continuous for both user and avatar (Surrogates). These various modes for 
depicting an aspect of digital culture within cinematic conventions are as interesting for the ways they invoke the 
digital (through various kinds of effects or, as in Avatar, an extensive application of the digital to produce nature in 
excess) as they are for resisting it, ‘performing’ it analogically with the photographic image and the body of the 
actor. 
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bodies, mediated by an interface, or in which one character controls another as an avatar.16 The 
nature of these bodies, their modes of representation and performance, and the conditions of the 
interface are salient points in my explication of the cinematic avatar.   
 I believe that the avatar offers rich possibilities for new cyborg theorizations; I offer just 
a schematic overview here. A clear first step is the nature of the prosthesis. Avatars are 
sometimes theorized in terms of this key component of cyborgism, but prosthetics becomes a 
different matter when the replacement of the body or a body part, so eloquently explored in 
Vivian Sobchack’s phenomenology, or the technological extension of the human, as theorized by 
McLuhan, takes the form of a body. Avatars are not simply tools or appendages, nor are their 
feedback circuits limited to the utilitarian or proprioceptive, for they are at the same time mirrors 
and faces, image bodies distributed through virtual environments and social networks.   
 Oscillatory and contingent, avatars can be engaged and disengaged, in contrast with the 
close integration of the cyborg. RoboCop’s Murphy cannot extract himself from the robotic body 
which sustains his biological one, and in the end of the film must find a way to exist as a 
monstrous hybrid, a body in tension with itself. Avatars approach the self-difference of the 
cyborg with distance and separation, placing emphasis on agency within a world of media 
influences. In Surrogates, the thematic question implied is not whether we are able to 
discontinue mediated lifestyles, but whether we should. In Avatar, Jake’s trajectory toward 
becoming his own avatar is a way of refiguring diegetic distance as a function of technological 
distance – moving through the avatarial relation to complete the digital body. 
                                                
16 By this standard, the classic virtual reality film Tron doesn’t qualify, though it is an important precursor to the 
films I focus on here. At the same time, there are many other films that share similar qualities which I have borne in 
mind while researching avatar films, but which fall outside of my focus on works derived in at least some respect 
from avatar use, including: films in which a character appears in his or her own dream (no interface control); films, 
like The Manchurian Candidate, in which one character exerts significant control over another (a different kind of 
subjection); body-swapping films, in which two characters each inhabit the body of the other (embodiment is ‘mixed 
up’ but not dual); films with supernatural or surrealistic avatarial figures, such as Cesare in The Cabinet of Dr. 
Caligari (pawn rather than second self) or Tyler Durden in Fight Club (not a consciously controlled ‘body’); etc. 
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Interfaces, of both software and hardware varieties, are the technological gateways to a 
variety of bodies, and highly cinematic spaces as well. Images of the vascular interface in Sleep 
Dealer create a third space between the character’s life in a futuristic Tijuana and his telepresent 
labor on a construction site in California, a richly symbolic bridge between competing images. 
We also find many images of visual technologies couched simultaneously as experiential 
technology and immersive cinema, with implications of an embodiment extending beyond the 
body. Surrogates is typical of the valorization of the visual, as operators wear a light version of 
VR goggles, physical appearance is emphasized, and the eye of the surrogate becomes a key 
point of access to the user. In digital avatar use it is important to remember that the avatar is not 
just the body on the screen, but the embodiment of a connection between two materially 
dissimilar bodies. 
 The relation between reality and virtuality and the problem of disembodiment are central 
themes in avatar films. These issues remain salient topics in the theorization of avatars and 
virtual technologies, but in juxtaposing cinema and interactive media we find fruitful fields in the 
representations of real and virtual, embodiment and disembodiment. Notably, the sort of 
disembodiment envisioned by cyberpunk pioneer William Gibson never comes into play, as 
characters are not only re-embodied, but the new bodies tend to represent cinematic fulfillment: 
Neo (Keanu Reeves), for instance, doesn’t lose his body when he re-enters the Matrix, but 
realizes the cinematic fulfillment of his embodiment within the simulation. Also, reclamation of 
the real is often the objective of characters in avatar films, but in The Matrix, Surrogates, Avalon, 
and others, we find the films struggling to define the reality that is salvaged at the end of the 
film, particularly as the films themselves function as celebrations of their own exploration of the 
‘virtual’. 
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 The cyborg image instantiates material and ontological difference in a single body (in the 
integration of human and machine typically), whereas the avatar decouples the disparate 
elements of the cyborg, re-situating them within avatarial relations and a variety of interfaces. 
The avatar privileges dualism over hybridity, interconnection over miscegenation. While dyadic 
relationships can certainly be problematic, it seems that there is more than one way to interface 
bodies and images, as we can find in Elizabeth Grosz’s notion of ‘interimplication’, or Henri 
Bergson’s concept of multiplicity. Duality offers the potential for dialectic, and there exist 
opportunities for exploring synthesis in the Gemini (two linked together) that are unavailable in 
the chimera (one divided). 
 Donna Haraway’s conception of human-machine integration, drawn from the cold 
science of the body as machine and compelled by the defense machine of the Reagan era, sought 
to wrest the power of informational technologies away from their patriarchal origins, employing 
the machine as metaphor for identity as construct, a system that could incorporate flexibility. 
“The machine is us,” she writes, “our processes, an aspect of our embodiment.” The avatar as 
theoretical model owes much to Haraway and other insightful writing on cyborgs, but within the 
contemporary mediascape I see an evolution of form that reconfigures Haraway’s border war as 
medial interface. “We are responsible for boundaries,” she declares, “we are they” – which is as 
astute and concise a statement as exists within the canon of cyborg theory, for certain; but, 
thinking avatarially, this study asks what happens when we replace the boundary – the barrier, 
partition, frontier – with the medium.17 
 In other words, I see a key distinction between Haraway’s concept of the computer as 
machine and contemporary use of the computer as media device. As Katheryn Hayles 
                                                
17 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth 
Century,” in Sex/Machine: Readings in Culture, Gender, and Technology, ed. Patrick D. Hopkins (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1998), 462. 
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demonstrates, information has a body, is embodied – but bodies can take a variety of forms, and 
these forms have changed significantly in the last twenty years.18 While images of cyborgs have 
constituted a potent and provocative tradition, what I find so very compelling about the avatar is 
that it is a body in images, accompanied by an eschewal of the mechanistic in favor of the natural 
and imaginal, so that the technology of the avatar is hidden in its construct, absent from its 
appearance. In CG characters and representations of avatars – which are frequently associated 
with digital reproductions of nature – we find an inversion of the cinematic cyborg: rather than a 
photographic image of a technological being, a technological image of the naturalized body, as in 
Avatar and the CG-enhanced Surrogates, or in bodies playing images, as we find in Gamer and 
other avatar films.  
 
Strands of the ‘Virtual’ 
 
Our contemporary sense of the moving image has evolved from three interwoven strands 
of the virtual arts that engage with one another in uneven historical rhythms – 
photography and film, electronic imaging and transmission, and computational processes 
– and we need concepts that can bring these strands together while recognizing the 
complexity of their relationships and differences. 
D. N. Rodowick19 
 
In an essay on digital cinema, Garrett Stewart asks “Why are so many recent films, 
despite their obvious digital enhancement at the level of technique, concerned in their plots with 
a non-electronic virtuality?”20 Stewart sees parallel, if ultimately diverging, trends in the 
representation of virtuality in European and American filmmaking. On the European side, he 
finds tendencies in the use of coincidence, erotic telepathy, and an uncanny “couched in the 
                                                
18 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
19 D. N. Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 98. 
20 Garrett Stewart, “Cimnemonics versus Digitime.” in Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze’s Film Philosophy, ed. D. N. 
Rodowick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 328. 
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repeatedly elegiac dimension of the filmic medium’s self-conscious memory effects.”21 Such can 
be found in the 2008 suspense film The Broken (Sean Ellis), which begins with the evocative 
image of a mirror suddenly shattering during a dinner party for Gina’s (Lena Headey) family. 
Subsequently, she witnesses members of her family replaced systematically and violently by 
doppelgängers, and begins to realize she has one as well. Determined to confront her own double 
after a series of harrowing encounters, Gina enters the apartment that once was hers, only to 
discover that she herself is the doppelgänger, having killed the original Gina, but lost her 
memory of it in a car accident soon afterward. Following her initial shock, she slowly comes to 
terms with her ontological state, as we too must come to terms with our ‘mistaken’ identification  
with the sinister double. 
On the American side, Stewart finds an ‘ontological gothic’ in cinematic variations on 
electronic virtuality and the supernatural, and offers as an example the noirish The Thirteenth 
Floor, in which different temporal versions of a Los Angeles past (1937) and present (1990s) are 
nested within a virtual reality game in the future. In the film, Hall (Craig Bierko) is helping to 
develop a VR simulation of 1937 L.A. when he becomes caught up in a murder that he 
supposedly committed, and over the course of his investigation is led to question the reality of 
his world. On a tip, he drives to the outskirts of the city, where he finds the edge of the 
simulation that has comprised the world he thought was real. Hall, who had been controlling an 
avatar in the historical simulation, eventually discovers that he himself is an avatar in a larger 
simulation (the same truth Thomas Anderson discovers in The Matrix of the same year). 
Whereas ‘spectral others’ invade European films, notes Stewart, in recent American cinema 
                                                
21 Ibid., 327. 
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“heroes may turn out to be their own spectral others: either the digital figments of someone else’s 
computer program or already their own ghosts, deluded into thinking themselves still alive.”22 
These revelations can certainly be traced along the Baudrillardian philosophy that drives 
The Matrix, but Stewart points out a different aspect in the injection of distance into agentive 
experience and 
 
between perception and somatic engagement. Actors within a spectacle have been 
transformed into spectators of their own programmed actions, with a new premium thus 
placed on virtuality. In the aftermath of a character’s autonomous ‘I’, subjectivity is more 
commonly overseen than internalized.23  
 
 
The ontological gothic appears then to be an avatarial ontology, although the iterative avatar 
relations in the film imply something more than whether a character is simply an original or a 
copy, as the model of the avatar demonstrates how agency is never unilateral, but always a 
negotiation. If I am avatarial, the film seems to ask, then what do my actions mean, and for 
whom am I an avatar? When Hall drives out of the city and finds the end of cinematic reality (the 
landscape beyond the city is only a graphical wireframe model), he faces fundamental questions 
about the nature of reality when it is revealed to be a construction (Fig. 2). However, this 
problem might be more productively constituted as a question of what has allowed him to take 
the already constructed world and make it meaningful. 
As diegetic subjects (and the actors who play them) are observing themselves, audiences 
may not be entirely sure who they are watching, as a character turns out to be an avatar or 
appears across two or more bodies, or in the case of motion-capture CG characters, where the 
performance of the actor ends and the work of the animators begins. Both of these questions – 
the matter of the constructedness of representation within digital culture, and the question of 
                                                
22 Ibid., 328. 
23 Ibid., 336. 
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what or who we are seeing when we view digital media and its analog(ue)s in avatar films – have 
to do with virtuality, images, and bodies.  
 
 
 
  Figure 2. Hall finds the outskirts of the city not yet rendered 
 
 
The concept of virtuality is multifaceted, and the term ‘virtual’ has been used in 
numerous, disparate ways, which has made it somewhat of a slippery notion. In this dissertation I 
consider virtuality in three different senses: as referring to computer and technological 
apparatuses that produce dimensional digital images and immersive experience, as in virtual 
reality and virtual environments; in terms of representation, as images present and reflect various 
realities and exist as both objects and views; and as part of phenomenological experience, in 
which we (often intuitively and unconsciously) relate subjectively to images and their 
materiality, and the technologies that produce them. In a film like The Thirteenth Floor these 
three different uses converge, as digital virtuality is represented in a cinematic form, employing 
an iterative performance of the body to disrupt the sense of a cohesive and ascertainable relation 
between body and image, thus evoking a sense of the virtual.  
This convergence can be witnessed at the level of the body in Bierko’s performance of 
three (or perhaps four or five) different ‘characters’: the 1990s Hall, who turns out to be a 
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sentient artificial intelligence who is used as an avatar to perform a murder; Ferguson, the 1937 
character Hall plays in the historical simulation; David, the real world player in 2024 who 
manipulates Hall; David in Hall’s body during the murders and an attempted rape; and Hall in 
David’s body after David is killed in the simulation and Hall’s consciousness inhabits his body.  
Within these convolutions, virtual technologies are an integral part of the diegesis, although they 
are with a single exception represented cinematically rather than digitally. The film’s 
representational strategy is to interlink its various settings and temporal disjunctions through the 
iteration of the actor’s body, and at the same time obfuscating a clear sense of character. Hall is 
established to be only a construct, and one only intermittently appearing in a body, yet the film is 
not self-reflexive or distanciating and so any sense of disjunction is focused on questions of 
reality, and specifically in undermining the role of the body as a locus for selfhood. Also, as 
multiple characters and bodies appear in the form of Craig Bierko, the body of the actor is further 
produced as a redundant yet fluid image, so that at any one point in the film we do not simply see 
Bierko or a particular character, but must view his performance as an abstract multiplicity. In this 
respect, the relationship between body and image is challenged, and the virtual evoked. 
 In order to clearly distinguish between technological, representational, and 
phenomenological virtuality, I’ll address each below. It is important, however, to first 
acknowledge the negative connotations, in respect to material reality, with which virtuality has 
been saddled following an initial wave of enthusiasm about virtual technologies in the 1990s. 
The virtual is sometimes associated with absence, as in ‘not there’ or ‘not real’, or as insufficient 
or inadequate, as in ‘almost, but not quite’. The virtual has also been characterized as deceptive 
or even hallucinogenic, the appearance of a thing which is not only not there, but which never 
was a ‘thing’, in a space that never was a ‘there’. These associations must be distinguished from 
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the etymological roots of the term in potency and power, influence and moral virtue. Literally 
meaning ‘manliness’, with ‘man’ (vir) at its root, the virtual is measured in its effectuality or 
forcefulness – “in essence or effect, although not formally or actually,” but also “effective in 
respect of inherent natural qualities and powers.”24 The effect, in this case, supercedes the object, 
and in a certain sense becomes the object, which is the reason we can talk about ‘the virtual’. 
With virtual technologies, the missing object (physical reality) has been replaced by 
immersive graphics and computer interfaces, and the social interaction transacted through 
these.25 Rhetoric surrounding the immersive technology of virtual reality (VR) reflected a belief 
in the power of simulative technologies to produce experiences for users that would be as 
effectual as real-world experiences.26 Early evangelists  of VR, such as Jaron Lanier and Howard 
Rheingold, lauded the technology as world-changing through its effects on individual 
perceptions of reality. Lanier later clarified that this would not necessarily be effected through an 
escape from reality, but through the realignment of the perception of one’s reality after having 
experienced an alternative to it;27 however, this clarification was offered to counter the more 
                                                
24 "virtual, adj. (and n.)". OED Online. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com (accessed July 07, 2012). I 
address the gender bias of the term in Chapter 7. 
25 A note on terminology: there are many references in this dissertation to virtual reality, virtual environments, and 
virtual technologies, in which I use the conventional terminology. ‘Virtual reality’ (or VR) refers to computer-
simulated environments that engender a sense of immersion for the user, facilitated either through head-mounted 
displays or room-sized apparatuses. ‘Virtual environments’ are spaces derived from virtual reality environments but 
use home computers rather than immersive displays, typically emphasize shared online space in persistent worlds 
(generally for socializing, gaming, and building), and, most importantly for my purposes here, are accessed with 
avatars. While virtual environments include all sorts of communal online territory, from text-based MUDs to 2D 
graphical worlds and chat rooms, when I use the term here I am typically thinking of MMOs (massively-multiplayer 
online games) such as World of Warcraft and virtual worlds such as Second Life, as well as single-player 
videogames that employ avatars and 3D graphics. ‘Virtual technologies’ refers generally to software and hardware 
that produce virtual reality and virtual environments as both technological and cultural phenomena. 
26 As a general note, I use the adjective ‘simulative’ to refer to virtual technologies rather than calling them 
‘simulations’. In computational terms and other systematic language, a simulation is a model of something (e.g. of 
airplane controls and the physics of flight in a flight simulator). Virtual environments are more along the line of 
places in which human behavior plays out rather than models for observing or predicting such behavior; thus I use 
the adjectival form to emphasize the more general definition of ‘simulation’, as an imitation of appearance or 
character. For a discussion of virtual environments as places, see Richard Bartle, Designing Virtual Worlds 
(Indianapolis: New Riders, 2004). 
27 Jaron Lanier, You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012). 
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popular view among both enthusiasts and critics in which VR at its cultural height was generally 
discursively opposed to material reality. Cyberculture theorist Michael Heim suggested that “in 
VR the images are the realities. We interact with virtual entities, and we become an entity 
ourselves in the virtual environment. As in the medieval theory of transubstantiation, the symbol 
becomes the reality.”28Images become real, in other words, and users become virtual. William 
Gibson’s vision of cyberspace as put forth in his influential novel Neuromancer became 
archetypal, imagining total disembodied presence in the network. However, when VR, which 
was closely watched and upon which many projections and anxieties were pinned, failed to 
emerge from its clunkier stages and take hold as a popular technology, the potency of the term as 
a contemporary watchword diminished. As virtual worlds and videogames developed and their 
complexity and sophistication escalated, notions of virtual embodiment increasingly gave way to 
discussions of graphics, hardware, and gameplay, and avatars were foregrounded as the bodies to 
occupy the new immersive spaces that were cropping up in 3D videogames like Doom and 
virtual worlds like Alphaworld. Of course, VR and other virtual environments don’t produce 
virtuality as such, and, according to scholars like Anne Friedberg, their appropriation of the term 
‘virtual’ has distracted from its broader meaning, particularly as pertaining to other modes of 
representation. Friedberg has identified these particularly with nineteenth century entertainments 
such as the diarama and panorama, which offered a ‘virtual’ gaze and were predecessors to the 
virtual gaze of cinema. The virtual for Friedberg is to a large extent dependent on the immersive 
quality of the representative mode and its potential for seamlessness. This is a notion essential 
for its consideration of the way in which we receive cinematic images and stories as effectual, 
even as we know they’re not real; however, my understanding of the virtual differs somewhat in 
                                                
28 Michael, Heim. “The Design of Virtual Reality,” Body & Society, 1995, Vol. 1(3-4): 70. 
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that I understand its greatest potency to be found in that which cannot be represented or directly 
perceived. 
 
Cracks Between and Surfaces Around 
 In The Virtual Window, Friedberg works to correct what she perceives as a 
misunderstanding of the virtual and “reclaim its considerable utility for making distinctions 
about the ontological status – and the materiality versus the immateriality – of an object.”29 
Social theorist and philosopher Brian Massumi goes further, arguing that  
 
Nothing is more destructive for the thinking and imaging of the virtual than equating it 
with the digital. All arts and technologies . . . envelop the virtual, in one way or another. 
Digital technologies in fact have a remarkably weak connection the virtual, by virtue of 
the enormous power of their systematization of the possible.30  
 
 
Evoking Bergson’s concept of the possible and the virtual, Massumi situates virtual technologies 
(as a subset of the digital) oppositionally to the virtual because of the algorithmic logics that 
drive them. Bergson theorized the virtual in terms of an ontological unpredictability; the 
‘possible’ is that which a system is designed to produce, while the ‘virtual’ connotes 
unanticipated states outside of the possible. Because digital technologies are algorithmically 
based, they leave no room for the unexpected. However, we will see how human interaction with 
the digital opens up possibilities for engaging the virtual when we approach it in 
phenomenological terms – or, as Massumi puts it, through the ‘analog’. 
 The virtual isn’t inherent in the digital, but neither is it ‘contained’ in artworks or objects. 
A fundamental premise of this dissertation is that we, and the world in which we live, are always 
already virtual. Elizabeth Grosz, in her discussion of virtuality and architecture, writes “we did 
                                                
29 Anne Friedberg, The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 7. 
30 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
2002), 137.  
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not have to wait for the computer screen or the movie projector in order to enter virtual space; we 
have been living in its shadow more or less continually.”31 Anthropologist Tom Boellstorff 
asserts that “virtual worlds show us how, under our very noses, our ‘real’ lives have been 
‘virtual’ all along. It is in being virtual that we are human: since it is human ‘nature’ to 
experience life through the prism of culture, human being has always been virtual being.”32 In 
situating the virtual at the level of culture, Boellstorff points to the overarching role of culture 
and society in defining relationships between the self and the world, as well as between the self 
and one’s own body. And while he doesn’t use the term ‘virtual’, Foucault’s genealogies of 
power and knowledge theorize the cultural flows of discourse and the implications for the body 
‘inscribed’, in which the relationship between the perceiving self and the material world is 
shaped by various invisible and taken-for-granted societal forces.33 This relationship is also 
subject to the influences of commodity culture and “the domination of society by ‘intangible as 
well as tangible things’” as Debord puts it, “which reaches its absolute fulfillment in the 
spectacle, where the tangible world is replaced by a selection of images which exist above it, and 
which simultaneously impose themselves as the tangible par excellence.”34 I don’t mean to imply 
here that virtuality is ideological, but that ideological discourse shapes the particular forms that 
virtuality takes for various groups and individuals. The notion that we are virtual is an 
acknowledgement that we already exist in mediated relationships with ourselves and our world, 
and the nature of these relationships becomes crucial. 
                                                
31 Elizabeth Grosz, Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 
78. 
32 Tom Boellstorff, Coming of Age in Second Life: An Anthropologist Explores the Virtually Human (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 5. 
33 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 
1979). 
34 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black & Red, 1970), Thesis 36. 
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 One implication of commodity culture, as well as of digital culture, is that we have 
become ‘more’ virtual in the last century, in that post-industrial societies are subject to greater 
virtualization than developing countries. While, following Boellstorff, virtuality is an inherent 
condition of all humanity, manifest for instance in mythology and religion,35 the case can be 
made that the development of cinema, radio, and television, the proliferation of images and 
consumer products, and the ubiquity of computer technologies have only enhanced our 
propensity for mediated experience. Such is the basis for Baudrillard’s declaration that 
contemporary society has become a simulation, but again it seems a mistake to conflate the two, 
as a simulacral culture may certainly affect the interconnections between perceiving beings and 
the material world, but it does not constitute these connections.  
 The question then becomes one of access: how do we encounter and recognize the 
virtual? Understanding virtuality as medial, it is clear that the arts and media technologies will 
bear some relation to the virtual. Such is Friedberg’s approach when she locates the virtual 
within “the register of representation itself.”36 I have alluded to her theorization of a virtual gaze 
active in immersive works such as panoramas, and later cinema;37 however, it is necessary to 
draw a clearer distinction between representation and the virtual, for while art and electronic 
media can be instrumental in generating encounters with the virtual, they are not themselves 
virtual nor do they represent virtuality directly. Massumi writes: 
 
                                                
35 Religion, and particularly Christianity in Western culture, has for centuries exerted systemic doctrinal duality in 
its subjects, by which the material world and mortal existence became the ‘virtual reality’ to the invisible but 
definitive reality of God and heaven, and the true nature of the human was spirit – or the soul, that liminal 
connection between the spiritual and the profane flesh. This view of matter and the body was heavily indebted to the 
abstractions of Neoplatonic philosophy, but in fundamental ways affected adherents at the level of the body – often 
mortally.  
36 Friedberg, The Virtual Window, 8. 
37 Anne Friedberg, Window Shopping: Cinema and the Postmodern (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993). 
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The virtual, as such, is inaccessible to the senses. This does not, however, preclude 
figuring it, in the sense of constructing images of it. To the contrary, it requires a 
multiplication of images. The virtual that cannot be felt also cannot but be felt, in its 
effects. When expressions of its effects are multiplied, the virtual fleetingly appears. Its 
fleeting is in the cracks between and the surfaces around images.38  
 
 
The virtual is affective, oblique, and fugitive. In order for an image to approach the virtual, 
Massumi indicates that it must “twist and fold in on itself, to multiply itself internally” or 
approach the virtual “topologically,” by which one might arrive at “an overimage of images of 
self-varying deformation: a unity of continuous separation from self.”39 For me, the avatar and 
the CG character incorporate striking configurations of self-variance, and in an attempt to engage 
virtuality through these configurations, I approach them with an eye toward superimposition, in 
the overlaid strata of digital, perceptual, and material elements, and spatialization, in the 
distance-in-connection produced by the interface and inherent to the avatar. This approach to 
images and technological apparatuses in terms of their layers and interconnections evokes that 
what Grosz sees as “the embeddedness, the nesting or interimplication (perhaps another name for 
difference) of the virtual and the real within each other.”40 That is, virtuality is not a singular 
epistemological and experiential laminate over the material world, but virtual and real produce 
and construct one another and intermingle in nested layers of history, design, convention, and 
use, in addition to individual psychological and phenomenological experience. 
 The topography of the virtual, with its many points of connection to and tensions with 
materiality, is uneven terrain. Human perception and the material world are constantly roiling 
and shifting against one another, resulting in much ideological work to temper the restless 
correspondence between the two. The universalizing impulses of societal order and bodily 
                                                
38 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 133. 
39 Ibid., 133-4. 
40 Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, 89. 
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discipline, as well as the torrents of consumerism and the market, are sources of ideological 
production that deeply affect our relation to the world and our bodies. However, as mentioned 
above, the virtual is never homogeneous, but always contingent. The negotiation of embodiment 
and enculturation by individuals, in addition to the particular qualities of various media and the 
distinctiveness of an artwork, alter the experience of virtuality, or ‘virtualities’, as these 
relationships are defined and redefined.  
 In this vein, it has been argued that some people are more virtual than others. In her work 
on race in the internet, Lisa Nakamura contends that “people of color have always been 
postmodern (and by extension ‘virtual’)” in their decentered, fragmented, and marginalized 
cultural status.41 A similar sentiment relative to gender is expressed by Nigel Clark, who argues 
that “‘women’s bodies have always been postmodern’ [as they] have had a longer history of 
subjection to inscription by idealized images.”42 I don’t mean to conflate postmodernism and 
virtuality, but in considering the problematic relationship between women’s bodies, patriarchal 
mandates, and image culture, one might say that a stronger influence of virtuality is evident. 
However, a different sort of connection between women and virtuality can also be drawn through 
Haraway’s association of the cyborg with the feminine in order to demonstrate the 
constructedness of identity – but a constructedness which, when understood and harnessed, can 
yield great power. As I will show, representations of virtuality regularly make use of raced and 
feminine bodies; on the surface, this results in marginalization, but depictions of women and 
black men relative to the virtual can also be understood in terms of the force or effectuality that 
the virtual implies.  
                                                
41 Lisa Nakamura, Cybertypes: Race, Ethnicity and Identity on the Internet (New York: Routledge, 2002), xv. 
42 Nigel Clark,  “Rear-View Mirrorshades: The Recursive Generation of the Cyberbody,” Body & Society, 1995, 
Vol. 1(3-4):117 (quoting Arthur and Marilouise Kroker). 
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 The indirect process of imaging the virtual, as outlined by Massumi, must be 
distinguished from the practice of representing the virtual, as we see for instance in The 
Thirteenth Floor, where virtual technologies are depicted and alluded to, and the cinematic 
representation summons the virtual in its presentation of both an object and a view, but the 
virtual is encountered indirectly, through the phenomenological encounter with the Bierko 
multiplicity. One may touch upon the virtual in the process of forming an image (Massumi 
suggests that “imagination is the mode of thought most precisely suited to differentiating the 
vagueness of the virtual”),43 with heightened awareness of the relation between perception and 
the physical world, but once the image is fixed temporally and materially, its relation to the 
virtual is much more difficult to grasp. Friedberg states that the virtual marks a “secondary order 
in the relationship between the real and its copy, the original and its reproduction, the image and 
its likeness.”44 While I am wary of placing the virtual too firmly within modes of representation, 
as noted above, I find useful her elucidation of the interstitial nature of the virtual. Friedberg 
refers to it as “a second-order materiality, liminally immaterial,” and evokes Bergson’s 
association of the virtual with perception, the images by which the material world is produced 
phenomenologically: “Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of ‘images’,” writes Bergson, “and by 
‘image’ we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a 
representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing – an existence placed half-way 
between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation.’”45 For Bergson, the image is in the beholder as a 
virtual instantiation; for Friedberg, certain images and technologies produce the virtual, as 
measured in the form of engagement they provide (as in virtual travel and virtual windows). 
                                                
43 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 134. 
44 Friedberg, The Virtual Window, 8. 
45 Ibid., 11. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (New York: Cosimo, 2007). 
 33 
 My approach lies somewhere between, but I rely on both. Friedberg’s emphasis on the 
propensity for certain images and technological forms to converge with the virtual initiates a 
broader discussion of cinematic images in the era of digital effects, but at the same time these 
forms must be situated relative to embodied observers. The virtual cannot be captured or fixed in 
an image, but, in my view, is encountered in the moment of engagement and within the 
conditions of viewership or use. With these diverging (but ultimately complementary) views in 
mind, we can here briefly address a variation on the virtual that pertains to this study – the 
‘virtual image’. 
 
Virtual Images, Embodied Frames 
 A term Friedberg locates in nineteenth century studies of optics, ‘virtual images’ are 
images with no fixed material substrate, e.g. reflected in mirrors, produced in the mind, or 
registering on the retina. This is not to say that these images are divorced from materiality, as 
they are reliant upon eye, brain, and mirror, but they are ephemeral, existing only in the moment 
of their creation. To these we find a contemporary parallel in Manovich’s study of radar blips, 
which he extends to real-time televisual and computer-mediated images; his pronouncement that 
“the image, in a traditional sense, no longer exists!” refers to a culture in which real-time images 
on screens have supplanted images in physical media.46 Real-time or virtual images become 
ways of thinking about the materiality of images as we now frequently encounter them on 
television monitors and computer displays. However, Manovich’s assertion underscores the 
importance of materiality in our engagement with images – indeed, reiterating the fact that 
images never simply float above their material supports or are independent of them, but when the 
material substrate of an image has changed, it is no longer the same image (it is ‘pictured’ 
                                                
46 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 100. 
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differently); when the substrate fixing the image has disappeared, it is, for Manovich, no longer 
an ‘image’.  
 I address images and their materiality here because, within the context of this 
dissertation, I understand virtuality in terms of the shifting relationships between bodies and 
images. A film like The Thirteenth Floor is interesting to me from the standpoint of the virtual 
not for its digital content or complex imagery – in fact its images are cinematically quite 
conventional – but for the way it evokes the digital, in both its abstraction as an informational 
technology and its intimacy with human experience, through the film’s manipulation of what or 
who we ‘see’ when we view Bierko in the film. CG imagery, on the other hand, tends to be 
employed obviously and bluntly in the overuse of its capacity to show, but while it often lacks 
nuance, it touches the virtual when it invokes the cognitive dissonance whereby we question 
what it is exactly that we are ‘seeing’, and in the way in which these images are processed 
simultaneously (if subtly) as both data and pictures.   
 W. J. T. Mitchell points out what has become clear in the proliferation of digital imagery: 
the image is already ‘virtual’, that which “can be lifted off the picture, transferred to another 
medium, translated into a verbal ekphrasis, or protected by copyright law.” He gives perhaps the 
most succinct summation of the immateriality of images in noting that “you can hang a picture, 
but you cannot hang an image.” A picture is the material instantiation of an image, which in 
comparison is “phantasmatic, virtual, or spectral.”47 Thus while pictures exist in the material 
world, Mitchell situates images within the plane of the virtual  – an aspect that becomes 
increasingly apparent as images are losing their material substrates, and must temporarily borrow 
those of the devices upon which they appear. 
                                                
47 Mitchell, W. J. T., What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 85. 
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 The ethereal qualities of the image that Mitchell suggests here can be contextualized 
within our fascination and experiences with images. With the shifts toward digital production 
and dissemination of images, fascination and experience must accommodate the 
dematerialization (eminently transferable and modifiable images displayed on screens) and 
redoubled materialization (the necessity and material presence of hardware for viewing images 
that proliferate across devices rather than on paper media) that characterize contemporary digital 
imagery. Both the de- and re-materialization lend themselves to a certain fantasy, of the image in 
its ‘imageness’ unfettered from the fixity of a medium, and of the technological capacity to exert 
power over the image – to affect the means by which one has been or might be affected, to 
subject the image to the medium (the computer), and perhaps to rein in its ‘surplus value’, as 
Mitchell puts it. “Everyone knows that images are, unfortunately, too valuable, and that is why 
they need to be put down.”48 Digital imagery thus might be said to offer different fascinations, 
simultaneously allowing the production and destruction of the ‘imageness’ of the image.  
 What must be made clear here is the tricky materiality of the digital image, for it not only 
comes into play literally (and effusively) in films like Avatar, but it is in many ways the 
capacities of the digital to which avatar films allude when they (often non-digitally) depict the 
virtual. On the one hand, the ‘image’ is for Mitchell an immaterial element, which must be 
instantiated in some material substrate in order to be a ‘picture’.49 And, as Freidberg writes, even 
a virtual image “begins to have its own liminal materiality, even if it is on a different ontological 
order.”50 Rodowick questions the presence of an image at all, suggesting that “through digital 
screens our relation is not to an image, but to function or force – that of control and the 
                                                
48 Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?, 76. 
49 This of course is complicated by the ekphrasis, which necessarily produces an interpretation or mental image 
based on the object of description. 
50 Friedberg, Virtual Window, 9; 
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management of information” – an interesting notion, given that virtuality etymologically relies 
on forcefulness rather than physicality.51  
 Digital images borrow their ‘liminal’ materiality from the objects that produce or display 
them. As in the science of optics, these images are associated with the instrument that 
provisionally generates or presents them, whether mirror, eye, television, or computer, rather 
than the medium in which they are fixed. Our contact with the image, should we wish to touch it 
(or, as Mitchell suggests, kiss it) becomes contact with the instrument – and indeed, 
contemporary devices and computers have been redefined as media machines that produce 
images, as well as aesthetically pleasing objects that make the machines a distinct and yet 
seamless part of the images they display and objects of touch by which images are selected, 
swiped, zoomed, edited, and even created.52 By Mitchell’s reasoning, a clarification of Manovich 
is necessary: it is pictures that are disappearing, rather than images – and in fact, we seem to be, 
more than ever before, in an era of the image. 
 The digital image is also material in another way, in that while it seems ephemeral, it of 
course must be preserved in a physical substrate, such as in magnetic alignments on a hard drive 
or molecular nubs on a flash drive – which at their base levels are physical rather than 
numerical.53 However, our contact with these instantiations is very different from that of analog 
media, and thus the paradox we face with digital media is that they are material, but not in a way 
in which they can be materially accessed by humans; they are displayed on physical hardware, 
from which they borrow a certain materiality, but there is no fixed relation between the two; and 
at the same time, they bear an ontological resemblance to Mitchell’s definition of an image, yet 
                                                
51 Rodowick, Virtual Life of Film, 141. 
52 A key difference between televisual and digital images is that the digital images can be manipulated, and 
especially without contacting a physical medium (there is no originating videotape). At the same time, there is 
increasing emphasis on touch -- contact with the device -- for the same purpose. 
53 Rodowick contends that “digital records may be printed, of course. But their ‘natural’ ontological state is to be 
manifested on electronic displays” – a theme I take up in Chapter 5. Rodowick, Virtual Life of Film, 135. 
 37 
they are not abstractions. My attempt to relate embodiment to the lost materiality or ‘body’ of the 
analog depends on these nuances, and even as I at a certain point move toward abstraction, or the 
‘imageness’ of the image, it is more out of an attempt to account phenomenologically for the 
ambiguity of digital materiality than to suggest that digital images are indeed disembodied. 
 A defining characteristic of digital culture is that it is also in many ways an image 
culture. In fact it is common for writers engaging new media to employ the terms ‘numerical’, 
‘informational’, and ‘binary’ rather than ‘digital’ when they want to refer to the mechanical 
aspects of digital technologies, as the digital is no longer associated exclusively with 
informational substrates. ‘Digital’ has come to connote the interactive, imagistic, and even 
affective engagement with computer information. This includes the graphical user interface 
(GUI), or practices of facilitating access to information through user friendly interfaces 
employing images, graphical iconography, conversational text, and the ubiquitous buttons that 
are more likely to be graphical rather than hardware elements. The GUI and its attendant 
hardware, the mouse, were fundamental to the development and proliferation of the personal 
computer in the eighties, where, along with videogames, the turn toward images and away from 
machine language and aesthetics was already visible.54 As processing and network speeds have 
increased, computers have developed into media devices, including their increasing use in image 
production and distribution, while digital elements in general have seemingly been integrated 
into almost every aspect of culture. An important aspect of digital culture, then, is the way in 
which computer information has been integrated with media production, graphical developments, 
and intuitive interfaces – a massive WYSIWYG (‘what you see is what you get’). 
                                                
54 A key moment in the transition was marked by Apple’s transluscent iMac G3 in 1998, which initiated the 
hardware as part of the aesthetics while at the same time shifting away from the magic of the box – the curtain 
pulled back, like the conjurer pushing up his sleeves – to the magic of the screen. 
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 To a significant extent, these developments help transform information into forms more 
compatible with human experience; however, disjunctures remain within, for instance, the 
ambiguous materiality of digital information, data intermingling with images in digital culture, 
and even the way in which the pace and spectacle of traditional media forms (such as 
advertising) have grown exponentially, fueled by developments in digital media. The body is not 
removed from the contemporary shifts toward information and images, but central to them. Here, 
then, I turn finally to the body and the essential role it plays, both conceptually and materially, in 
processing the data streams and image influx of digital culture.  
 Mark Hansen, drawing from media philosopher Pierre Lévy’s writings on virtualization 
and Bergson’s philosophy of images and virtuality, takes a phenomenological approach to 
informational technologies and embodiment. He argues against Deleuze’s ‘disembodying’ 
abstraction of the body as the center of indetermination – the process, as introduced by Bergson, 
by which the body isolates certain aspects of images to generate perceptions. In his theorization 
of the movement-image and the time-image, Deleuze moves away from Bergson’s emphasis on 
affect in its phenomenological sense, offering up instead a formal understanding of affectivity as 
a permutation of the image. Hansen’s aim is to restore the framing function of the human body: 
“to redeem Bergson’s embodied conception of the center of indetermination will ultimately 
require us to reverse the entire trajectory of Deleuze’s study, to move not from the body to the 
frame, but from the frame (back) to the body.” Thus any media content, including photographs, 
cinematic images, and video signals, requires consideration of the “historically contingent 
negotiation between technical capacities and the ongoing ‘evolution’ of embodied (human) 
perception.”55 As technology evolves, so does the capacity of human perception – not toward a 
                                                
55 Mark B. N. Hansen,  New Philosophy for New Media (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 8. 
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machine-like subjectivity, as implied by the cyborg, but requiring a greater investment of the 
body. As Hanson writes:  
When the body acts to enframe digital information – or, as I put it, to forge the digital 
image – what it frames is in effect itself: its own affectively experienced sensation of 
coming into contact with the digital. In this way, the act of enframing information can be 
said to ‘give body’ to digital data – to transform something that is unframed, 
disembodied, and formless into concrete embodied information intrinsically imbued with 
(human) meaning.56  
 
 
Hansen doesn’t explore avatars in his study, but to my mind the avatar is a salient figure at the 
intersection of multiple embodying processes. As an object of affective use and cultural 
signification, the avatar is well-situated for an examination of the digital through the virtual and 
the corporeal, although one that in contemporary scholarship has been overlooked for its 
theoretical potential in understanding an evolving digital culture. 
 In looking at the ways in which information is framed by the body, an awareness of the 
ways in which the body is already virtual is essential for a consideration of the possibilities for 
any engagement with virtuality on a phenomenological level. The term ‘embodiment’ has been 
used to connote the virtual dimension of having or being a body – not simply implying a 
connectedness between self and body, but in fact highlighting difference. “Embodiment never 
coincides exactly with ‘the body’,” writes Hayles, even though it is the only way in which the 
body can be known and experienced. ”Whereas the body is an idealized form that gestures 
toward a Platonic reality, embodiment is the specific instantiation generated from the noise of 
difference.”57 Because embodiment for Hayles is contingent and individual, there is “also at least 
an incipient tension between it and hegemonic cultural constructs. Embodiment is thus inherently 
destabilizing with respect to the body, for at any time this tension can widen into a perceived 
                                                
56 Ibid., 13. 
57 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 196. 
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disparity.”58 The body in this equation is what becomes ‘virtual’ as an inaccessible ‘reality’ that 
never appears except through its particular instantiations.59 Thus virtuality is primary in 
embodiment – in the tensions between body and self, in the multiple ways in which the body is 
experienced through and as images, and in regard to our interaction with images, media forms, 
and technologies by which connections within the complex network of embodiment are shifted, 
recombined, and transfigured. The avatar, as an image body connected to a human one within 
what might be thought of as a circuitous embodiment, becomes in many ways an ideal figure 
through which to think bodies, images, and virtuality. 
 
A Circuitous Method 
It was a sense of the uncanny that initiated my abiding interest in avatars. I began 
exploring Second Life as a curiosity but was soon captivated by what I can only describe as a 
perceptual refraction between avatar and user, with both simultaneously ‘present’ in different 
ways. I absorbed the ethnographic and anthropological research that is routinely conducted in 
Second Life, but found that these studies, while revealing much about behavior and community, 
failed to capture the perplexing nature of the avatar, as their typically iconoclastic aim was to 
break through the illusion on their way to engaging users. Returning to film theory gave me a 
basis for understanding virtual environments as imagistic, but as these were not traditional 
images a second theoretical move was required, and I brought in new media theory to 
contextualize the cinematic frame through which I was approaching Second Life. Such an 
approach accords with the rising influence of digital technologies in filmmaking practice and 
aesthetics, which has been addressed by several scholars carving out hybrid approaches to the 
                                                
58 Ibid., 197. 
59 On may notice a parallel here between this dichotomy of the ‘virtual’ body and ‘actual’ embodiment, and the 
inversion of materiality and digital virtuality in a virtual world, where the physical bodies of users occupy a position 
of off-screen abstractions while their avatars command a great deal of visual presence. 
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theorization of digital media; as I compared the perceptual and affective reaction I’d had with 
avatars to the CG creatures and characters that were appearing with more frequency in film, it 
became clear that these figures could comprise a productive secondary thread in my study. I 
found fertile ground as well in the analog performances of digital technologies in the avatar films 
as one way of exploring the ripples of digital culture.  
 While in Second Life I also developed an odd sympathy for the avatars, including a rather 
compassionate attitude toward my own; these were not simply icons or cartoon characters by 
which users oriented themselves in the game or environment, but in their design as richly 
detailed (if occasionally clunky) human figures they seem to have tipped over into a different 
plane of online interaction. I was regularly struck by what seemed to be an undeniable sense of 
presence in themselves – an aspect in tension with their basic function of designating the user’s 
presence.60 At the same time these were bodies used, thoroughly subject to control and 
manipulation. While this was often done carefully and even lovingly by users invested in their 
creations, the avatar itself became somewhat of a melancholy figure for me. In videogames, the 
icon or avatar is most often thought of in terms of the presence, agency, and force of the user 
within the environment, but it is important to note that the avatar is also the site of vulnerability; 
this aspect of vulnerability became quite pronounced for me, and shows up as well in avatar 
films such as Gamer, where sympathy for the avatar provides the (overdetermined) emotional 
spine of the film, and in others, like Surrogates, where the film’s commentary on the human 
condition has as much to do with bemoaning our avatarial state. 
                                                
60 This aspect is also especially noticeable in the many portraits users make and post of their avatars, as the avatarial 
connection does not persist through these comparatively fixed images, and since the pictures are typically designed 
to showcase the avatar in itself rather than in service of a user. Still, while abstracted from their users, avatars are 
able to appear as ‘themselves’, without their users these appearances are inevitably to some extent hollow. 
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 As I was never particularly social in Second Life, the imagistic world remained quite 
concrete at the level of illusion, with the ‘real’ world, the users, floating spectrally in a vast 
dispersion under the surface. The sense of inversion of the material and immaterial worlds was 
compelling, with the ‘immaterial’ world manifest in bodies of avatars and the physics of the 
environment, and the ‘material’ world present only ‘virtually’ through the creations and actions 
of the users. I sought for a way to study the virtual environment that preserved the sense of 
uncanniness and traces of virtuality, as it is in these qualities that I found its phenomenological 
potency. As this was a quality but not a text, however, shifting my emphasis to media 
representations of the avatar provided material for substantive study that reflected back on the 
virtual environment, as well as helping to develop the theoretical aspects of the avatar. 
 These avatar texts are mostly films, but I also analyze television and web series, as well 
as interfaces and some general aspects of avatar use. As we are part of a convergence culture in 
which different media forms bleed into one another, clear distinctions between them are no 
longer possible – or necessarily desirable, as disciplinary rigidity can obstruct comprehensive 
analysis for the particular material I take as my subject. Indeed, avatar films are inherently 
convergent, with cinema appropriating new media forms in what might be thought of as 
mythologies of interactive media – or what Paul Young calls ‘media fantasy films’, referring to 
those texts by which cinema recontextualizes other media within classical Hollywood 
paradigms.61 At the same time, virtual environments and the non-filmic texts that I explore draw 
heavily from cinematic convention in their strategies of visualization and narration – in the web 
series Molotov Alva and His Search for the Creator (2008, Douglas Gayeton), to take a literal 
example, the protagonist is a filmmaker in Second Life. Like the cyborg in tension with itself, 
                                                
61 Paul Young, The Cinema Dreams its Rivals, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). 
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the avatar incorporates several dualisms; my transmedia approach attempts to interface between 
these by considering the avatar’s many manifestations. 
 This dissertation is indebted to a number of theorists who have approached cinema from a 
new media perspective and vice versa. Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin laid important 
groundwork in Remediation: Understanding New Media, a comprehensive treatment of new 
media as appropriating pre-existing media forms and language. The authors situate film texts 
such as the avatarial Strange Days (1995, Kathryn Bigelow) as a film darkly appropriating the 
subjective view of the FPS (first-person shooter) and its techniques for moving through space 
originally acquired from cinema. This cross-media exchange is part of a discourse in which each 
recasts the other according to its own logic. Bolter and Grusin’s definition of the double logic of 
remediation informs my accentuation of the avatar as a medial figure. Demonstrating that a 
remediative culture works to simultaneously multiply its media and erase the appearance of 
mediation, the authors lay out a defining paradox of contemporary media that speaks directly to 
phenomenological engagement and the knotty questions of materiality. 
 Manovich’s comprehensive work The Language of New Media is more specific in its 
address of new media antecedents, drawing an agonistic line from Vertov’s Man With a Movie 
Camera (1929) through practices of interactivity and visualization in computer media. Manovich 
hangs his argument on the enduring influence of the cinema, arguing that “cinematic ways of 
seeing the world, of structuring time, of narrating a story, of linking one experience to the next, 
have become the basic means by which computer users access and interact with all cultural 
data.”62 Cinema, for Manovich, is in a certain sense double, serving as both the classical 
theatrical model which new media subvert and the broader ‘cultural interface’ by which they 
repackage data for consumption. The latter assertion has sparked some resistance – Hansen, for 
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instance, criticizes it as ‘overdetermined’, disallowing the full spectrum of new media 
functionality by confining it to a cinematic paradigm – but to some extent at least Manovich’s 
view of the dual role of cinema in the contemporary mediascape accords with the view of other 
scholars, such as Rodowick, who argue that while film is disappearing, cinema persists in its 
visual language and narrative techniques.  
 If Manovich overreaches in imposing cinema as the dominant language of new media, he 
does point to an important element of digital culture in that an aesthetic of information has 
yielded to the primacy of the image. The design and function of digital technologies have 
steadily evolved to reflect and accommodate human experience, and thus while the body moves 
to the fore in framing digital information, the design of digital culture meets it with the image – 
the intersection at which the avatar is situated. Thus, in a final contrast with the cyborg model, 
we find in digital culture emphasis on the movement of technology toward the human sphere. 
That is, rather than humans modifying for synthesis with machines, it is the machines that are 
continuously modified for greater compatibility with humans, with data presented in images (and 
images increasingly computer-generated or modified), intuitive and haptic interfaces, and 
mobilized devices that personalize technology.63 The framing function of the body must then 
increasingly deal with images and personal devices in addition to data and machines. 
 With his ‘terminal identity’, Scott Bukatman uses science fiction and postmodernist 
theory to posit an information age subjectivity, alluding to both the ‘termination’ of the 
traditional subject and the new subjectivity formed at the television screen or computer terminal. 
His encyclopedic work, coursing through a range of media texts, arts, games, and graphical 
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to automobiles, has made it nearly invisible in its ubiquity. 
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works on its way to drawing out the theoretical implications of popular texts for contemporary 
subjectivity, provides something of a roadmap for my study. The ‘virtual subject’ he describes, 
well situated within cyborg and posthumanist constructs, is “a new subject capable of inhabiting 
the bewildering and disembodied space of the electronic environment,” and an important 
precursor for my delineation of avatar ontologies.64 The tension between the real and the digital 
embodied in the avatar is a forked path seeking the way to unity and wholeness within digital 
culture, whether that be through renunciation of virtual modes of being, or an acceptance of 
avatarial ontology through multiplicity. Many writings on the cyborg have dealt with these issues 
which I take up afresh with the avatar, and Bukatman’s handling of textual multiplicities 
facilitates my treatment of the ways in which the avatar presents itself as a means for finding 
unity or wholeness in and through digital culture. 
 I am also indebted to Vivian Sobchack’s eloquent essays on the philosophical aspects of 
the prosthesis and her phenomenological approach to film in Carnal Thoughts. Her sensorial, 
embodied approach to spectatorship has provided an invaluable framework for my 
conceptualization of the contingencies of virtuality. Steven Shaviro’s critique of the Lacanian 
model in film theory, The Cinematic Body, provides foundational elements for my use of, and 
departures from, the mirror stage. And Paul Young and Claudia Springer, whom I have 
mentioned above, have provided valuable insights that I use throughout this study. In particular, 
Young’s treatment of cinematic texts through which classical Hollywood refashioned its 
intermedia rivalries with radio, television, and the internet provided me with a conceptual 
framework for thinking about avatar films in the context of their function within cinematic 
tradition. 
                                                
64 Scott Bukatman, Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern Science Fiction (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1993), 118. 
 46 
The texts I analyze here are of the type, I feel, that Steven Shaviro calls ‘expressive’, or 
giving voice to contemporary experience in digital culture. “By the term expressive,” he writes, 
“I mean both symptomatic and productive.  These works are symptomatic, in that they provide 
indices of complex social processes. . . . But they are also productive, in the sense that they do 
not represent social processes, so much as they participate freely in these processes, and help to 
constitute them.”65 These films, while often far from being cinematic masterpieces, are important 
texts because of highly relevant discourses in which they participate. Many of these films have 
garnered little critical attention and beg further analysis, while others have been written about 
extensively, as we see in the academic fever sparked by Avatar or the several books written 
about the Matrix franchise. Notably, however, neither of the latter have been substantively 
addressed in terms of avatars (or at least, in the case of Avatar, not avatars in the contemporary 
sense), and thus these highly visible films warrant another look.66 Seeing these films from an 
avatarial perspective can be, I believe, a means for honing our understanding of the digital as it 
pertains to cinema and issues of embodiment. 
 
Organization 
 In this dissertation I move from the avatar body, masculinity, and cinematic death toward 
the image body, femininity, and digital vitality. I take as my point of departure the mirror phase, 
as theorized by Lacan, as his influential formulation is critical to my work for its doubling of the 
subject in its inception, and for the connection he postulated must be made between the body and 
its image in the formation of the self. I am less concerned with the specific psychoanalytical 
aspects of the mirror phase than I am with the configuration it suggests, for its obvious 
                                                
65 Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect (Winchester, UK: O-Books, 2010), 2. 
66 The Matrix has been approached from a gaming standpoint, but with a greater focus on the logic of the videogame 
rather than the body of the avatar.  
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implications for avatars and interfaces. In Chapter 1 I begin by situating the avatar relative to the 
psychoanalytic frameworks that determined how the one must be seen as two, before 
complicating these approaches with an analysis of three avatarial works that demonstrate the role 
of the half in constituting the double. Seeing the half and double not as imbalances but as integral 
parts of an avatarial gestalt is a first step in conceptualizing the distributed, interlinked 
embodiment this gestalt proposes. 
 Chapter 2 explores levels and hierarchies, depth and surface in avatar ‘bodies’, 
identifying points of connection and sites of ambiguity between material bodies and their 
imagistic counterparts. In a dissection of the avatar  I plumb the depths of its digital body and 
feel out the space of the interface apparatus, working toward a fuller understanding of what it 
means to be an ‘avatar’. The index serves as the point of departure, while gradations of distance 
from the index mark the status of the image body. 
 In Chapter 3 I trace the trend in avatar films of a masculine repulsion of virtuality and a 
crisis of agency when the male character is positioned as avatar rather than player. In this chapter 
I counter the myth of interactivity in gaming and analyze how it plays out along gender divisions 
in avatar films, and then further question how the film Gamer ‘plays’ its characters in an 
avatarial fashion. Chapter 4 takes mortality as its theme, as I conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
final scenes of the Matrix trilogy, focusing on Neo’s avatarial ascension and death and 
comparing his final act to the ‘death’ of film. In examining Neo as a layered complex, I suggest 
that he becomes the ‘One’ only through his multiplicity, by fully becoming an ‘avatar’. I further 
propose superimposition as a conceptual strategy for perceiving embodiment as overlapping 
‘images’ of the body, moving toward the supposed vitality of the digital (and the multilayered 
CG character) relative to the demise of the photographic body. 
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 Tracking Jake Sully’s (Sam Worthington) character trajectory in Avatar from disabled 
half to composited digital whole, in Chapter 5 I examine the contest between the photographic 
and the digital in Avatar, and Cameron’s use of the avatar as a device for linking audience 
sympathy with a CG protagonist and effecting his vision of a total digital cinema. To make the 
film work, Cameron must overcome an alterity of the digital that has precedents in animation, 
and so I also examine films that combine live action and animation in order to illuminate the 
hierarchy of image forms that renders animated characters as ‘natives’, cast as other to their 
photographic counterparts. Nativeness segues back into gender, and in the final chapter I look at 
the ways in which femininity has been positioned as being closer to the virtual, surveying the 
various roles given to female characters in avatar films, and how virtuality triangulates with the 
body and the image in defining and perpetuating a paradoxical discourse of the feminine as 
overly near the body and simultaneously abstracted from it. Women in these films (as well as a 
few raced men) are trapped in their own virtuality, but at the same time are the characters who 
are best able to navigate their respective virtual worlds. If indeed our own world is becoming 
more virtual (in that our relationships to images has become more and more integral to daily 
life), then what guides do we have for managing these relationships? 
 In the conclusion I make a final proposal: drawing from my arguments on embodiment, 
gestalt, and gender, I flip the model of femininity as incarcerated by virtuality and, reading 
against the grain, suggest that avatar films (generally inadvertently) posit the feminine as a 
model for navigating the virtual. I identify this as a medial position, one through which 
embodiment is perceived as a channel for the flow of the various psychological, 
phenomenological, and cultural aspects of which it is comprised. The tendency for many avatar 
films to grant their male protagonists victory over the encroachment of the virtual, allowing them 
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to preserve the physical body (by implication, substantively photographic) and reclaim agency, 
produce only empty ideological attempts to reify an idealized notion of wholeness. It is the 
women in these films who exist within an avatarial gestalt, and who are best equipped for 
navigating image culture and embodying the contradictions of a digital world.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE INCARNATION OF MYSELF 
 
 
A recent debate between internet pundits PJ Rey and Mr. Teacup on the nature of 
cyberspace relative to the real world was hashed out, quite appropriately, in cyberspace (to the 
extent that such a ‘space’ exists) on their blogs, with posts entitled respectively “There is No 
‘Cyberspace’” and “There is Only Cyberspace.”1 Rey’s argument took a stand against what he 
and his collaborators on the Cyborgology blog refer to as ‘digital dualism’, in which online space 
is falsely considered abstracted from reality. For Rey, there is no essential separation, as web 
pages and videogames are grounded in the material world temporally, socially, and 
economically; any experiential sense of immersion for the player in virtual space falls under 
what Rey refers to as ‘augmented reality’. In this view, online and computer interaction are 
merely another aspect of reality, and the concept of cyberspace as separate from reality is a 
bygone relic; augmented reality represents the contemporary understanding of our relation to 
virtual technologies.2 Indeed, Rey adds that in his view the qualifier ‘augmented’ is superfluous, 
as it implies more difference between cyberspace and the real world than exists, explaining that 
his use of it is due to the insufficiency of the already contested notion of ‘reality’ to absorb more 
ambiguity.  
Taking issue with Rey’s post, Teacup retorted with a Lacanian response in which he 
agreed that digital dualism is an erroneous belief, but not because cyberspace is ontologically 
continuous with the real and therefore does not exist; rather, Teacup argues from the opposite 
                                                
1 Mr. Teacup, “There is Only Cyberspace,” A Blog of Various Philosophical Reflections and Speculations (February 
3, 2012), http://www.mrteacup.org/post/there-is-only-cyberspace.html; PJ Rey, “There is No ‘Cyberspace’,” 
Cyborgology (February 1, 2012), http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2012/02/01/there-is-no-cyberspace/. 
2 Rey notes, significantly, that influential cyberspace visionary William Gibson has moved away from his seminal 
characterization of cyberspace as a space distinct from the real world, as this perception “no longer describes what’s 
happening.” 
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perspective, that “reality does not exist, there is only cyberspace.” According to Lacan, the Real 
cannot be encountered directly, and thus fantasy mediates our contact with the real world. 
Cyberspace becomes another example of the many fictions through which we perceive our lives, 
but Teacup grants particular weight to the internet as substantiating his metaphor. The ubiquity 
and social impact of online communication and information, in addition to the internet’s ability 
to encompass many other forms of fantasy, gives basis to Teacup’s rhetorical extension of the 
fundamental fantasy of the Lacanian Imaginary (the site of ideals, images, and desire) into the 
computer space that was once internalized in the network but has become increasingly 
externalized into social reality. 
 Rey and Teacup’s disagreement demonstrates a key consideration for contemporary 
subjectivity in the way that the real extends into the virtual, and the virtual guides the real. What 
is most pertinent in this debate is not who is right, but how the conversation can happen at all 
when we consider their use of the term ‘cyberspace’. Rey is talking about computer technologies, 
while Teacup alludes to psychic engagement with the world, and while these are two separate 
issues, their dichotomous ideas of cyberspace are not without a point of interection, in the 
phenomenological experience of online space and digital data. As extensive and penetrating as 
the internet is, it is not actual online space that fuels this debate, but the idea of what cyberspace 
means for everyday living, and this aspect evokes the virtual. 
 The virtual is not a rejection of or alternative to the material world, but a way of 
understanding how we exist within it, and this begins with the body. Teacup contextualizes this 
relationship within a Lacanian framework that challenges Rey’s cyborg approach while offering 
a provocative hypotheses relative to embodiment: 
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Our subjective self-consciousness feels like it has been grafted on, and sits in an uneasy 
relationship with the body. The phrase ‘we have always been cyborgs’ is often taken to 
mean that we have always had different technologies, that human-constructed objects 
have extended us in various ways. Lacan proposes a radical and disturbing cyborg 
hypothesis: the original, zero-level alien technology that has been artificially grafted on 
the body is the self. 
 
 
In this view, the body is always already in tension with the self. As Donna Haraway summarily 
puts it, “if the cyborg is anything at all, it is self-difference.”3 However, from a 
phenomenological standpoint, the stance taken by Teacup is problematic – if at the same time 
interesting for its technological bent. “Embodiment,” Vivian Sobchack writes, “is a radically 
material condition of human being that necessarily entails both the body and consciousness, 
objectivity and subjectivity, in an irreducible ensemble.”4 The embodied self is formed precisely 
through having and being a body, and thus the concept of a graft does indeed seem alien. 
However, Teacup’s Lacanian insight is in regard to the dissonance and even outright discord 
between self and body. Lacan situates this initially in the mirror stage, in which idealization and 
antipathy become wedged between self and an illusion of self that originates in two opposing 
impressions of the body. 
 The mirror holds a central place in Lacan’s theory of the formation of subjectivity, in 
which he conceptualizes a sort of ‘image body’, although not simply in the reflected image. In 
the mirror stage, the child “assumes an image,” seeing in its reflection an idealized body that 
appears whole relative to the fragmented body of still-developing motor skills he or she 
experiences subjectively.5 The reflection of the mother as the adult both idealized and existing in 
the real world completes the imago of what the child might become  as represented by the image. 
                                                
3 Donna Haraway, “The Actors are Cyborg, Nature is Coyote, and the Geography is Elsewhere: Postscript to 
‘Cyborgs at Large’,” in, Technoculture, Constance Penley and Andrew Ross, eds. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), 22. 
4 Vivian Sobchack, Carnal Thoughts, 4. 
5 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 2. 
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Although the child eventually leaves the mirror stage as he or she is inducted into the Symbolic 
order with the acquisition of language, the mirror stage remains with the subject as it typifies an 
essential libidinal relationship with the body image. Thus subjectivity is gained only through an 
encounter with a virtual counterpart while remaining irrevocably fissured as the result of an 
inability to overcome the differences between the material and image bodies. 
Self-difference in at least some form does indeed inhere in embodiment, as demonstrated 
in the models of mental processes and the brain produced in recent neuroscientific advances. 
Teacup’s concept of grafting accords to some extent with the school of thought that our 
mammalian brains evolved on top of a reptilian prototype that remains, and we are thus to some 
extent constantly in conflict with our evolutionary heritage. However, other recent thought has 
posited an advantage to self-difference, as in David Eagleman’s theory of the brain as a ‘team of 
rivals’ moderated by the conscious mind – an evolutionary development which allows for 
adaptation and complex decision-making. Eagleman paints a picture of consciousness as the tip 
of the iceberg as numerous subroutines perform the bulk of the labor in managing the body and 
interacting with the world. This organization is, for Eagleman, highly beneficial, as it allows the 
conscious mind to focus on a few managerial decisions, especially where the ‘rivals’ are at odds, 
rather than the immense work of coordinating muscle movement, processing the full range of 
sensorial stimuli, and even working through difficult problems, which largely occurs under the 
surface while the conscious mind ‘takes credit’ for a good idea.6 In a way this is not so different 
from Freud’s model of the mind as competing factions, the superego policing the id and the ego 
sustained in balance between the two. But whereas for Freud the repressed aspects of self – as if 
                                                
6 This has implications for agency as well, as Eagleman writes “people have little capacity to choose or explain their 
actions, motivations, and beliefs, and the captain’s wheel is steered by the unconscious brain, shaped by 
innumerable generations of evolutionary selection and a lifetime of experiences.” David Eagleman,. Incognito: The 
Secret Lives of the Brain (New York: Pantheon Books, 2011), 190. 
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a dark double lurking in dreams and childhood trauma – threatens the ego, for Eagleman human 
evolution and consciousness as we understand it depends on the mind opposed to itself in order 
to work through complex decisions. Transferring conscious processes to the unconscious mind is 
for Eagleman a healthy process, a move toward efficiency than repression. Acknowledging how 
small a role the conscious mind may play in cognition and behavior can yet be disconcerting, 
however.  
 There are other ways in which we are alien to ourselves as well. The interior of our 
bodies – muscles, organs, blood, etc. – is strange to us, alarming when it comes to the surface 
and foreign on a video monitor as viewed through a spectroscopic probe. Indeed, most of us 
encounter the inner workings of the body only through images, whether in educational materials 
or through medical imagery such as x-rays and MRI scans. Even our external bodies, and 
especially faces, are encountered largely through images as objective views of ourselves exist 
outside our field of vision. Photographs and home video become means for self-reflection – and 
increasingly for self-expression with the rise of social media – with the mirror, of course, 
operating as the basic technology for encountering the self externally. If we have an affinity for 
images, it is perhaps in part because we exist in images, and the model of the avatar suggests that 
we not only take pleasure in viewing them, but that this affinity extends into a certain level of 
identification.  
In the mirror stage, the reflected body becomes desirable for its apparent wholeness, and 
the state of fragmentation and longing for wholeness that emerge from the formation of 
subjectivity during the mirror stage produce an oscillatory self that moves between subjective 
consciousness and a symbolic, idealized other. Bob Rehak, in his psychoanalytic history of 
videogames, conceives of this other as a ‘living avatar’, for “if the mirror stage initiates a 
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lifelong split between self-as-observer and self-as-observed, and the video game exploits this 
structure, then, in one sense, we already exist in an avatarial relation to ourselves.”7 The 
popularity of videogames, he suggests, can be explained in part in the way they revisit the 
mirror, and even provide an interface to it. Turning off the game and breaking the avatarial 
connection allows the user to preserve a (false) sense of wholeness after having been subjectively 
sundered while playing the game. The avatar becomes the reflexive ideal, and indeed our 
videogame counterparts are frequently endowed with better moves and increased abilities, even 
if the novice player might encounter frustration in fully engaging these bodies.  
At the same time, the avatar should not be construed as simply an ideal, for gaming is a 
play of power relations – including the relationship between user and avatar. The pleasures of the 
avatar “seem amplified by the uncanny difference between reality and reflection: an alterity 
enabling players both to embrace the avatar as an ideal and to reject it as an inferior other.”8 
Videogame avatars, in their alterity, seem to invite sadism as the ontological distinction of the 
self-image forms an illicitness that must be symbolically punished, destroyed, or powered off, 
only to be resurrected again (and again).  
 Rehak’s application of Lacanian theory to videogames is insightful for problematizing 
discourses of entering cyberspace. Ultimately, however, Rehak’s analysis preserves the tension 
and need for identification that the mirror stage institutes. For Lacan, the condition of the mirror 
demands an either/or approach (which, as Rehak points out, becomes oscillatory), as the subject 
is torn between percieing self  as either this incomplete sensory experience or that illusion of 
completeness. Sherry Turkle, in her psychosocial work with players and avatars, analyzed player 
attempts to modulate between these positions, as her subjects created alter egos with whom to 
                                                
7 Bob Rehak, “Playing at Being: Psychoanalysis and the Avatar,” in The Video Game Theory Reader, eds. Mark J. 
P. Wolf and Bernard Perron (New York: Routledge, 2003), 123. 
8 Ibid., 107. 
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identify and which could be used to counter social alienation or negative self-image, or to 
explore aspects of self-difference through gender play, for instance. However, here as well the 
avatar is stuck in a circuit of fantasy and reality with the mirror used as a means to an end, 
seeking the gestalt that never fully materializes. For Turkle, success was dependent on achieving 
an altered self-image that persists once the computer is turned off; this proved elusive as avatar 
identity came to be seen as less intertwined with real world identity than originally thought. 
 The controlled experiments of Nick Yee and Jeremy Bailenson imported the device of the 
mirror into virtual space in order to measure behavioral change as a product of difference in 
avatarial appearance. In one experiment, a first-person user would encounter his or her 
‘reflection’ before engaging in a brief social interaction, followed by an interaction with another 
avatar. As might be expected, participants were more assertive and confident when their avatars 
were taller and more attractive, but Yee and Bailenson also highlighted the short duration in 
which subjects had encountered themselves with avatarial modifications, looking into the virtual 
mirror for only about a minute. The power of altered appearance on self-perception is evident, 
even when one knows the alteration is limited, and this experiment is interesting for its literal use 
of a mirror, even if Yee and Bailenson were only able to demonstrate its effects for short-term 
use.9 
 I have mentioned these examples of avatarial mirroring, through videogames, virtual 
worlds, and controlled experiments, to establish a sense of how avatars have been used and 
theorized relative to the Lacanian mirror. Each produces variations on using what might be 
thought of as the fragmentation intrinsic to the avatarial interface (a subjectively embodied self 
                                                
9 More recently VR interfaces and virtual environments have been used in therapy for PTSD, acrophobia (fear of 
heights), and other phobias and disorders. These uses are less concerned with social identity and more with 
immersion in controlled trauma-inducing scenarios. While the practice is still young, early results are positive. See 
Amanda Schaffer, “Not a Game: Simulation to Lessen War Trauma,” New York Times, August 28, 2007. 
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here, an objective image body there) to confront (through reenactment) the fragmentation 
postulated by Lacan in the mirror stage. I have noted ways in which they seem not to achieve 
their implicit or stated aims of producing and sustaining some sort of idealized gestalt, but I am 
less concerned here with their effectuality than I am with addressing the gestalts they suggest. 
For Rehak, the psychology of videogaming falls squarely within a Lacanian definition of 
fragmented subjectivity, while in the experiments conducted by Turkle, Yee, and Bailenson, 
success was dependent on its persistence outside of the fragmentation of the interface. My aim in 
this dissertation is to draw out, through the lens of contemporary new media theory and an 
analysis of media texts that situate avatars and virtuality within digital culture, a 
reconceptualization of the gestalt from Lacan’s use of the mirror in his theorization of 
subjectivity that posits a relation between body and image.  
 An important aspect of these media texts is the way they position virtuality relative to the 
‘real’. The avatar film Surrogates offers an iconoclastic reaction to what it presents as a cultural 
fantasy of replacing one’s fragmented reality with an idealized self-image (Fig. 3). Set in the 
near future, the film imagines a world in which most of the population lives vicariously through 
androids, which they control avatarially from ‘stim chairs’. These surrogates usually appear as 
younger and more attractive versions of their users, for whom they provide prophylactic safety 
and a degree of social acceptance. An anti-surrogate faction, nicknamed ‘Dreads’ in an 
overdetermined nod to their organic roots, have been sequestered on reservations where they 
appear to live impoverished lives amidst junked cars and run-down mobile homes.  
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Figure 3. Agent Peters (Radha Mitchell) views a cutaway demo of a surrogate 
body in Surrogates. 
 
 
The film begins with a murder, an attack with a secret weapon that kills an operator 
through his surrogate – an inconceivable death in this society. During the investigation, Agent 
Greer (Bruce Willis) confronts the menace to the surrogate lifestyle represented by the weapon, 
as well as his deteriorating home life, as his wife Maggie (Rosamund Pike) has grown distant, 
and refuses to appear even around the house without her surrogate. Bemoaning this loss of 
intimacy and dealing with the loss of their son, Greer begins to wonder whether surrogate living 
blunts reality too severely. As his investigation into the murder procedes, it turns out that the 
creator of surrogate technology, whose sympathies have turned sharply against surrogates, is 
planning to use the weapon to kill all surrogate users through a central network. In an attempt to 
foil the investigation, Greer’s partner, Agent Peters (Radha Mitchell), is killed and her surrogate 
co-opted, but Greer still manages to stop the genocide.  However, now operating Peters’s 
surrogate, Greer is presented with the opportunity to destroy only the surrogates. He does so, and 
his action results in former surrogate users stumbling out of the apartments they haven’t left in 
years, squinting in the sunlight, while Greer puts his arm around a contrite Maggie. Facing the 
window, they look out on a new day. 
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 What this day will bring is not exactly clear, for there seems to be little investment by the 
film in providing a real in which to return. However, the reality against which surrogacy is 
opposed fits rather nicely within Baudrillard’s dystopic vision of the ‘desert of the real’) – the 
age spots and crow’s feet on a balding Willis, the detritus and poverty of the Dread reservation, 
and finally the banality and indetermination of the real world once surrogacy has ended. Greer 
has destroyed the idols, but not the need, or at least the impulse to create them. The emptiness of 
the film’s ending, littered with the photogenic corpses of decommissioned imagos, seems an 
almost tacit acknowledgement that the surrogate within the operator remains. Avatar films like 
Surrogates offer pop mythologies dealing with the crisis of being an avatar – an anxiety 
conflatable with the crisis of becoming an image, even as images, in this film and in general, 
serve as objects of desire. The iconoclastic move of killing one’s mirror image has rich 
antecedents in the literary and psychoanalytical figure of the double or doppelgänger, which 
wrestles with problems of dualism. Where the cyborg divides and integrates, the double 
multiplies and separates, and we find these two antipodal but ultimately related points 
intersecting in the avatar – the ‘incarnation of myself’10 – and in the related problem of being a 
‘half’. 
 
The Double That Hid in the Depths of You 
 
The double in Romantic literature is a figure of projection and materialization, a 
psychological state embodied, who then often haunts or helps a character from the outside. As a 
second self, the double is a solipsism, an excess of self or the result of an inability to contain 
some psychic element (such as overwhelming guilt) or dangerous impulse that forces a 
                                                
10 This phrase, spoken by the character Ivan in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, is part of Ivan’s 
defiant response when confronted with his double in the form of a sinister gentleman. However, while he detests the 
double, he feels that he also knows him intimately, admitting “I only don’t know by what means I can destroy you.” 
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manifestation of the hidden self – an ominous return of the repressed, which usually leads to a 
(cathartic) confrontation and a fight to the death. Freud siezed on the notion of the double in his 
essay “The Uncanny,” identifying it with the return of repressed material or regression to a 
primitive state, and quoting at length his colleague Otto Rank, who developed the notion of the 
double along psychoanalytical and anthropological lines. Fundamental to the presence of the 
double, for Rank, is the relation of the self to the self, and he relies on the Freudian unconscious 
to explain it, as well as resorting to aboriginal societies which were viewed as fossilized cultures 
forming a sort of pre-consciousness to the advanced societies that followed. Belief in an 
immortal soul and an impulse for self-preservation factor largely in his anthropological study, as 
the atavistic view of the double is closely related to death. The uncanny double is a product of 
the mind opposed to itself – which also prefigures the Lacanian subject always haunted by his 
double in the mirror. 
 A key text for Rank’s understanding of the double is the 1913 film The Student of Prague 
(Stellan Rye), in which Balduin (Paul Wegener), a poor student, strikes a deal with an evil 
sorcerer: in exchange for wealth and success, the sorcerer will be allowed to remove one thing 
from Balduin’s room. Balduin laughs at the terms, knowing the room contains nothing of value, 
but after signing the contract stands aghast when the sorcerer draws his reflected image from the 
large mirror in the room and leads it away (Fig. 4). Balduin’s doppelgänger returns periodically 
to bedevil his attempts to woo the countess with whom he has become obsessed, eventually 
driving him to the brink of suicide, when his double appears one last time. Balduin shoots it with 
a pistol and it disappears, then he laughs with relief as he is finally able to again gaze at his 
reflection in a hand mirror. In that same moment, however, he feels a pain in his chest and 
realizes he has been shot – in striking the image, he has killed himself.  
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Figure 4. Balduin, the sorcerer, and his reflection/double in The Student of 
Prague. 
 
 
 Image and body are interestingly conflated in the double; in The Student of Prague, the 
mirror image takes physical form and acts on its own, but never quite ceases to be a reflection or 
image. Balduin becomes simultaneously overpresent to himself and alienated from himself, and 
this oscillation produces ontological uncertainty as the character doubled to some extent becomes 
a facsimile as well – one half of an unholy dyad. The horror of facing the double is at the same 
time the horror of becoming the double, becoming aware of oneself as an ontological half or 
‘image’ of oneself. This particular horror appears to be a masculine one, as the literary double is 
almost exclusively a male phenomenon – a tendency perpetuated in avatar films.11 For the 
                                                
11 As noted in Rank, xxi, n.9. In contrast, films in which the double is female tend to take a different approach. The 
Broken demonstrates that being the sinister double also has its emotional remifications and the potential for 
sympathetic characterizations. In Krzysztof Kieslowski’s The Double Life of Véronique (1991), Véronique (Irène 
Jacob) is filled with grief and longing when her double, whom she senses but never sees until she views a 
photograph at the end of the film, dies during a choral performance. The connection between the two women is 
intuitive, emotional, and loving, rather than the ocularcentric horror of the male double. Whereas with the male 
double, as in the hypermasculine Fight Club (1999, David Fincher), the doppelgänger is a product of self-loathing 
and repression, feminine doubling is more comfortable with its reflexivity and self-images. Notably, however, Maya 
Deren’s 1943 film Meshes of the Afternoon uses the double to explore Freudian themes of the return of the repressed 
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subject whose identity is forged in the illusion of unity, centeredness, and transcendence, the 
doubled body is abhorrent.  
  In The Student of Prague, the image comes into play in more ways than one. Writing 
about the film, Rank praises “the uniqueness of cinematography in visibly portraying 
psychological events,” as well as cinema’s ability to render with clarity “the interesting and 
meaningful problems of man’s relation to himself.”12 It is interesting that Rank focuses on the 
cinematic capacity to produce the double, since of course it cannot except through visual trickery 
in editing, camerawork and mise-en-scène (Balduin’s double appears to be a look-alike rather 
than a double exposure) – after all, there may be two Balduins but there can only be one 
Wegener. However, Rank seems more focused on the nature of the medium in something like a 
surrealist vein, asserting that cinematography “reminds us of the dream-work, [and] can also 
express certain psychological facts and relationships – which the writer is unable to describe with 
verbal clarity – in such clear and conspicuous imagery that it facilitates our understanding of 
them.”13 Rank’s privileging of an indexical medium to portray subjective states, while somewhat 
ironic on its surface given his comparison to literature as a less adequate medium for 
representing the mind, is perhaps best understood precisely within the indexicality of cinema – 
that is, its capacity for disrupting its own photographic index. Cinema even in its naturalistic 
mode shares something of the mischievous nature of the double with its play of presence and 
absence, but in its capacity to image that of which no picture can be taken, as well as in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
and intrusions of the unconscious mind, challenging any masculine claim to the trauma of the double. I discuss 
matters of gender realtive to the double of the avatar in Chapters 3 and 6, regarding masculinity and femininity, 
respectively. Otto Rank, The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study, ed. and trans. Harry Tucker, Jr. (Durham: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1971). 
12 Rank, The Double, 7. 
13 Ibid., 4. 
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visual presence understood to mimic the dream state, cinema seemed to Rank unrivaled.14 The 
haunting moment in which Balduin’s reflection emerges from the mirror attains its particularly 
eerie quality because of its occurrence on film, as to show the double is, to a certain extent, to see 
the double. That is, we as viewers have also encountered a double which, while not so personal 
for us as it is for Balduin, nevertheless ruptures the cinematic world which in so many ways 
mirrors our own. 
 In contemporary films, such as the avatarial texts we are now prepared to engage, the 
tricks of doubling and disrupting the index have become much more sophisticated; however, they 
more often rely on the rather simple ‘trick’ of placing an actor in multiple roles. That is, rather 
than two actors playing ‘Balduin’, we are more apt to find a single actor playing a character and 
his or her avatar.15 What seems simple on the surface, however, becomes fertile ground for study 
when we consider it in light of image production within digital culture and the relationship 
between actors in images and characters with avatars – as well as the cultural and psychological 
crisis of not only having an avatar, but being an avatar. 
 
The Face in the Virtual Mirror 
 
I concur that there is a split between the physical and virtual self.  Furthermore, I believe 
that it is a purpose – no, a duty – of virtual worlds to facilitate the reconciliation of these 
selves. 
 Richard Bartle16 
  
As co-creater the first MUD (multi-user dungeon) in which users adventured and 
socialized in the shared online space of a text-only environment, Richard Bartle interestingly 
                                                
14 We can see of course in Méliès the tendency to associate cinematic tricks with magic and sorcery, and he built his 
career upon this aspect of cinema. But Méliès used this quality in the service of spectacle rather than introspection. 
Digital effects cinema also tends to avoid subjective states, demonstrating instead an overwhelming propensity for 
objectivity, to show rather than express. 
15 Gamer is an exception here, as Simon and Tillman together form Kable. 
16 Bartle, Designing Virtual Worlds, 510. 
 64 
initially resisted the impulse to allow players to create character descriptions, arguing that 
players could explore identity more freely if they weren’t “tied to some image.”17 Eventually, 
however, Bartle came around to the possibilities of playing with textual images tied to the self, 
and even produced a taxonomy of levels of engagement, from casual play to full-blown persona, 
as a measure of users’ psychological and social integration with their self-representations. The 
signification of these images, he argues, is a product of dissonance and consonance, as “[signs] 
arise because of the difference between virtual world technology and the way reality works. . . . 
immersion is accepting the signifier as the signified.”18 The reconciliation Bartle proposes seems 
to be the solution to a split seemingly effected by the existence of the virtual environment itself – 
one for which images initially seemed part of the problem, and later the means for integrating the 
physical and virtual selves. The implicit question remains, however, of the role of virtual 
environments relative to virtual selves, whether one of production, reconciliation, or dissonance 
– or all three. 
Films about avatars thematize the split and potential reconciliation between physical and 
virtual selves, although not typically through presenting the virtual diegetically as a product of 
digital technology. Rather, virtual selves tend to be represented through performance and in actor 
bodies, or what might be thought of as ‘analog’ forms. Even the CG technologies used to 
produce images of avatarial bodies often dissimulate their technological origins; digital effects in 
Surrogates, for instance, are used more frequently to add subtle manipulations to actor bodies 
(such as smoother skin) than to produce images of machine bodies.  
Division and reconciliation are visually manifest in a particular trope within avatar films, 
a contemplative moment in which a character comes face-to-face with the avatarial double. In 
                                                
17 Ibid., 184. 
18 Ibid., 635. 
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Surrogates, which depicts a world in which people live through robotic avatar bodies, Greer’s 
surrogate body (Bruce Willis plays both Greer and his surrogate) enters the bedroom where 
Greer’s biological body lies inert, and as he sets down the glass of water he brought for it (or it 
brought for him?), looks at this body with what seems to be a mix of pathos and disdain, an 
existential ambivalence about having ‘beaten the meat’, as Sobchack puts it. Moving to the 
charger, the surrogate docks and Greer disconnects from the interface, completing the face-to-
face look on his way out of the room with a glance at his surrogate. Because only one body at a 
time can actively ‘look’, this exchange is completed through two looks, separated by a transfer of 
active use from one body to the other. 
In another example, the look between user and avatar is facilitated by a mirror. In Sleep 
Dealer, Memo (Luis Fernando Peña) is a Mexican migrant laborer who works on a construction 
site in San Diego, operating his robot avatar through a VR-type interface in Tijuana. Seeing what 
the robot ‘sees’, Memo catches a glimpse of his avatarial self in the reflection produced in a 
metal sheet. Memo looks in one place but sees in another, through contact lenses that place the 
image display directly on the eye; he is ‘touched’ by images even as his sense of his own body is 
decoupled. Attached to tubes and cables and wearing an oxygen mask, Memo is unable to emote, 
and thus while his face is relatively blank, his emotions are projected onto the unfeeling visage 
of the robot, which strangely seems to contemplate its own avatar ontology in this moment. In 
Memo’s drained expression it appears that the image dominates him, and it seems that both 
Greer’s and Memo’s face-to-face looks wrestle with seeing the self as a hollowed-out image, the 
depersonalizing double that leaves each feeling only half human. One might find a desire for 
wholeness or reconciliation in these looks, but to what wholeness can they aspire? How can one, 
having been divided and encountering the image of oneself face-to-face, ever be whole again?  
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While these looks imply concern about being avatarial, a comparable look in Avatar 
moves more toward an implicit wholeness. When Jake Sully (Sam Worthington) initially sees his 
avatar body, created originally for his deceased identical twin, the strangeness of its blue flesh 
and large size are belied by its lithe athleticism, alien beauty, and humanoid appearance; indeed, 
as the avatar contains his DNA and was designed with features of Worthington’s face, Jake 
encounters himself in a strange mirror, but one filled with potential for the crippled protagonist 
rather than the emasculation of the cosmeticized body (Surrogates) or mechanized laborer (Sleep 
Dealer).19 The paraplegic Jake, already half a man, is primed to see himself in a different light, 
and the foreignness of the avatar body is quickly overcome by what it offers him. Each of the 
avatar bodies, these selves as images, are also framed as pictures of a sort: Greer’s surrogate in 
the charger, Memo’s robot in the mirror, and Jake’s avatar in contained within the steel girders of 
its tank. While the looks of Greer and Memo are shot in POV, however, Jake’s moment with his 
avatarial image includes a moving shot with the camera positioned behind him, adopting the 
perspective of the videogame (positioning him as avatar) that serves as an apt visual metaphor 
for the particular form of the ‘reconciliation’ this body will afford him. 
 “The double,” writes Baudrillard of clones, while evoking the psychological double of 
Romantic literature, “is precisely not a prosthesis: which, just like the soul, the shadow, the 
mirror image, haunts the subject like his other. . . . when the double materializes, when it 
becomes visible, it signifies imminent death.”20 The conundrum for the avatar user in these films 
is determining when the avatar body moves from the status of useful prosthesis to ontologically 
problematic self-other. Avatars, it seems, occupy a space somewhere in between, and in digital 
                                                
19 As with the psychological double, these looks seem mostly to be a male phenomenon. Maggie, for instance, never 
appears outside of her surrogate until the end of the film, and when she does have a face-to-face moment with 
another female surrogate in the salon, she is focused on sustaining the image body rather than reflecting on it (I 
discuss this moment more in depth in Chapter 6). 
20 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 95. 
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use different types of avatar bodies function differently: early avatars with their limited 
expressivity are arguably closer to tools, while contemporary avatars seem to approach the 
double. Greer, Memo, and Jake each deal with the problem of becoming too close to or too much 
like their avatars (Jake’s conflict is externalized through his allegiance to Colonel Quaritch 
[Steven Lang], who encourages Jake to use the body but maintain an emotional distance); 
however, inherent in and even integral to the films is the sense that not only will these characters 
find difficulty separating themselves from their avatar bodies, but that the characters are 
ultimately, inseparably avatarial. Memo implicitly comes to accept his avatarial state as an 
economic necessity, as Sleep Dealer ends with Memo staying in Tijuana and his job as an avatar 
operator rather than returning to his family’s milpa; Surrogates ends with the destruction of the 
avatar bodies, but the film fails to conceive of a world without them, removing the advantages 
the surrogates afforded their operators (including pleasure, security, attractiveness, and 
acceptance), and replacing them with a bright new day of mundanity and vulnerability; and 
Avatar concludes with an embrace of Jake’s new body imbued with a prelapsarian wholeness 
diegetically and a fundamental doubling imagistically – achieving wholeness, it seems, only 
through the embrace of the double and fully ‘bonding’ with the avatar body. The problem faced 
by the characters in each of these films thus seems less a matter of what to do with the avatar 
body than how to face their own avatarial nature, which the avatar bodies bring into sharper 
relief.   
The conceptual move from the avatar body which gives rise to avatarial behavior, to an 
avatarial quality within the user that prefigures the avatar, reflects the move from machines to 
images as the theoretical point of intersection between the body and technology in contemporary 
culture. Tom Boellstorff notes that “cyborg selfhood is predicated on a prosthetic continuity 
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between human and machine. . . . In contrast, virtual embodiment is predicated on a 
discontinuity, the gap between virtual and actual.”21 Prosthetic continuity in film is often 
visualized as the integration of steel and flesh or the intelligent robot masquerading as human. 
But how is the discontinuous gap visualized here? The avatars in Surrogates and Sleep Dealer 
are mechanistic bodies, though not exactly robots; in an inverse of AI and the sentient robot, 
these are ‘mindless’ mechanical bodies that require a human operator to function while 
appearing autonomous (and often human). Rather than acting as vessels for replicated or 
downloaded human consciousness, these bodies simply channel it, becoming the medium for 
human engagement with the world on one respect or another. The absence of AI in these films 
removes the threat of machine agency, but at the same time positions the prosthesis as self-
determined by making it discontinuous with the human body, appearing to act as a body of its 
own. In this way, these machine bodies are positioned as images, as reflections of their users: in 
Surrogates, the appearance of the robots is tied to personal identity, and in Sleep Dealer the 
robot operates as a clear metaphor for Memo’s political and ontological status as a part of the 
machine, while at the same time precisely not a machine – in fact, having replaced machine AI in 
a postindustrial world still reliant on infrastructural machinery and steel. The reflexive properties 
of the avatar body in Avatar, exemplified diegetically in Jake’s genetic tie to the Na’vi body he 
will ‘drive’, however, repositions the otherness of the avatar body within the construct of the 
mirror, so that while the character can disconnect technologically, an ontological divestment is 
impossible; Jake, once but no longer a twin, finds in this new body a way to become his own 
twin, to become the image of himself. 
These avatars at the same time function as disarticulated prostheses, connected to the 
body from a distance, or rather in an ‘ensemble’ that incorporates distance as conditional for its 
                                                
21 Boellstorff, Coming of Age in Second Life, 138. 
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use. Thus on the one hand avatar use is clearly subject to the amputation theorized by McLuhan 
as a condition or result of the prosthetic extension; such amputation of experience is the central 
theme of Surrogates, where Greer is vexed in his relationship with the ‘surrogate’ Maggie has 
become. On the other hand, the disarticulated prosthesis takes on a certain life of its own in 
projecting wholeness and existing as a type of body, ‘experiencing’ the world on behalf of its 
user in online use (a phenomenological condition that is the subject of fantasy and anxiety in the 
films). McLuhan’s exchange of extension for amputation is predicated upon the presumption of a 
certain bodily integrity or original wholeness of the human that is diminished and supplemented. 
The avatar on its surface implies fragmentation, but more essentially, perhaps, suggests 
connection, as avatars only ‘work’ when connected, when engaged within a doubling relation.  
Anxieties about the avatar in Surrogates and Sleep Dealer are ultimately not fears of hybridity 
and displacement by technology, but enunciate rather the doubled condition of human 
subjectivity and embodiment – an existence eventually embraced in Avatar on multiple diegetic, 
thematic, and technological levels, in becoming, to invoke Baudrillard again, “the double that hid 
in the depths of you.”22 The avatar body as a fragmentation that is perceived as a whole becomes 
an analog to the human body also experientially fragmented that can only become whole by 
merging with another whole – the double ‘outside of you’ that serves as a ludic materialization of 
the double within. 
The face-to-face encounters in these films never fall squarely within the horror of the 
double in nineteenth century literature. Contrary to the literary double that spells death through 
over-presence, dis-integrating the individual by presenting the subject back to himself, the 
avatarial look accepts, to one degree or another, a counter-self that exists in images. The weary 
familiarity present in Greer’s look, and the pathos evoked by the look Memo’s robot seemingly 
                                                
22 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 107. 
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directs at itself, convey the characters’ resignation to a general condition rather than individual 
fear or abjection – not certain death, but a reality of the double culturally ingrained, even if the 
characters find it personally undesirable (within the world of Surrogates, Greer’s dissatisfaction, 
along with the small Dread minority, is an exception in an avatarial society that is otherwise 
quite satisfied with itself). But in Avatar, the face-to-face look turns to curiosity, fascination, and 
possibility – the thrill of a body not just represented in images, but seemingly made of images. 
The response to the avatarial double moves from futile rejection in Surrogates to begrudging 
acceptance in Sleep Dealer, to the desirability of the spectacular digital body in Avatar.   
The face-to-face look visualizes the way in which avatars have come into their own – not 
in the way that AI did in the sentient machine, but rather in the way that they are neither sentient 
nor simply tools or prostheses. Where the integration of the cyborg is too near, the avatar 
produces distance within the human connection with technology, and thus the avatar not only 
becomes the potential object for a look achieved at a distance, but also gives a face to the 
technological extension, allowing the avatar to look back. In the mirror Memo sees not only 
himself re-embodied, but also his robotic avatar looking back at him, with each body in service 
of the other. The eyes of Jake’s avatar are closed while in the tank, containing its ‘look’, as the 
avatar does not impose on him the anxiety of the double but moves the avatar back toward a 
prosthesis he can become rather than a double that he already is.23  
Surrogates offers another interesting facet of the avatar returning the look in what might 
be called a ‘triangulated POV’, as Greer’s surrogate looks at the biological body while a nearby 
monitor displays the first-person view of what the surrogate ‘sees’.24 The first person view 
                                                
23 In Chapter 5 I develop Jake’s particular double as a character trait rather than as part of a cultural condition. 
24 Thanks to Sue Felleman for this suggesting terminology. Also, I can’t help but notice the similarity of the view in 
the monitor to reports of near-death experiences, in which the momentarily deceased note the strangeness of seeing 
their own bodies from the outside. 
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belongs on the one hand to Greer, whose eyes are obscured by goggle displays, but on the other 
hand to the surrogate, whose iris cameras provide the view which Greer sees, and whose body 
makes possible this particular view of Greer from the outside. The POV collapses in on itself –
contained in a single shot and to a single character, relayed by two bodies and an extra screen – 
in a self-gazing paradox.  
This form of self-looking facilitated by the second body in the film can be related to the 
online avatar which, while typically not returning the look face-to-face, is situated between its 
user and interactions with other users, so that avatarial interaction with others is always partly a 
solipsistic interaction within the user-avatar dyad: what they see when they look at ‘me’ is also 
within my view, the same body I am seeing, and thus also a kind of mirror. The avatar in Second 
Life does turn to face the user in an adjustment mode, when the user manipulates appearance in a 
configuration that includes a certain amount of intimacy, as the avatar loses social functions in 
this mode.25 Interestingly, however, the avatar is still on view to other users, who learn to 
recognize this mode as a form of personal space and, as a matter of etiquette, keep their distance 
until the modifications are complete and the avatar returns to being socially avatarial, rather than 
personally avatarial. Also, in Second Life snapshots and portraiture, the face of the avatar is 
generally turned toward the user, whose view is at this point disassociated with what the avatar 
‘sees’ and instead occupies the place of other users in seeing the self-representation face-to-face. 
The virtual camera captures the avatar as both a self-existing double with an ontology of its own, 
and a perfect half, so to speak, cleft from the user to which its blank gaze now turns. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 This might be the equivalent of the face-to-face looks in the films, and can be a rather odd experience after having 
spent most of one’s time in the virtual environment behind the avatar. 
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Altered Egos 
 
As simultaneously halves and doubles, avatars suggest a particular configuration for a 
human existence situated between virtuality and materiality, encompassing both while unable to 
fully be either – we are double in that our embodiment encompasses multiple experiential 
aspects, and halves in that we can never simply exist as one of these aspects, material, discursive, 
or imaginary. This dichotomy is explored in the work of Robbie Cooper, whose images of 
avatars and users in his book Alter Ego in a certain way reproduce the avatarial relation, and thus 
the book itself might be thought of as an avatarial work, as well as a book about avatars. A 
diptych-like layout positions users and avatars on facing pages, in reflective compositions with 
both user and avatar occupying similar size and position in the frame, and often sharing poses 
and clothing styles. The juxtaposition of these images can be quite striking: a 25-year-old 
stewardess-in-training from Seoul appears demure with her hand at the base of her neck, in 
marked contrast with the confidence of her sleek male elf avatar and his multi-bladed swords; a 
mother of three poses with her children while her sexy, raven-haired avatar shows off her assets 
above text describing her appearances in virtual pin-up magazines; and a severely disabled man 
is photographed with the oxygen mask that partly obscures his face, while his Boba Fett-like 
avatar in the Star Wars Galaxies platform is, interestingly, also fully masked (Fig. 5). After 
viewing these side-by-side images and reading about the personal relationships the individuals 
have with their avatars (written by the users themselves), the gap between the two sides begins to 
elide into two manifestations of something singular rather than divided, or even a single image or 
entity produced in the connection of the two.   
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Figure 5. A disabled user and his avatar, pictured in Alter Ego 
 
 
Classical diptychs traditionally feature two related images, such as the Virgin Mary and 
the angel Gabriel, on opposite panels, forming a single picture or scene in two frames. The 
functional hinge of what was also called a ‘traveling icon’ allowed the pair of images to close in 
on themselves to form a single body. Something similar can be seen in Cooper’s arrangement of 
the pages, poses, and text that elide these side-by-side images in something more than a 
meaningful connection (from user to avatar) or spatial configuration (such as in the shared space 
between Gabriel and Mary at the annunciation) to a sort of haptic conflation; as the reader turns 
pages, the two pictures are face-to-face within their paginated enclosure in a narcissistic kiss.    
 We take for granted, perhaps, that avatars always have users, and featuring them together 
in the pages of a book or on the introductory page of the Second Life website seems a fairly 
natural exercise. Typically, however, only one body at a time appears to others in avatar use, and 
such a visual arrangement is integral to the notion of what an avatar is. Showing the two together 
violates the avatarial arrangement in online use, and thus the book works doubly as both a 
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thoughtful joining of what is typically asunder into coexisting images, and an iconoclastic exposé 
that upsets the mystery and vitality of the avatar by revealing the second body.   
 Avatars and users are given equal ontological weight in the book, which raises the 
question of which is designated the ‘alter ego’, the other I. Cooper’s pairs evoke both a Janus 
that looks out at the viewer from two faces, and a Narcissus fascinated with the self-look. In the 
book’s subtitle, Avatars and their Creators, Cooper plays with a semantic distinction between 
the avatar and the user, notably granting ‘avatars’ the primary position and designating users as 
‘creators’. The book can be read as a collection of avatars and their origin stories, so to speak, as 
each avatar portrait includes thoughts by the ‘creator’ about why that particular avatarial form 
was chosen. Users are associated with an act of creation rather than their continued or active use, 
implying an act by which one body produces another. But who creates whom? The virtual 
element in virtual technologies is not their digital format, their mimetic creations of bodies and 
objects, or their interactive components, but rather the way they facilitate an understanding of 
and certain experiential connections to the virtuality inherent in being human. Or, recalling 
Boellstorff’s statement, “virtual worlds show us how, under our very noses, our ‘real’ lives have 
been ‘virtual’ all along.” Virtual technologies have brought out the avatar in us and extended a 
sense of our own virtuality, in concert with the theoretical formulations and cultural and 
informational contexts that have made us aware of our status as virtual beings. Regarding avatars 
and their creators, then, we must acknowledge the role of the informational and visual 
technologies that bring out or reflect the avatarial in us, under the guise of unilateral control. 
In later work, Cooper takes the imaging of the ‘avatar’ further by dividing the avatarial 
halves, showing pictures of avatar users (this time children playing videogames) while removing 
the avatar bodies from the picture. In the photo/video series “Immersion,” Cooper positions the 
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camera at the level of the screen, so we see the children from the point of view of the avatar, so 
to speak (Fig. 6).26 These are unusual images of telepresence, with the lens trained exclusively on 
the physical world, alluding to the virtual world only through the responses it generates. The 
children are focused and clearly engaged with something we can’t see, but at first glance this 
could be any engrossing activity, and thus the pictures, at least initially, lack the visual thrust and 
explicit connections of his Alter Ego series. But what is most interesting about the pictures is not 
what they show, but what they don’t.   
Knowing through Cooper’s introduction that the subjects are captured while immersed in 
virtual environments, their eyes, half locked in concentration, half lost in a trance are distant and 
difficult to read, even as they seem to be staring directly into the camera. The children are very 
present in the images which, with blank backgrounds, feature little else, but at the same time they 
are somehow missing, as if the camera captured their bodies but missed something of their 
embodiment.27 In the SyFy series Caprica (2009-10), a character learning to move the avatar in 
which he is embodied is instructed to ‘tell himself’ to walk, and bodily movement becomes a 
cognitive action that is at the same time very much a proprioceptive and instinctive one; the 
character initiates the movement through language, but once initiated walking comes naturally 
and easily, clearly drawn from the lived body rather than progressing as a stultifyingly cognitive 
exercise in putting one foot in front of the other. It is a similar dichotomy of active and passive 
that seems evident in the photographs, as the kids’ senses are highly activated – they are running, 
jumping, and battling with dexterous maneuvers that make use of the embodied experiences and 
skills they have acquired in the physical world, even if the actual movements they make to 
                                                
26 The series can be found on his website, robbiecooper.org. 
27 I specifically avoid any reference to mind or consciousness here, as the images put to rest any lingering doubts 
about the engagement of the body with virtual space: tensed muscles, darting eyes, rapid movements of the fingers, 
leaning and dodging, etc. 
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accomplish this are not of the same type. The small movements and twitches that accompany the 
button-pushing (particularly evident in new players unaccustomed to channeling their embodied 
impulses) are indicative of the signals still reaching the muscles. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A girl locked in concentration while playing a videogame in Robbie 
Cooper’s “Immersion” project. 
 
 
The viewer is positioned by the camera in the place of the off-screen double, in the 
position of the imagistic virtual environment and avatar bodies that captivate and invigorate the 
player, while the players occupy the space in front of the screen. At the same time, however, the 
engaged players are partly ‘here’, on the side of the viewer, while we are partly ‘there’, trying to 
see through their eyes and imagine the virtual experiences they are having, and thus the images 
have a highly liminal quality that invokes the virtual. While Cooper creates an avatarial work in 
Alter Ego, “Immersion” suggests that the avatarial connection ultimately cannot be fully 
captured in a single or even multiple images, only alluded to in various ways – or through 
various bodies.  
The “Immersion” project might be thought of as producing images of half-avatars; having 
established the ‘avatar’ in Alter Ego as the physical and digital doubles juxtaposed, in 
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“Immersion” he bifurcates this avatar by placing half of it off-screen. Thinking about the two 
works together, we can see how Cooper actually moves closer to an image of the virtuality of the 
human by rendering the digital counterpart implicit and drawing attention to the interstitial space 
between. With “Immersion” in mind, it is an insightful exercise to manually cover up one or the 
other of the diptych frames in Alter Ego to see pictures of avatars that represent not only a 
person, but that person’s connection with various facets of their own virtuality, or, on the other 
side, images of people who ‘picture’ themselves differently and engage their own virtual 
embodiment in the avatarial double. 
 The missing double in the “Immersion” images recalls, to a certain extent, the absent 
reflection in the mirror in The Student of Prague, a mirror that both reflects and doesn’t – “a 
strange mirror, then, very like that of childhood, and very different. . . . because, like the child 
again, we are prey to the imaginary, the double, and are so paradoxically through a real 
perception.”28 Christian Metz’s well-known theorization of cinema as mirror produces a kind of a 
half, as film “differs from the primordial mirror in one essential point: although . . . everything 
may come to be projected, there is one thing and one thing only that is never reflected in it: the 
spectator's own body. In a certain emplacement, the mirror suddenly becomes clear glass.”29 
With the reflection missing, Metz’s spectator identifies instead with himself as a ‘pure act of 
perception’ – much more a half than a double. From this vantage he becomes ‘all-perceiving’, 
‘all-powerful’ – “it is I who make the film.”30 
 Of course, it is the player who also ‘makes the game’, albeit in a much more literal sense. 
The cinematic apparatus offers valuable insight into the spatialization of perception and the 
                                                
28 Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, trans. Celia Britton, et al. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 49. 
29 Ibid., 45. 
30 Ibid., 48. 
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materiality of media engagement, as I discuss later in this chapter, but thinking through Metz’s 
classic application of Lacan to cinema, relative to the mirrors of the double and the gamer, 
produces a discord that illuminates the half. The compensatory reaction to halfness within the 
cinematic apparatus produces for Metz a sort of closed-circuit: evoking the psychology of the 
mirror, cinema produces a specular absence, which the spectator then fills by identifying with 
himself as perceiver – the one who looks rather than the image that appears. But the familiar 
scenes of audiences watching films (especially horror films) depict the bodily reactions, the 
absorption that belie the self-completing, all-powerful circuit of the apparatus. (It is hard to 
‘picture’ Metz’s transcendent spectator, while the image of the gamer seems more compatible.)  
The question of halves and doubles is common to both film and videogames. For Lacan, 
the half is an enduring subjective state, which Metz resolves by making the half a whole in the 
context of film viewing. The avatarial double presents two possibilities, both of which are 
explored in this study. First, doubling produces halves, and a split between the medial and 
material worlds which must be resolved by a return to the real and some claim on wholeness. We 
have encountered this in Surrogates, with the incapacitation of the surrogate bodies and the 
resumption of familial relations as an (unconvincing) claim on wholeness. Second, a 
reconception of wholeness that only occurs through connection, spatialization, doubling, and a 
kind of imaginal embodiment, which I develop in this study.31 The latter approach presumes a 
postmodern fragmentation of self that must be conceptually reconciled and managed – rather 
than becoming a half when confronted with the avatarial double, the avatar instead presumes that 
                                                
31 I use the term ‘imaginal’ rather than ‘imagelike’ or ‘imagistic’ to suggest a more active, participatory formation 
for the kinds of images I refer to in this study relative to avatars and embodiment. The term, derived from the Latin 
imago, refers to the imagination or a mental image, and find this sense captures an aspect of avatar creation and self-
perception that I wish to convey. "imaginal, adj.1". OED Online. June 2012. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91635 (accessed September 04, 2012). 
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we are already fragmented halves seeking ways to connect the various ‘pieces’ of which we are 
comprised.  
 Understanding the half then is important for conceptualizing the implications of the 
avatar. While the two threads delineated above bifurcate in very different directions, they share 
common ground in the half. In later chapters we will see the frequent avatar theme, growing out 
of the cyborg mythology, in the journey toward wholeness and the return to the real, representing 
the first approach, as well as a model for connective gestalt in accord with the second. For now I 
turn my attention to three avatarial texts that explore the half by placing one or the other of the 
fissured halves/doubles of characters ‘off-screen’ – that is, not simply out of the picture, but 
connected to screens that are alluded to but not shown (The Guild), or in characters who only 
appear on screens whose frames are off-screen, resulting in a conflation of diegetic and non-
diegetic screens with a viewer that is heard but not seen (Thomas in Love) or only abstractly 
implied (Molotov Alva). 
 
Half a Double, Twice Removed 
 
Avatar films explore the double in characters torn between two worlds, two lives, or two 
bodies.  Black Heaven (Gilles Marchand, 2010), for instance, is partly set in a virtual world that 
is presented as a dark and dangerous lure, drawing the protagonist away from a healthy real-
world relationship in pursuit of a virtual femme fatale (whose dark persona notably flourishes in 
the virtual realm, while outside of it she is somber and broken). In the anime Summer Wars 
(Mamoru Hosada, 2009) the real world has grown too dependent on and intertwined with the 
virtual world, so when a villainous program hijacks the protagonist’s avatar and threatens global 
infrastructure through its networks and virtual commons, the protagonist must reclaim his 
avatarial double, and in doing so proves himself and redeems his character. But narratives of the 
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double in avatar films are also narratives of the half, and certain films and web media adeptly 
explore the avatarial connection from the standpoint of one half of the embodied dyad. 
Molotov Alva and his Search for the Creator: A Second Life Odyssey purports to be the 
online video diary of a Second Life user who has abandoned his mortal existence. The web 
series, purchased by HBO Films, features the character Molotov Alva who, having left the real 
world (and implicitly his user body) behind, starts a new virtual life within the world of Second 
Life. The series begins with a notice of a missing user (identified by the same name) before 
shifting to the dispatches of the digital Molotov. Having left what he curiously calls his ‘straight-
world life’ behind, Molotov recounts how he has gradually lost his connections with the real 
world: he builds a virtual house, but rejects it when he realizes it ties him too closely to real 
world living; photographs imported from the real world are kept in a garden, but over time the 
memories have faded away, so that the pictures become curiosities rather than referential or 
nostalgic objects (Fig. 7); and while he understands that sensorial experiences, such as the sand 
and water on a beach, are only accessible through his memories of experiencing such things 
materially, he eventually settles into a sort of simulacral existentialism, content with his new 
digital reality as the center of experience. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Molotov Alva in his garden of forgotten photos. 
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Somewhat paradoxically, at one point he declares his decision that in this new world, “at 
least who I was [in the real world] would remain constant.” Molotov’s creation story, which 
begins when he “falls from the heavens,” implies a pre-existence that is only acknowledged 
within his growing agnosticism. His embodied memories from another life initially ground his 
experience and material instincts, and he forms his avatar body into “a perfectly rendered digital 
facsimile of my carbon-based self,” while simultaneously disavowing the avatarial connection, 
i.e. that he has or was a user. The narrative becomes one of a clean bodily transition between the 
material and virtual worlds, intentionally undertaken, the series later clarifies, as Molotov 
“uploaded his entire life” into an online world. The user in this formulation is not missing, but 
transformed – or so it seems. After finding himself in the virtual world, Molotov soon sets out to 
find the ‘Creator’, determined to discover the ‘one’ who conceived of the virtual world and 
brought it into existence. This missing element vexes him and provides the main dramatic thrust 
of the series, and while he searches in vain amidst the varied communities and personalities to be 
found in Second Life, his reenactment of religion’s central drama seems as if it would logically 
point back to the material world of the user – the unseen creative force existing in the 
metaphysical position relative to the virtual, and thus what Molotov seeks seems to be a meta-
virtual return to the physical. If the search for God is ultimately a search for self, then Molotov’s 
search for his creator would essentially be an avatarial turn inward, to find the source of the 
virtual elements dictating or influencing one’s existence.32 
                                                
32 With a similar theme but different result, The Truman Show (1998, Peter Weir) also follows a character’s quest to 
discover truth and meet his creator within a completely fabricated world. Truman’s (Jim Carrey) attempts to escape 
the enormous set he lives in eventually provoke the creator (played by Ed Harris) to confront him with a 
philosophical argument about the nature of truth and reality. Truman exits for the real world anyway, and Molotov 
eventually does the same. Molotov’s quest differs from Truman’s in that the absence of a creator is set from the 
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Users do not exist in this imaginary world. Even when Molotov finally gets his answer in 
Episode 7 the disavowal of the user persists. According to the oracle he finds (a chimp lured with 
a banana), there is not one creator, but many, and Molotov understands this to mean the virtual 
denizens, rather than any external force. His satisfaction with this answer soon wanes, though, 
and in an inventive reversal, Molotov finds his only satisfaction in a VR-type interface with 3D 
photographic scenes of the real world, called “Back to Reality,” which he views from a 
suspended virtual platform in the center of a spherical image space. He becomes addicted to this 
virtual counterpart to the virtual (which doesn’t necessarily follow the logic of a double negative, 
which would result in a return to the actual, for these still appear as images to him), hungry for 
any shard of “organic reality” he can find after finally giving up on the virtual world. Narcotized 
by these images of the real, he is only able to pull himself out when his inworld girlfriend comes 
to tell him that she has found a way out, and is leaving. Molotov realizes that “while I’d gone off 
searching for reality, Abigail [his girlfriend] remained the only real thing here,” and follows her 
through the tunnel marked ‘Last Exit’. The series concludes with his long search for fulfillment 
in the virtual world ending only by leaving it for the “new, uncertain reality” through the tunnel, 
and thus his unresolved journey begins anew, back in the material world he once left, which 
nevertheless remains ambiguous. 
Molotov’s search for the creator and examination of his own life return him to a real 
without users, in which one exists in one state or the other – in the real world longing to be 
virtual, or in the virtual world searching for the real. The other Second Life denizens are cast as 
permanent residents, not interlopers like Molotov, and also sans users, and so while there are 
organic and digital worlds, the connection between them is on the level of Platonic forms, 
                                                                                                                                                       
beginning in his denial of the user. The only way to confront the creator is to confront the artifice of the film, but 
actual creator Douglas Geyeton keeps the focus on the artifice of Second Life. 
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necessitating transubstantiation for movement across the non-interface. Molotov Alva thus 
presents a story of halves, where neither physical nor virtual existence feels complete to the 
character, leaving him always searching for the other – an imaginary journey through the imago 
that left him opining for the ‘real’ world he left behind. What Molotov is really missing, 
however, is exactly the obvious missing element: the avatarial connection, the double that 
resolves the half. As always one or the other, he has no way to reconcile virtuality and 
materiality. Also, as machinima, the method of production is tied diegetically and thematically to 
the series in a way that adds further dimensionality to the text. Produced using the Second Life 
engine, movement and gestures are enacted in real time in performances that are virtually 
‘filmed’ rather than the frame-by-frame incremental production of traditional animation practice, 
and thus they rely on game mechanics rather than on the movement of the medium itself to 
produce the movement of character bodies. Molotov Alva is an avatar that diegetically disavows 
his connection with a user, and in production an avatar body disassociated from its user in that 
the avatar ‘plays’ a character which exists in the virtual world.   
Web series The Guild, created by Felicia Day, takes the opposite approach.  The series 
follows a group of MMO players who band together as a guild, and whose association with each 
other is, at least initially, exclusively online, through avatars.  The avatars, however, and the 
game world in which they exist, remain unseen. Shots of the guild members frequently feature 
them at their computers, typically wired in for voice chat, but their interactions play out through 
cuts to their various apartments rather than transpiring in virtual space (Fig. 7). The visual device 
of not showing avatars in a narrative about avatarial connections produces, as with Cooper’s 
“Immersion” series, a sense of the half-avatar in that we are kept from the world that engrosses 
and even consumes the lives of the characters. The series opens with Codex (Day) discussing her 
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addiction to the generically termed “The Game” with her therapist, who tells Codex that she 
can’t grow if she’s “still immersed in an imaginary social environment.” The implication of 
Codex’s ‘problem’ of spending too much time in her virtual life and not enough in her real one is 
that she, and by extension any serious gamer or avatar user, has become incomplete or 
underequipped for the real world as a result of heavy avatar use – a social half in addition to a 
virtual one. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Felicia Day as Codex at her computer in The Guild. 
 
 
As we meet the other members of the motley guild, Day plays their geeked-out 
involvement and social awkwardness for laughs. However, as these ‘incomplete’ characters 
become sympathetic and relatable, their status as halves takes on a rather different quality: rather 
than humans adjusting to life in a technological world, these are characters already firmly tied to 
a technologically-facilitated mode of living, attempting to find their way in the analog world. In 
their geekiness they become wise fools (or wise geeks), ones who see the world from the vantage 
of (a supposed) incompleteness and in doing so see the truth. They are thus equipped because 
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they have embraced their own virtual existences within an online virtual environment – they 
know they are halves. Their status as such is further underscored as they leave their doubles 
behind in the first face-to-face meeting of the guild to discuss the issue Codex is dealing with 
when Zaboo (Sandeep Parikh), another member of the guild, shows up on her doorstep after 
misreading her winking emoticons as flirting, and begins sleeping on her couch. The breakdown 
of the spatial distance between Codex and Zaboo and then the guild as a whole produces a crisis 
of the avatarial distance itself, as their avatarial relationships have been predicated on a certain 
distance; over time, however, they find new ways to interface in person, and at the end of the 
first season the guild reforms in the real world to wage battle in a local diner. 
Interestingly, their opponent, whom they meet in the last episode, is Zaboo’s Indian 
mother (thus implicitly pitting the Hindu tradition of the avatar against the digital). As the 
conflict heats up, Zaboo’s mother is depicted with CG flames in her eyes and streaming blue 
electricity flowing from her fingers, ‘melting’ Zaboo’s mind in her attempts to get him to return 
to her after he has absconded to Codex’s apartment. She feels incomplete without him, but 
Zaboo cannot become his own man (Codex later calls him a “starter character” in real life, who 
needs to “level up”) within the force field of a possessive mother. The guild bands together in 
this Oedipal conflict to help him overcome the physical bond of mother and child, enabling the 
perpetuation of the virtual bond of user and avatar. If Zaboo is a starter character in real life, it is 
because he has not been freed from the familial constraints that tie him to the real world 
(humorously summarized in his revelation that he had been breast-fed until he was eleven); thus 
the character cannot seem to escape the double/half ontology, but only find ways to make and 
manage connections. 
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While The Guild depicts users but not their avatars, and Molotov Alva narrativizes an 
avatar without a user, Thomas in Love (Pierre-Paul Renders, 2000, Thomas est amoureux) is an 
avatarial story which is centered on absence. The film takes place at the level of the screen, the 
point of connection between characters that mediates all of their interaction, and also the point at 
which the film ‘materializes’. Thomas Thomas (Benoît Verhaert), with a doubled name that 
belies (or reveals?) his status as a half, is an agoraphobe who has not been out of his apartment in 
eight years, nor has anyone been in. He does all of his communication through the computer, 
although we never see the computer itself outside of what appears on the screen. The film opens 
with a ‘shot’ of pixelated digital wallpaper (the type common on PC backgrounds in the nineties) 
which gives way to a sexual simulation in which Thomas engages in virtual sex with a buxom 
‘sextoon’ via a cybersex suit. During the lovemaking we see a phantom hand (the representation 
of his hand via the cybersex suit) appear on the screen, fondling one of the digital breasts, and 
this is the first and last we see of Thomas until the final shot of the film. The interim is filled 
with Thomas’s (usually unsolicited) social interactions via the ‘visiophone’ with a grumpy 
customer service agent, his mother (the maternal bond again), his therapist, matches in an online 
dating service, and a prostitute with whom he makes a personal connection, and who in the end 
convinces him to finally leave his apartment (Fig. 9). These are done in a web-cam aesthetic, 
with characters talking to the cameras in their apartments and homes; the other characters see 
Thomas but can’t come near him, while we occupy a position approximating his point of view 
but never see him, only hearing his voice. As Thomas’s body is missing from the world outside 
his apartment, so it is missing from the film as well, as if his fear of enclosed public spaces 
extends also to the frame of the screen; footage of him on the beach as a child that his mother 
shares with him makes him panic, ostensibly in seeing himself outside, but much more, it seems, 
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to be present to himself in the image. When he does briefly appear in the last shot, finally leaving 
his apartment through an outside door, he is washed away in the overexposed image, exiting the 
Platonic cave into the bright daylight of video noise and exposure threshold. Notably, this is also 
the first time in the film when Thomas is not viewing the screen with us, and there is at this 
moment a strange and palpable sense of disembodiment – of the absent body finally departed 
into the image, or perhaps the image ‘body’ finally made fully manifest. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. A woman from the dating service in Thomas in Love. 
 
 
The defining image of the film, or rather non-image, is the graphical wallpaper, a generic 
pattern of pixels tiled across the screen forming something of a digital texture. Our induction into 
the world of the film thus stops us short at the level of the screen, and the film returns to this 
screen regularly between the visiophone calls. The wallpaper comes to stand in for or even 
‘picture’ the screen, and the subtle shifts and twitches in the pattern create an oddly affecting 
picture of a restive or agitated screen. The wallpaper of the GUI is both in front and behind, too 
near and too far, the static curtain for the roiling information of the network just ‘behind’ it and 
at the same time the eternally receding backdrop for any number of windows; the spatial depth 
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that characterizes what Bolter and Grusin refer to as the immediacy of remediated perspectival 
images (such as photographs or videos) was, in the era of digital wallpaper, framed by the flat 
hypermediacy of the pixelated plane that awaits a window to see ‘through’ and is at the same 
time the impermeable surface that remains always at the level of the screen.   
With its enhanced liminality as the threshold for both character and viewers, the screen in 
Thomas in Love supplants the missing body – Thomas is replaced by the screen, not incorporated 
into the machine or consumed by the device. The virtuality of computer space coincides, on a 
representative level, with the virtuality of Thomas himself. That is, what remains of him in the 
sound of his voice and the address of other characters produce his trace, or the residue of his 
missing body which is conflated with the pixelated screen in its most basic form, with visible 
pixels and the basic shapes through which the pixels are made to represent ‘pixelation’. 
Thomas’s trace is not found in the image of the body, which is implied early in the film in the 
translucent, ghostly image of his arm touching the sextoon; rather, the representative presence of 
the body in virtual space becomes something to depart from. Wallpaper and screen form the 
constitutive body of the image displayed on a computer, while the missing body is seamlessly 
conflated with the screen without being consumed. Thomas finally enters the image, and the real 
world at the same time.   
 While I have discussed the ‘screen’ in Thomas in Love, the material screen is implicit, 
attached to no visible device. Indeed, the argument can be made that we don’t see a screen per 
se, as in a photographic image of the hardware that displays the video and computer content 
which make up the film, but rather we seem to be seeing the video feed from the network and 
CPU that is then displayed on the screen of the film’s viewing – at the cineplex, or, in the case of 
this viewer, on a television set at home. The ‘materiality’ of this film comprised entirely of 
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simulated environments and video streams from webcams is much more closely aligned with the 
materiality of its exhibition than its diegetic objects. With the two screens conflated, my 
television became a shared liminal point of access.  
 Thomas’s virtual sex, in which intercourse and interface are conflated in touching and 
being touched by the digital virtual world, and later the teledildonic encounter he has with a 
woman he meets on the dating site, ultimately prove unsatisfying for him. In a rather disturbing 
moment, when he and the sextoon approach orgasm, the signal begins to break down, infusing 
both analog video static and digital noise as a kind of sensuousness of the medium in reaction to 
the sexual intensity. In the final moments the simulation enters the ‘bestial phase’, as the sextoon 
turned wild-eyed beast thrusts her gaping mouth toward the screen – a Freudian representation of 
consumption by media as vagina dentata. Thomas must overcome the ‘iconophobia’, it seems, in 
which he fears the contamination of the image when applied to his own body rather than the 
bodies of others. He is comfortable, if not entirely satisfied, with copulation with and through 
images (the threat of consumption is ultimately allayed as another fantasy scenario) from which 
he can withdraw. But his final exit from his apartment, and entry into the world of images (where 
we finally see him) makes of the half a double, which points toward salvation in the blinding 
light outside the cave. 
 Through these examples of halves I have hoped to lay groundwork for better 
understanding the doubling of the avatar in terms of images and screens. In Surrogates, having a 
double is taken for granted in a society that has not only acclimated to managing two bodies but 
has become dependent on surrogate living – a marked contrast with The Terminator and 
RoboCop in which the threat is contained in a single monstrous body. Greer’s concern however 
is that he has become a half, that humanity suffers for its overreliance not just on technology, but 
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precisely on the way in which technology has been humanized. We have seen that in the 
mirrored subjectivity theorized by Lacan and the Freudian-inflected double in Romantic 
literature that the double typically presumes or produces the half. And having sorted through the 
dichotomous claims that there is no cyberspace or there is only cyberspace, we face the avatarial 
question of whether avatars and virtuality are a departure from the real or material world, or 
whether material reality can only be encountered through mediated experience, and the sense of 
the virtual by which we engage these medial connections.   
Moving forward, I turn to a closer inspection of the digital avatar as source material for 
representations of avatars and the thematic issues they engender, as well as a basis for 
approaching the theoretical possibilities the avatar offers. Continuing also with a consideration of 
the mirror, I will return to the “spatial identification” that occurs during the mirror stage, as 
Lacan refers to it, extending “from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality” – but less 
for the space separating the subject and the imago than the space connecting them in what might 
be thought of as an interfacial rather than specular approach to subjectivity.33 That is, thinking 
avatarially, I am curious as to what extent the ‘gestalt’ might be positioned as part of or even as 
the spatialized arrangement rather than as an unattainable image within it.  
 
                                                
33 Lacan, Écrits, 4. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CORPUS AVATAR 
 
 
The introduction page on the Second Life website features a photograph of a young 
woman with a streak of red in her hair and a pair of headphones on her ears. Immediately next to 
her is a picture of an avatar with the same headphones and red streak, a clear double (Fig. 10). 
The promotional text reads “It’s you – only in 3D,” referring to the 3D virtual environment and 
the opportunity for users to create self-representational avatars.1 The lure of the invitation works 
doubly, promising the technological fantasy of 3D as well as a reassuring sense of familiarity, 
but also raises the question of what it might mean for an embodied human in the material world 
to become ‘3D’.  
 In its use in cinema and photography, 3D extends outward, seeming to break free of its 
frame and burst into the off-screen world – or at least this has been the case as a novelty during 
Hollywood cinema’s turf war with television in the fifties and in amusement parks today. On the 
other hand, 3D can also draw inward, inviting viewers into the world of images with a greater 
sense of visual immersion; Second Life and some of the more subtle uses of 3D in contemporary 
films rely on this quality. Objects pictured in these spaces seem to be more discrete, more 
tangible, less connected to the rest of the image. Discourse surrounding 3D presents it as a more 
complete or even a purer mediation in contrast with traditional images in that it seems to retain 
an additional element of the real world – its dimensionality ascertained by stereoscopic viewing 
– while at the same time heightening the visual experience of its depictions; that is, 3D is 
heralded as a more realistic form, but in practice is mostly relegated to fantasy. 
                                                
1 This image and the attending copy were accessed from secondlife.com in 2010. The promotional text changes 
periodically; at the time of this writing it reads: “Second Life is a 3D world where everyone you see is a real person 
and every place you visit is built by people just like you.” 
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 The Second Life tag plays on this incongruity, however, implying that the you in a 3D 
image world will be a little more exciting than the three-dimensional, physical you. We can see 
in the subtle differences between the two promotional images – smoother skin, a narrowing of 
the face, better symmetry, brighter highlights in the eyes – what in regular practice is often more 
extreme, as Second Life is full of long, leggy avatars with thin waists and beefy biceps. In 
Second Life, as in other virtual environments, dimensionality is produced through movement 
within perspectival space and interaction with objects rather than stereoscopic illusion, but it is 
designed to produce a similar immersive effect. Accessing it with an avatar not only permits 
occasion for cosmetic modifications, but entry into a world of image objects as well, available 
for interaction with image bodies. 
 
 
 
  Figure 10. “It’s You – Only in 3D.” 
 
 
The irony of leaving three dimensions to become 3D might be understood in terms of the 
trompe l’oeil of 3D, as a way for three-dimensional bodies and objects to exist in two-
dimensional images – 3D makes ‘space’ for the viewer. The perceived distinction of bodies and 
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objects as discrete elements within 3D image space is consonant with the statement’s focus on 
individuality in the implied assurance of remaining a unique entity – that is, no matter how 
thorough the simulation or convincing the images it will still be ‘you’. The avatar is here 
presented as the point of entry into the virtual world, positioned as an intermediary form between 
the real and mediated environments that inducts the participant into image space through a 
mediation of the self (in the form of a body), and thus might be understood to embody a way of 
being within mediation. That is, if our world has become image-driven and experience has 
become mediated, we are compelled to devise compatible spaces and bodies. The recourse to the 
familiar ‘you’ privileges an enhancement of self through mediation over a loss of self in the 
image world, as well as implying a certain compatibility of the embodied self with image-based 
mediation. In other words, we adapt to our environment, and in this respect Second Life becomes 
less an imaginal simulation of the material world than a model for the body’s entry into an 
image-driven world. 
 In virtual environments, 3D demands inclusion of the avatar body, and the presence of 
this body transforms the experience of the space.2 Such is the aesthetic and symbolic place of 
3D, and I have considered it here for its propensity to both push the image world outward and 
draw the viewer or user into the world of images. In the mirror stage, the reflected body is not an 
isolated image, but one set within the imaginal space of the mirror; thus while the reflected body 
is taken as a representation of wholeness, it is already set within and connected to the ‘virtual’ 
world on the other side, already part of the objects (the images) that surround it. The fantasy of 
                                                
2 Tom Boellstorff reports that in its early stages Second Life avatars were originally conceived as floating eyeballs 
rather than bodies. It is an interesting thought experiment to imagine how the Second Life environment would be 
different if this strange panopticism had been adopted. One immediately thinks of the many houses and other 
domiciles, dance clubs, and other buildings that would likely be absent, as well as the toll on the Second Life 
economy, which revolves around fashion, real estate, and sex. For Second Life, as with many other virtual 
environments, avatars are not simply a mode of access to an existing world, but in many ways the world exists for 
avatarial engagement. 
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the image body is organic to the imaginal space in which it is set, in “the relation between the 
movements assumed in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual 
complex and the reality it reduplicates – the child’s own body, and the persons and things around 
him.”3 The mirror as screen presents an object of fantasy, accessible only through desire and 
misrecognition from a spectatorial distance (it is this defining quality that characterizes the 
cinematic apparatus); the mirror as an optical instrument, a technology, however, has an inherent 
materiality as it exists in, and only reflects, the real world. In this case it is the distance between 
the body and its reflection that is misperceived or falsely appraised, as there can only be the 
distance between body and mirror.  
This chapter seeks to define the image body of the avatar in terms of the apparatus that 
produces it, distinguishing between the cinematic apparatus and the interface for a virtual 
environment in an attempt to better understand the relation between bodies and images within 
digital culture. In addition, it is necessary to examine the constitution of the body available for 
identification within the interface apparatus. Although avatar appearance can vary widely – from 
conventional or consumerist notions of beauty through the gamut of creative, quirky, and 
subversive bodies, all of which offer different affective and psychological interactions with their 
users – my interest here is more on construction than appearance. I undertake a 
phenomenological consideration of the avatar body as a body, laying groundwork for a better 
understanding of the experiential relationship between user and avatar as one body to another.4  
 
 
                                                
3 Lacan, Écrits, 1. 
4 I don’t assume, of course, that an avatar body is materially similar to a physical, sensorial human body, but I take 
this approach as much to demonstrate some of the ways in which physical embodiment and virtual bodies coincide 
as I do to explore the construction of the avatar and digital imaging technologies in general. That is, when users 
make phenomenological connections with avatars, I suggest that it is as much a result of a felt affinity with them as 
being imaginally and multiply embodied as it is for their similarities to human bodies in the surface appearance. 
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Iconic Evolutions 
 
The inclination to insert representative bodies into computer-generated spaces can be 
seen from the first videogames and social environments. Spacewar!, developed by MIT students 
in 1962, was not the first computer game, but it is significant for its space age fantasy elements 
that invited players into an imaginary scenario, despite the simplicity of its representative icons 
(two blips, the oblong ‘needle’ and the triangular ‘wedge’).5 A decade later, ‘adventure’ games, 
influenced by the recently published Dungeons & Dragons, produced textual geographies to be 
explored subjectively by players in a ground-level version of the strategic map games that 
preceded them. Graphical videogames from the early eighties and beyond followed the trend set 
by Spacewar!, exhibiting a strong tendency to include a representative of the player within the 
space of play. These iconic representations were at first a series of crude shapes, but gradually 
employed more sophisticated imagery as the technology improved, coming to resemble the 
vehicles, ships, creatures, and bodies they once pretended to be.6 
 These avatarial objects, or ‘player characters’ as they came to be called within gaming 
jargon, display the player’s relation to other objects in the game – not only in regard to the 
agentive (and often destructive) presence that is frequently discussed in writings on videogames, 
but as much for the vulnerability these representations facilitate. The imperiling of the player 
character contributes to the visceral thrill of the game for players, and connects it 
proprioceptively to the player’s body as much as the agentive actions conducted by the player on 
                                                
5 Games preceding Spacewar! include Alan Turing’s chess program (written for a computer that didn’t yet exist), 
Alexander Douglas’s OXO (1952, a tic-tac-toe game), William Higinbotham’s Tennis for Two (1958, paddle game), 
and other games developed at MIT just prior to Spacewar!, including Mouse in the Maze (where the mouse was 
represented by a dot). These games prioritized strategy over fiction, and while Spacewar! was hardly immersive, it 
was highly influential in initiating the trend of videogame production toward immersion, fantasy, and identification.  
6 Some games, like Pac-Man, took aesthetic advantage of the primitive graphics available at the time, stripping 
down design to a basic functional shape that became a cultural icon; outside of the chomping disc, however, the 
tendency toward mimesis is still apparent in the game in the fruit and ghosts that players seek and avoid, 
respectively. 
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the space of the game. This condition becomes more pronounced with increasingly realistic 
depictions of bodies, although at the same time producing an inverse effect by conflating the 
body with disposability. In the historical development of avatar bodies, we can see these 
conflicting pulls of dissonance and flow by which contact with virtual technologies is negotiated. 
While the evolution of the avatar proceeded through many gradations and variations, a 
few moments stand out as points of seminal transition. It is an occasional misconception that 
text-based games preceded graphical games, but the textual genre didn’t develop until the mid- 
to late-seventies, some years after the advent of graphical games. One of the first text-based 
games, Colossal Cave Adventure, inspired variations like the dungeon-crawl Zork (also called 
Dungeon) and other adventure games – which several years later provided the basis for the first 
MUD (multi-user dungeon). These second-person, interactive narratives immersed the player in 
the world of the story and the map, but it was with the development of multiplayer versions and 
networked capability that made the representation of self to other players, and not only the game, 
a more integral aspect of play and the increasing possibilities for socialization. This was the 
environment in which Roy Trubshaw began working on the first MUD, or what later became 
known as MUD1, in 1978. Richard Bartle completed MUD1 in 1980, abiding by Trubshaw’s 
desire to create a shared space within the interactive fiction. Other adventure games, such as 
Orthanc “allowed players to meet and talk in the dungeon, but otherwise was a single-player 
game.”7 MUD1 was designed to facilitate human interaction as much as interaction with the 
computer, and this necessitated a greater role for representational bodies in the shared space. 
                                                
7 Eric Hagstrom, quoted in Raph Koster, Raph Koster’s Website. Accessed April 19, 2009. 
http://www.raphkoster.com/gaming/mudtimeline.shtml. 
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 Initially, Bartle resisted the impulse to allow players to create character descriptions, 
arguing that players could explore identity more freely if they weren’t “tied to some image.”8 
Before long, however, Bartle became enthusiastic about the possibilities of playing with textual 
representations of self and character, and produced a taxonomy of levels of engagement from 
casual play to full-blown persona as a measure of users’ psychological and social integration 
with their self-representations. The signification of these ‘images’, he suggests, is a product of 
both dissonance and consonance, as “[signs] arise because of the difference between virtual 
world technology and the way reality works. . . . [where] immersion is accepting the signifier as 
the signified.”9 The reconciliation Bartle proposes seems to be the solution to a split seemingly 
effected by the existence of the virtual environment itself – one for which images initially 
seemed part of the problem, and later the means for integrating the physical and virtual selves.  
 MUDs and adventure games were very conscious of space and subsequently bodies by 
virtue of the fact that visual objects had to be described. Reading the text was conflated with 
looking, as the short descriptions tended to include basic visual information, and as the social 
element of MUDs became popular, descriptions of character became expressions of personality. 
Due to this strong visual component, as well as the increasing popularity of console and then 
home computer games in the early eighties, it is not surprising that the MUD went graphical. 
Work on Habitat, “one of the first attempts to create a very large scale commercial multi-user 
environment,” began in 1985, the same year Nintendo released the popular Super Mario 
Brothers and only a year after an improved MUD1 was released commercially; the beta version 
of Habitat was released the following year.10 Aesthetically, Habitat took a different direction than 
                                                
8 Bartle, Designing Virtual Worlds, 184. 
9 Ibid., 635. 
10 Farmer, F. Randall and Morningstar, Chip. “The Lessons of Lucasfilm’s Habitat.” Presented at The First 
International Conference on Cyberspace, May 1990. Accessed April 14, 2009. 
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many of the text-based spaces and videogames of the period, minimizing fantasy content in favor 
of a more quotidian environment. While quests could be undertaken, Habitat was conceived as a 
place where users “can communicate, play games, go on adventures, fall in love, get married, get 
divorced, start businesses, found religions, wage wars, protest against them, and experiment with 
self-government.”11 Habitat was thus a precursor to contemporary social spaces like Second Life 
and other MUVEs (multi-user virtual environments, as distinct from the more goal-driven 
MMOs), as well as the domestic simulation game The Sims (2000, Electronic Arts). 
 Graphics for avatars in Habitat were rather rudimentary, but they did have 
interchangeability, such as options for clothing, skin color, and a number of faces and body types 
to choose from, which made them more expressive (Fig. 11). Even with the limited options 
presented by the game, this was an important step in the development of the avatar body, as it 
began to conflate sign and body. Pictures begin to act more like bodies not only when they move, 
as the avatars in Habitat did (crudely), but when their modes of expression become more 
nuanced. Bodies do not signify the same way that pictures do; the avatars in Habitat were simple, 
two-dimensional, and rather cartoonish, but they could be distinguished from videogame 
characters in the shift from signifying through what they were, such as Italian plumbers, to 
signifying through what they wore, for instance, as clothing and hairstyles as the adornment of 
the body started to become the primary signifiers of the human-like avatar.12 (The potent cultural 
signifiers of skin color and gender are discussed more thoroughly below.) 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.fudco.com/chip/lessons.html. In denoting titles, I follow the common practice of italicizing game titles 
and indicating shared online spaces in Roman. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ken Hillis refers to avatars as ‘sign/bodies’, interpreting the iconic status of digital avatars as part of the 
signifying discourse in which avatars are set, and thus accords them the status of meaningful images. While I don’t 
disagree with his logic, to my mind the move toward the body is a move away from the clearer signification of 
traditional images imported into virtual spaces, and thus I prefer the term ‘image bodies’ as a way of conceptualizing 
their synthesis of high visibility and semantic ambiguity. Ken Hillis, Online a Lot of the Time: Ritual, Fetish, Sign 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). 
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Figure 11. At home in Habitat.    
 
 A decade after Habitat, the differences between the trifurcation of videogames, graphical 
MUVEs, and textual MUDs had increased, generating significant implications for the avatarial 
body. In fact, the period of the mid-nineties represented perhaps the greatest range of possibility 
for user representation in virtual spaces, with each alternative bearing different ramifications for 
user experience. As I have noted, virtuality is contingent, and various forms of virtual 
embodiment interact with human embodiment differently. Videogames had by this period 
become increasingly popular, and while 3D games using vector graphics had been around for 
some years, it was the release of id Software’s Wolfenstein 3D in 1992, followed the next year by 
the extremely influential Doom, that established a new benchmark for gaming. The fast pace of 
these dungeon crawls and the sense of immersion they engendered established a new era of 
gaming, and cemented the place of the first-person shooter (FPS). In many ways the FPS 
constituted the visual instantiation of the second-person adventure game, with the player at the 
center of action instead of abstracted from a player character or avatar (the designative ‘you’, 
which Bob Rehak refers to as a syntactical méconaissance, an interpellation effected when the 
‘you’ of the descriptive text is conflated with the ‘I’ of the player). The avatar body in these 
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games had become implicit – still vulnerable and, as multiplayer versions developed, visual to 
other players, but otherwise absent, visually distilled in the phallic weapon jutting obliquely and 
menacingly into frame.13 
 The violent, disembodied gaze of the FPS that removed the avatar visually from the space 
of the game was antithetical to the emphasis on self-representation in the MUVEs, which were 
themselves developing in different directions. The Palace was essentially a collection of pictorial 
chat spaces, and while users could move their avatars across the screen or into a different room, 
each room was simply a static 2D backdrop. Guests were given a yellow smiley face avatar, and 
after registering the face would turn red and the user could attach custom images, which were 
typically imported from scans or the internet. These picture avatars, while sometimes following 
various trends, were quite diverse in comparison with the relatively limited modular bodies in 
Habitat in that they could be pictures of anything. As such, the Palace avatars operated much 
more clearly in a symbolic register, and less like the iconic and functional bodies developing in 
other graphical worlds. AlphaWorld, on the other hand, might be called a prototype for Second 
Life, where avatars were 3D and highly customizable, and building was a common activity. The 
player’s view could be switched between first-person and a ‘god view’, which was somewhat 
above and behind the avatar, and in distinction from the picture avatars of The Palace, the avatars 
in AlphaWorld, while incorporating user preferences and designs, were relatively uniform 
overall, thus eliding the wider disparity in signification that could characterize the more chaotic 
Palace. The AlphaWorld avatars thus most clearly represented the trend toward realistic bodies 
that were organic to their virtual environment. 
                                                
13 Cutscenes introduce a cinematic identification that becomes an avatarial one for both first-person and third-person 
games. A FPS player may only see his or her avatar during these interstitial, non-interactive scenes, and then ‘re-
inhabit’ the character once gameplay resumes. 
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 Worlds Chat was something of a combination of these two MUVEs. Set in 3D space but 
permitting the importation of 2D images, Worlds Chat actually served as one of the more 
interesting experiments in virtual embodiment with its motley combination of avatarial pictures 
and dimensional game space (Fig. 12). Avatars could be scanned photographs of users, computer 
art creatures, or any number of images culled from the web or otherwise created, appearing in 
various scales and resolutions as they glided through the space station setting. For all of its visual 
interest, however, the platform somewhat paradoxically employed a first-person view – 
influenced, perhaps, by Doom’s popularity and immersiveness, but also interestingly granting a 
‘view’ to the picture serving as an avatar.14 
 
 
   
  Figure 12. Heterogeneity in Worlds Chat. 
   
 
 The persistent popularity of MUDs and their variations throughout the nineties, despite 
the surge of videogaming and the many MUVE options, attests to the particular opportunities 
they afforded for the conceptualization of space and practices of embodied interaction. While 
                                                
14 For a comprehensive overview of these and other virtual worlds of the period see Bruce Damer, Avatars!: 
Exploring and Building Virtual Worlds on the Internet (Berkeley: Peachpit Press, 1998). 
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socializing came to predominate over the exploratory aims of adventure games and early MUDs, 
these spaces were distinct from chat rooms in that they included character and setting 
descriptions, and their characters could be made to perform embodied actions through bits of 
literary illustration. Characters were discursively produced with descriptions, while the user’s 
presence was marked by a screen name, indicators of action or entry and exit into a room, and 
any conversation made through the chat interface. Character descriptions actually only appeared 
when another user executed a ‘look’ command, and so while situated quite distinctly as the 
object of a look, without this look the character was invisible – and without a contribution to the 
chat stream, the user is for the most part as well (a hovering that could make other users 
uncomfortable, who often called out the ‘lurker’).  
 The informational composition of the character can range from a few words of 
straightforward description to the lyrical passages Julian Dibbell recalls in his memoir of time 
spent in LambdaMOO.15 Dibbell makes it clear that there were plenty of uninspired descriptions, 
but his observations of the textual interactions amidst the literati collective he fell in with 
illustrate a different intersection, between the descriptive image and the body. Well-written 
passages could include information about attitude, history, and desire of the character (or the 
user’s persona), or could be “essentially nothing but the details of their clothing and their 
hairstyles, presented nonetheless with such precision and flair that they seemed almost the 
distillation of a personality, the story of a character condensed, as it were, into the moment just 
before its telling.”16 While these descriptions could be highly expressive, their presence could be 
                                                
15 MOO is an acronym for MUD object-oriented, referring to MUDs in which users could build onto (or rather add 
descriptions of) the virtual world and do more with objects. (Not to be confused with MMO, which refers to a 
massively multiplayer online game.) 
16 Julian Dibbell, My Tiny Life: Crime and Passion in a Virtual World (New York: Holt, 1998), 134. An example he 
gives of a character description by user Niacin: “Having pissed away what was left of the family money and nothing 
to show for it but an old red and black BSA motorbike that he keeps in perfect working order, he ended up in the 
North Woods, where he does carpentry sometimes. He keeps his long, sandy hair tied back mostly. His eyes are a 
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inconsistent in the shared virtual space. A graphical avatar remains on the screen, but a textual 
character only appears with a ‘look’ command, and can slip quickly off-screen with the 
cascading conversation. A user can speak in character or integrate visual descriptions into his or 
her conversation in order to maintain a certain perceptual engagement, but sustained discourse of 
this kind can be difficult.17  
 It is useful to note however, how the ‘informational’ body of the textual character 
actually includes much more than the description, as every aspect of MUD users is expressed 
verbally. This body of information includes screen name, the description, and any conversational 
text contributed by the user. There are obvious parallels here with the construction of a character 
in a book (and it is this literary aspect that Dibbell’s silver-tongued comrades exploited); the 
distinction lies in what Ken Hillis calls “iconic indexicality or indexical iconicity,” which seems 
to users to transmit “some material aspect of the geographically distinct individual to whom it 
directly points.”18 For Hillis, avatars are indexical by virtue of their real-time technological 
connection to the actions of a user; their iconicity is due to the resemblance to a body to at least 
some extent, both in appearance and function. From a technological standpoint this is based in 
the automatism of the interface – the avatar doesn’t move without a command, and so avatar 
movement is a result of user activity. While the movements themselves may differ in form, as 
wind and weathervane are (user pushes a key, the avatar waves), one produces the other.  
 The real-time performance and automatic processes distinguish this action from the hand 
of the animator, for instance (after all, a painting does not have an indexical relation to the hand 
                                                                                                                                                       
pale blue, with flecks of gold in them and grey rings around the iris. High cheekbones, mouth quirked up in an ironic 
grin. He’s wearing a black t-shirt tucked into a pair of tight, faded levis and black work boots. In the pocket of his 
shirt, a pack of Lucky Strikes and the tooth of a wolf” (137). 
17 Dibbell refers to lengthy encounters, sexual and otherwise, which were highly textural through their textuality. 
However, Lori Kendall points out that while role-play was practiced in some virtual communities, in general its 
influence and pervasiveness have been overblown. Long-term roles are difficult to maintain, and many descriptions 
are less about producing character than giving a brief insight into personality. 
18 Hillis, Online a Lot of the Time, 114. 
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of the artist). Hillis is just as interested, however, in the phenomenological aspect of indexicality, 
in the way in which avatars are experientially understood to transmit some material aspect, and 
here he approaches the virtual. Mixed-media artist Lynne Heller captures it more lyrically when 
she states “the most basic of human interaction with objects, particularly images, causes us to 
necessarily invest them with spirit in order to understand, control, and dominate the ‘stuff’ of our 
existence.”19 From a phenomenological standpoint we look for those human aspects (including 
embodiment) transmitted through a network, reconstructed digitally, appearing in a form that 
facilitates affective responses. Heller’s recourse to the spiritual in what she calls ‘virtual-
materiality’ evokes the ephemerality of the virtual – that which perplexes and enchants within 
the processes of framing digital information and images. The textual body is a very simple form 
of what is done in other media transmissions with much more data (in photos or video chat, for 
instance), and can be quite fascinating in its spartan reliance on verbal communication – on the 
ways in which humans have encoded their interactions for millennia. Within these constraints 
Dibbell addresses the “terminal paradox” of approaching a “wordless knowledge of another 
person through a medium composed entirely of words,” as intimate verbal encounters produce 
bodies of human data integrating the rhetorical and corporeal: 
 
What had it truly been then, underneath the surface? . . . perhaps nothing else but what its 
surface mutely insisted it be: an unresolved pastiche of possible bodies both real and 
imagined, a moment of attraction suspended among the available categories of gender-
marked desire like an image lost amid a house of mirrors, bounced endlessly from one to 
another to the next and back until you knew that if you tried to find where the truth of it 
stood you’d only end up equally as lost?20 
 
 
                                                
19 Lynne Heller, “Fuzzy Precincts and Bleeding Edges: Feminist Theory and the Study of Virtual-Materiality” 
(ISEA2011 Istanbul, The 17th International Symposium on Electronic Art, September 14-21, 2011, Keynote 
address). 
20 Dibbell, My Tiny Life, 146, 133. 
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This brings me to the final historical moment, which extends into the present. Second 
Life launched in 2003, followed by World of Warcraft the next year. This period also marked the 
sixth generation of videogame consoles, with the release of the still-popular PlayStation 2, 
Microsoft’s introduction of the Xbox, and the waning of Sega and Atari, flagships of of erstwhile 
generations of gaming. The graphical capabilities ushered in by these platforms gave rise to a 
new breed of hyperrealistic game environments and avatar bodies that has continued with 
seventh-generation consoles (PlayStation 3, Xbox 360, Nintendo Wii) and for the foreseeable 
future. Second Life has more or less kept pace by crowdsourcing development, giving its users 
increasingly powerful tools for rendering realistic bodies, clothing, and hair (although server 
capacity and processing speeds occasionally prove insufficient for user ambitions). 
 The aesthetic of the hyperreal in virtual environments trends strongly toward the natural. 
Verdant landscapes replete with diverse foliage, wooden bridges over babbling brooks, 
moonlight shimmering on ocean vistas – such is also the trend of digital culture, away from 
machine aesthetics and toward the imagistic. The design of bodies follows suit, eschewing 
pixilation and classic videogame animations in an attempt to accurately simulate human 
appearance and movement. These bodies seem to enter a different register of graphical 
production, one that is closer to the photorealism of contemporary digital effects in cinema to 
traditional notions of iconicity in virtual environments. This is not to say that avatars have 
achieved such a level of realism – they haven’t – but the quest toward fidelity changes the 
relationship between body and image, and thus the nature of the experiential opportunities they 
afford relative to the virtual. 
 
Virtual Materiality 
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Definitions of the term ‘body’ reveal the dichotomy between holism and fragmentation in 
the word itself. The concept of an “assemblage of parts, organs, and tissues that constitutes the 
whole material organism” manifests the holistic view of parts that only become a body when 
they form a whole, and a whole that is never simply one thing; another definition of a body as a 
“collective mass” alludes to the utility of seeing atomized fragments as a whole, even though 
they don’t constitute one per se.21 I have reviewed the development of the avatar in its most 
popular form toward greater visual and functional complexity, away from iconicity and toward 
corporeality, and here turn to a consideration of the avatar ‘body’ as a collection of multiple 
informational elements held in layers of programs and data, images and simulations. This is more 
than a ‘collection’, I suggest, which implies a grouping of distinct objects, but something like a 
‘body’ – a single entity or gestalt arising from of disparate fragments. 
 Regarding the materiality implicit in the term ‘avatar’, Boellstorff notes that “while 
‘avatar’ historically referred to incarnation – a movement from virtual to actual – with respect to 
online worlds it connotes the opposite movement from actual to virtual, a decarnation or 
invirtualization.”22 Shifts in materiality are inherent in the concept of the avatar, although in 
contemporary avatar use there are two bodies, one biological and the other digital, meeting in the 
plane of the virtual. I have endeavored thus far to demonstrate that the digital avatar is more than 
just an image of a body, or a tool resembling a body, and with a bit of critical dissection I will 
autopsy the avatar in a demonstration of its depth, systems, and layers, attempting to identify 
those properties facilitating phenomenological connections. 
 This body is made up of a number of parts that cohere into the entity on the screen – 
layers of information and programming concealed beneath a visual surface of skin, clothing, and 
                                                
21 "body, n.". OED Online, Oxford University Press (accessed July 10, 2012). 
22 Boellstorff, Coming of Age in Second Life, 128. 
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hair. This layering is to a limited extent on display during instances of ‘lag’ (the delay in 
rendering objects on screen due to server demands or connection speeds) as the user waits while 
the environment and avatar body are assembled (in Second Life, this results in grayish coloring, 
lack of clothing or hair, or a partial body). Manovich argues that in instances of lag the 
artificiality and constructedness of virtual worlds and objects are brought to the fore, breaking 
the user’s immersive experience. However, the temporal construction of the avatar body during 
lag isn’t necessarily a negative, as it also, I suggest, contributes to an appreciation of the avatar 
as a body. One might note for instance the popularity and near ubiquity of behind-the-scenes 
appendices on DVDs that demonstrate CG production techniques; rather than simply breaking 
the illusion of animated and visual effects, the peek behind the curtain can be understood as 
adding a certain depth or dimension to images whose pro-filmic referent is absent or concealed, 
grounding them in real-world technology and the work of animators and motion-capture 
performances in addition to demonstrating the numerous layers that go into making a realistic 
composite. Not only do these revelatory appendices not spoil the effect, but they seem to be part 
of the overall fascination with CG imagery. 
 Theorist Bernadette Wegenstein writes that “the advent of new media has facilitated 
enormously the move of the reunion between holism and fragmentation” – a holism manifested 
in plurality that on the one hand evokes postmodern multiplicity, but on the other gestalt, in that 
digital information can be encountered in embodied terms, producing virtual entities (such as 
avatars) that are more than the sum of their parts, and that hold together experientially in a way 
that acknowledges fragmentation.23 Against Manovich, I argue that the manifest constructedness 
of the avatar actually contributes to the holism of the avatar, as it demonstrates that the avatar 
                                                
23 Bernadette Wegenstein, Getting Under the Skin: The Body and Media Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 36. 
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body is more than just an image or surface, but a multi-layered entity whose embodiment 
vaguely mirrors the ‘layers’ of human embodiment. As Alexander Galloway writes:  
 
The disabling act . . . any type of gamic aggression or gamic deficiency that arrives from 
outside the world of the game and infringes negatively on the game in some way, 
[including] crashes, low polygon counts, bugs, slowdowns, temporary freezes, and 
network lag, [can be irritating] but at the same time, they are often the most constitutive 
category of game acts, for they have the ability to define the outer boundaries of 
aesthetics in gaming, the degree zero for an entire medium.24  
 
 
The disabling act is a defining act, and in avatar use can serve as an (all too frequent) reminder 
that entire structures lie under the imaginal surfaces of environment and avatars. 
 Turning to the avatar body on the table, as it were, we first notice the clothing – an 
interesting aspect of the virtual realm in which bodies are visually created and then partially 
concealed. Virtual worlds researchers Jim Blascovich and Jeremy Bailenson refer to avatars as 
‘worn’ by users, but we can see that even avatars wear things. Clothing is a bodily adornment, 
expressive of taste and identity, something commonly purchased and frequently changed. As a 
second surface, clothing to some extent reflects (and initially ‘adhered’ to) skins in Second Life, 
which can also be expressive and exchanged, but trends in avatar fashion have moved toward 
distinguishing clothing from the skin. In its basic form, as was the case in earlier virtual worlds, 
virtual clothing is simply a ‘paint’ applied to the avatar body without altering its shape, but 
contemporary fashion sits atop the skin and flows around the avatar body, accentuating its form 
as a dimensional and social body in that the clothing is situated externally and complementary to 
it. 
We are now to the skin, that external organ which for humans acts as interface with the 
world, and for avatars marks a bodily boundary in human interfacing with virtual objects and 
                                                
24 Alexander R. Galloway, Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2006), 31. 
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terrain. Skin is “always ambivalent: on the one hand, an endless surface without beginning or 
end, similar to the Möbius strip, and, on the other hand, more than a wrapping for the body, but a 
semantically productive expanse.”25 As with the human body, the visual surface of the avatar 
cannot be viewed in its entirety all at once, as a picture can; it is always partly hidden, always 
moving and changing in appearance depending on the angle from which it is viewed. From 
robots to furries, avatar skin is certainly mutable in Second Life, but, as in CG cinema, 
simulations of human skin have represented a holy grail for virtual bodies, and skin in many 
ways has come to define the potential for avatarial embodiment. Increasing levels of realism in 
virtual environments have invited ever greater associations with the human body, and skin is a 
key element of what constitutes humanness in realms virtual (Fig. 13).  
 
 
    
  Figure 13. Skins for sale in Second Life. 
 
 
 Human-like figures (however cartoonish) have been a common fixture in virtual 
environments long before contemporary technologies made realistic skins possible, but a fixation 
with skin that has attended technological advances in graphical rendering toward unifying the 
                                                
25 Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener, Film Theory: An Introduction Through the Senses (New York: Routledge, 
2010), 116. 
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modular avatar body – the more realistic the surface, the greater the sense of holism, as skin is 
associated with the coherence and integrity of the body. With increasingly realistic skin textures, 
facial appearance, and body shape, developers have produced highly affective bodies – though 
not entirely escaping of the uncanny valley or uncanniness of the automaton.26 Uncanniness can 
occur not only in the small disjunctures in appearance and movement, but in the subtler way that 
these avatars seem to exhibit a degree of self-existence or belonging to themselves, in “the 
illusion of avatars in that environment possessing souls and controlling their own destinies – a 
virtual existence,” as Heller puts it.27 Skin carries ontological weight, and those in possession of 
it within a virtual environment are of a different order, distinct from other objects. An encounter 
with a finely rendered avatar necessitates a sort of ‘double consciousness’ in which the avatar is 
understood as simultaneously inanimate and alive, belonging to users and at the same time 
exhibiting its own bodily presence.28 
 Skins in Second Life are bought and sold, featured at in-world boutiques and online 
websites, and given names – Melissa, Sam, Yvonne – in place of model numbers.29 Genitals and 
nipples come attached with these models; for standard issue Second Life avatars, however, they 
must be purchased separately. With skin comes sex, and graphical avatars in general preserve the 
binarism that characterizes real world cultural definitions of the body – definitions, as Foucault 
argues, that are inscribed on the body, producing its materiality discursively. The conformity of 
                                                
26 Masahiro Mori developed the concept of the uncanny valley, in which a plot of the response of an observer to 
robots (or CG characters) becomes increasingly positive and empathetic as the appearance and/or movement of the 
robot or character becomes more human-like. At the point at which appearance and/or movement approach nearly or 
barely human, the response becomes one of revulsion and the line dips into the ‘uncanny valley’ before quickly 
rising again in response to a healthy human. The realism of contemporary avatars is frequently countered by 
disjointing during movement, odd overlaps or penetrations between clothing and bodies, ‘dead eyes’, etc., that can 
contribute to an occasional sense of the uncanny valley. 
27 Heller, “Fuzzy Precincts and Bleeding Edges.” 
28 Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?, 7. 
29 This aspect calls to mind the Blade Runner replicants who, while designed for specific labors, are given names – 
Zhora, Leon, Pris, Roy – as part of their integration into human society. 
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avatar bodies to sex designations despite the potential fluidity of gender play helps produce their 
virtual materiality by appealing to normative ideas of what a body is, especially as the 
relationship between virtual gender and real-world sex is easily troubled. Race as well becomes 
an ironically stabilizing force in the face of perceived bodily instability, providing “familiar, 
solid, and reassuring versions of race which other users can readily accept and understand,” 
reifying the white, Western male subject by providing “the necessary contrast, the dark 
background, against which the user can feel even more ‘himself’ than he did before.”30  
Skin and its color, bodies and their shapes, become the virtually material substrates of 
race and gender, and avatar bodies take part in this discursive inscription. This occurs on the one 
hand through conventional signs – for instance, in the hair and clothing of a female avatar. But 
such signs are to some extent available to, and widely used by, less nuanced figures in gaming 
and virtual worlds, as in the gendering of Pac-Man with a bow and lipstick to create Ms. Pac-
Man, adding signs of (female) gender to a basic shape. The gendering of more sophisticated 
avatar bodies, while often employing similar forms of signification, at the same time resist 
obvious signification through the naturalization of the body: while Ms. Pac-Man is female 
because of the signs that code her so, a female avatar is styled femininely ‘because’ she is 
female. 
 The face, the most expressive part of the body and as the part most often associated with 
self, is also a well-equipped, affective ‘interface’ (Fig. 14). With its concentration of sensory 
organs the face becomes the primary input mechanism for interfacing with the material world, as 
well as for expression and communication with others. We commonly ‘read’ faces for 
information about a person’s feelings or intent, and can keenly detect subtle shifts. Mark Hansen 
sees the face as a potential catalyst for affective interfacing with computers, where it may offer 
                                                
30 Lisa Nakamura, Cybertypes, 39-40. 
 112 
“a promising alternative to the profoundly impoverished, yet currently dominant model of the 
human-computer interface.”31 Relative to the face (or what he refers to in new media applications 
as the ‘digital facial image’), icons and information insufficiently address the potential for more 
human-compatible interfaces. Rather than a GUI that reduces “the wide bandwidth of embodied 
human expressivity to a fixed repertoire of functions and icons,” he envisions an “open-ended, 
positive feedback loop linking information to the entire affective register.”32 While avatars do not 
generally constitute such a functional interface, they do prompt affective responses; such 
responses contribute to one of the avatar’s visual paradoxes, in that one intuitively seeks 
expression and reaction in the face, which is not there. However, developments in facial 
recognition software are pushing toward fully mimetic avatars that will convey expression and 
lip movement, while on the gaming front exploring the potential for the integration of player 
expressions into gameplay.33 To a significant extent the face is situated as the next frontier for 
human-computer interaction. 
 
 
    
                                                
31 Hansen, New Philosophy for New Media, 129. 
32 Ibid., 129-30. 
33 See “Facial-Capture Avatars Go from Hollywood to Home PCs,” Innovation News Daily (June 11, 2012). 
http://www.innovationnewsdaily.com/1256-facial-capture-avatars-hollywood.html.  
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  Figure 14. The face as affective interface. 
 
 
 Beneath the skin we find the skeleton, the frame that moves the body and to which the 
prims that shape the avatar are attached. The skeleton is that invisible part of the avatar body that 
remains constant within the mutability of shape and appearance, and which, as the instrument for 
movement, has a key role in the enactment of the avatar body as a body instead of an imagistic 
object or bit of digital statuary. Movement occurs within the simulated physics of the virtual 
environment, encompassing gravity, distance, solidity, and dimensionality, so that avatar bodies 
are moved relative to other objects and within a spatiality that reinforces the sense of their 
‘bodyness’. Avatars don’t need to walk or run in virtual environments, yet they typically do, on 
legs that recall Katherine Hayles’s discussion of skeuomorphs – design features that were once 
functional but, having lost their utility, are kept for aesthetic reasons. Movement through space is 
a defining quality of virtual environments, and movement of an avatar body conflates entry into 
virtual space with embodiment, allowing virtual environments to become spaces that are not 
simply interactive and spatialized, but places for embodied engagement, places in which to be 
enworlded. 
 We now put the avatar’s tissues under the microscope. In the skin and clothing we find 
textures, those patterns and pictures either created in-world or, more often, derived from 
photographs. Avatars wearing textures can thus literally be clothed in images, and much of their 
virtual materiality is dependent on these textures which import and repurpose the materiality of 
the photograph, taking advantage of both its depth (being able to see into the photograph) and its 
superficiality (the way depth is rendered as surface). The use of images as digital flesh or 
sartorial covering recalls new media theorist Alluquere Rosanne Stone’s description of putting 
on “cybernetic space like a garment,” but relative to the fabrics and flesh of Second Life fashion 
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and bodies, her sense, formulated within early computer graphics and text-based virtual 
communities, comes off as ironic – more akin to putting on information and electronic pulses, 
the no-space of cyberspace, a diaphanous digitality rather than virtual velvet.34 
 Examining the surface more closely, we note that the digital material of computerized 
images is visually manifest on the display as arrangements of pixels, the basic unity of digital 
imagery. Pixels are often thought of as informational bits, but in actuality are not ‘contained’ in 
the image data except as a raster grid of integers; the pixel itself is the physical part of the 
display whose color and shading is dictated by the data that define it, and thus pixels are the 
point at which immaterial information stored materially on a drive is rematerialized (at sixty 
hertz) in visual form. The materiality of the pixel operates as the point of contact between 
embodied user and computer space, in a way distinct from the cinematic image where grain is 
part of the film stock that is illuminated by a projector and reflected off a screen, and the 
photographic print in which the grain is fixed: the materiality of the pixel is tied to the display 
rather than the image, and is instantly mutable even while being physical. 
 Changing lenses, we go deeper, into software and code and the programs for movement 
and appearance and the existence of the avatar body itself. It is here that the avatar body is 
formed as a collection or ‘body’ of digital information, indirectly engaged when users want to 
move their avatar or perform other actions. It is this programming that is added to or altered 
when Second Life users script their own movements and poses, or purchase skins, hair, and 
clothing, adding to or changing the body of the program and content of the database. 
Programming in Second Life is tied to the larger platform, but is also an individual creation, a 
part of the program for just the user; it is this program that reflects visually the choices and 
                                                
34 Alllucquere Rosanne Stone, “Will the Real Body Please Stand Up? Boundary Stories about Virtual Cultures,” In 
Cyberspace: First Steps, ed. Michael Benedikt (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 109. 
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agency of the user, inhered in the avatar body. It is here that we also find the username, that bit 
of information that becomes in many ways the essential part of any avatar; the avatar’s 
appearance may change completely with the use of different skins, but the username is the 
information that resides at the core of the avatar’s programming and identity within the system, 
and also on the surface as information for users – in Second Life, hanging prominently above the 
avatar’s head. In a rather abstract sense the username might be thought of as the ‘soul’ of the 
avatar in that it becomes the signifier, as information attached and integral to the body, for the 
underlying and invisible informational structures of the avatar body relative to the imaginal 
presence of its visible overlay. 
 At the atomic level we find binary code, the fundamental dyadic form of digital 
information in which all computer information is preserved. At this point it may seem that we 
have thoroughly dematerialized the avatar body, but on the contrary it is at the level of computer 
code that we have reached the physical instantiation of the avatar in which its information is 
inscribed on hard drives. Of course, avatar bodies share this quality with everything else digital, 
and in that sense are hardly unique, but what is compelling about the avatar is the way it presents 
information – which, as Hayles reminds us, requires a body – in the actual form of a body. 
Machine alterity comes to characterize the computer at the level of this language accessible only 
to computers, that its creators can’t read except through the use of computers, and that is in itself 
incomprehensible to the human mind – or perhaps, thinking again in metaphysical terms, rather 
than alterity, spirituality.35 While resorting to metaphysical language does not make the avatar 
any more a body in the same sense as the sensorial human body, the concept of there being 
something inside a body, invisible and complex, that enlivens it and makes it more than it 
                                                
35 Heller’s understanding of the material world being accessed through an injection of ‘spirit’ comes to mind here, 
by which she implies that we not only respond affectively to the world, but inject it perceptually with a quickening 
force. 
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appears on its surface, is well-rooted in the cultural understanding of embodiment, and thus the 
phenomenological experience of avatar bodies as bodies certainly allows for such associations. 
Of course, the most obvious animating influence on the avatar body is the user, and in this 
respect we become the spirit element enlivening the avatar body – and also a defining aspect of 
its materiality. 
 Finally, the avatar body is linked to a virtual ‘camera’, a point in space that provides a 
view of the avatar relative to the environment that is drawn around it in the moment of viewing. 
The camera is the point of visual connection between user and avatar that facilitates a number of 
other connections, functional, communicative, aesthetic, and experiential. That is, while the 
visual is certainly primary, it is also primarily a facilitator for other forms of interaction beyond 
the look, including the haptic connection through the controller, navigation of space, cognitive 
puzzle-solving, chatting, building, etc.  
 Collectively, these layers of graphical, algorithmic, and informational layers comprise the 
body of the avatar. We become aware of these layers through the lag that reveals constructed 
elements, glitches that expose their programming, and the general knowledge that digital 
imagery is numerically based. Composited together, they produce an image that “is not ‘one’, or 
identical with itself,” as D. N. Rodowick writes of these images that have no “visible presence 
for us or to us without the aid of a display.”36 Yet it appears as one, as a collection of systems, 
information, and vivifying animation ‘contained’ within a virtual skin – an entity at the 
intersection of the representational human body and a body of information, interfaced with an 
embodied human who relates to each of these aspects differently. This brings us back to the 
reflection, for what is the nature of the body in the mirror? It is an image, to be certain, but one 
known to have an interior, even if making the connection between the subjective I and the 
                                                
36 Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film, 135. 
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objective image body can be perplexing. The mirror image has a depth, a presence that the 
photograph does not, and while the picture of the exteriorized self the mirror returns is always 
just out of reach, at the same time we are always present to it as it is to us, always connected. 
“Identification is, from the beginning, a question of relation, of self to other, subject to object, 
inside to outside.”37 The avatar reminds us however that the relation to self is not vectorial, but a 
circuit. As a ‘virtual image’, the mirror reflection necessitates the presence of the object being 
reflected – the mirror requires two. It pictures me, but I am its image as well.  
 
Constitutive Mediation 
 
Soft piano music over black, then two names appear in elegant script: Sunni Irvine and 
Ocean Lane. The names dissolve into a long, gliding shot drifting toward an ethereal island 
cathedral set amidst delicate white and blue trees. Dissolve again to the interior where a 
bridesmaid begins her slow promenade down the aisle, flanked on either side by white and 
burgundy pews and ornate flower arrangements. A singer’s voice joins the piano as the video 
dissolves to a wide shot of the bride’s extravagant gown, then cutting to a closer shot and a slow 
push on a well-tanned Sunni, resplendent in her garland, veil, and jewelry. The breeze tousles her 
hair, and her big blue eyes gaze longingly down the aisle where Ocean awaits. This is their 
wedding video. 
 Or the ultimate in digital fantasy – the machinima video of the Second Life wedding, 
where simulacral layers stack as high as the cake: the opulence of the dream wedding, the union 
of perfect bodies, and the video running through the clichéd conventions of slow dissolves, 
romantic poses, and photos of their courtship (in Second Life) mingled with footage of the 
ceremony, with the entire event taking place in a virtual world. But at the same time, its 
                                                
37 Diana Fuss, Identification Papers (New York: Routledge, 1995), 3. 
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connections to the real world are plain. Weddings are typically designed to be fantasy affairs, 
and ritual serves to reify the virtuality of cultural norms. And while kisses and handshakes in 
Second Life lack physical contact and sensory stimulation, nevertheless the performance of such 
actions serve as social interactions that are not only appreciated for their symbolic value, but can 
also be ‘felt’ in the body through body memory and imagination. Anecdotes of such events, 
including the comments attached to their video records, reflect the degree to which participants 
frequently understand these events, and the bodies through which they are performed, as 
experientially real.38 
 I have presented the case for the avatar as a body in certain ways mirroring our own from 
a technological perspective, but affectively the avatar is also a body in that it is perceived as a 
body, treated as a body, cared for as a body, used and abused as a body. Avatars draw the kinds 
of looks and reactions that are associable with bodies, and they perform embodied actions on 
behalf of their users, strolling through galleries, drinking virtual Coke, meditating in the Zen 
garden, having virtual sex. A clear distinction can be drawn, for instance, in the difference in 
behavior toward an avatar and a ‘bot’ or NPC (non-player character); the bodies are made of the 
same stuff, but one performs a programmed series of actions while the other is performed by a 
user. Bots look like avatars, and can interact with players or users to a limited extent (in social or 
expeditionary situations they typically give the user information; in gaming, NPCs are often 
killed by the player), but they are treated very differently, even with various forms of bodily 
contact and emoting. It is clear that through all the layers that make up the avatar body, in order 
to make it an ‘avatar’ in the full sense of the word, it requires a connection to a user – that is, to a 
body. Operated by a user, the avatar responds to physical interfacial touch in a way distinct from 
                                                
38 Part of this reality includes real world expenses. The YouTube note for one Second Life wedding reports that it 
cost 65,000 Lindens, or about $225.  
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the use of other media and information – rather than handling a tool or writing a word, using the 
body to move and perform another body in a space that facilitates and encourages a particular 
kind of phenomenological engagement, body to body. 
 The avatar body connected temporally, haptically, and through an experiential virtual 
materiality to a human body produces a connective entity exhibiting “the body as constitutive 
mediation,” as Bernadette Wegenstein writes in regard to new media artifacts that engage 
embodiment in new ways: “what has previously been known as a medium has adopted the 
characteristics of body within the techno- and new media sphere of the new millennium.”39 
Digital media, whose visual components extend beyond the traditional definitions of images as 
exemplified in the avatar body, and which are in a certain sense more proximate to the human 
body in that they are subject to use, manipulation, and the touch of the interface, take on the 
qualities of a body. The new media works analyzed by Wegenstein relate to human embodiment 
in multiple ways, from proprioceptive interaction in VR displays that take shape according to the 
movement of the participant’s body, to conceptual architecture incorporating biological and 
organic design.   
 On the other hand, Wegenstein understands the human body as defined by its connections 
and capacity for mediation, indeed as mediation itself, which can be understood as the condition 
in which a person’s interaction with the world as well as with his or her own body is a product of 
language, interpretation, projection, and imagination. Her conception, however, is not simply a 
reiteration of the poststructuralist deconstruction of the subject, but a consideration of how 
virtual technologies don’t simply contribute to the fragmentation of embodied experience but 
rather how fragmentation can be understood as gestalt. If human subjectivity is inherently 
                                                
39 Bernadette Wegenstein, Getting Under the Skin: The Body and Media Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 
120. 
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fragmented, understanding it as such doesn’t necessarily eliminate the possibility for holism if 
holism is reconceived in terms of the connections between disparate material and experiential 
elements. One might then think of the connection between the physical body of the user and a 
visualized, interactive form of its virtuality in the avatar body, touching at the interface (which is 
itself is materially immaterial, defined by connections, images, invisible processes) as a sort of 
‘body’. The avatar, which can only be avatarial when connected to a user, and the user, who is in 
certain ways virtual, incorporate at the interface to form a body defined by connection and 
mediation – what might be designated an ‘avatar’.   
 This ‘avatar’ is unstable, temporary, and contingent – reflecting the virtuality of human 
embodiment – but at the same time a compelling and even comfortable arrangement. I have 
hitherto directed attention to the avatar body in order to distinguish it from the connection that 
animates this body and produces it as an avatar, rather than as solely an avatar body (as when the 
user is ‘afk’, away from keyboard) or a picture of an avatar as produced with a snapshot 
function. Identifying the avatar body as an entity with depth and complexity and exuding self-
existence, I have sought to isolate it within the avatar relation; while accepted nomenclature 
designates this entity as the ‘avatar’, I argue that the avatar body is not the avatar per se, but the 
object that facilitates an avatarial connection within shared online space, and provides a digital 
body connected to the physical one, facilitating a particular form for experiential virtuality. The 
avatar body is avatarial when interfaced with another body, and thus the ‘avatar’ is composed of 
these two bodies and the connection between them; this relation constitutes its body and its 
materiality, including the two bodies and the interface at which they touch. In other words, we 
are avatar in the fact that we use avatars – our materiality is theirs, our bodies avatarial. 
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 In this regard I follow Galloway’s approach to the gaming apparatus as including the 
‘entire apparatus’ of machine and operator. “If photographs are images, and films are moving 
images, then video games are actions,” he writes, “video games come into being when the 
machine is powered up and the software is executed; they exist when enacted.”40 The operator 
and machine play the videogame together, and for Galloway, “the two types of action [machine 
action and operator action] are ontologically the same. In fact, in much of gameplay, the two 
actions exist as a unified, single phenomenon, even if they are distinguishable for the purposes of 
analysis.”41 Avatars are doubles; their ontology is connection, and they depend on their users for 
action and being. Avatars are also halves – perhaps only halves, masquerading as doubles, and 
the model of the ‘avatar’ suggests that our ontology shares something with theirs. The ‘avatar’ 
proposes a gestalt that is not inherent but established in the connections made through the virtual 
– that is, not achieved subsequent to or separate from the connections, but precisely in the action 
of making and utilizing connections.  
 This ontological model represents the figural potential of the avatar, to which I will later 
return in considering its implications in regard to motion-capture and digital effects cinema. For 
the moment, however, I turn my attention to the way in which connectivity is problematized in 
avatar films. As with the cyborg, theoretical promise can run contrary to representation in 
popular media, and in the next chapter I follow the question of agency relative to the avatar as 
the source of certain tensions, tying it back to interactivity as problematic in itself. Echoes of the 
cyborg resound as the malformed gestalt of human and technology is feared much more often 
than embraced, but I also attempt in this chapter to move toward doubles, reflections, and 
                                                
40 Galloway, Gaming, 2. 
41 Ibid., 5. 
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images, and the discursive distinction between players and those played – an especially vexing 
problem when one is playing oneself. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
WHO’S PLAYING YOU? 
 
 
Guard: Who aims – the player or the slayer? 
Tillman: I’m the hand. Someone somewhere else is the eye. 
Guard: That’s tripped out, man. 
Tillman: Sometimes they take over completely. Move you around like a robot.  
 But that don’t work so good. 
Guard: Why not? 
Tillman: The delay. 
Guard: Right, the ‘ping’. They talk about that. The time it takes for the slayer to 
 respond to the player’s commands. 
Tillman: Whatever they call it, when you’re in the game, a slice of a second is the 
 difference between living and dying. When that trigger pulls . . . it’s just 
 me. 
  From Gamer 
 
 The tagline for the film Gamer is the deliberately provocative question “Who’s Playing 
You?” which not only upends the conventional notion of control in gaming (as extending from 
the player) but also situates the potential moviegoer in the position of the avatar – as an object of 
control, devoid of agency. This bleak outlook on contemporary subjectivity as that of a 
videogame character can be compared with the slogan for Kinect, Microsoft’s motion-sensing 
input device for Xbox, which declares “You Are the Controller” (Fig. 15). Being the controller 
rather than the controlled holds on its surface the promise of agentive fulfillment, but on closer 
inspection the two slogans are more similar than dissimilar; in gaming the controller is, 
traditionally at least, the plastic, tethered, utilitarian input device that is gripped and manipulated, 
sometimes even pounded or thrown, in service of the more animated or complex movements of 
the bodies on the screen. To be the ‘controller’ holds the double meaning of being the one in 
control, as the player, as well as being the object of control – the hardware (or in this case 
wetware) through which the game is played.   
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  Figure. 15. Advertisement for Kinect. 
 
 In this doubling we find the body circuitously implicated within the relationship between 
player, machine, and code in gaming that Alexander Galloway identifies as “a singularity . . . an 
undivided act wherein meaning and doing transpire in the same gamic gesture.”1 As previously 
noted, rather than reading a text from a critical distance, as with traditional media forms, 
Galloway avers that the player creates the gamic text in the moment of play by ‘doing’, in a 
process that with practice becomes intuitive, producing a singularity. The Kinect sensor adds 
somatic performance to this unifying process, as the player must precisely perform her own body 
in order to succeed in the game – to play by ‘being’ the controller in both senses simultaneously. 
In the game Dance Central (2010, Harmonix) the circuit of performance and control is clearly 
manifest, as the player must follow the onscreen movements of the character while the Kinect 
sensor records missteps and delays in keeping time with the rhythm – or lag, we might say, 
recalling both the wait time for an overloaded network and the ‘ping’ in Gamer. In Dance 
                                                
1 Galloway, Gaming, 104. 
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Central, who is playing whom is ambiguous to say the least, as the best players are essentially 
the best puppets. The game recalls a certain scene from Gamer in which protagonist John 
Tillman (Gerard Butler), a death row convict and mind-controlled avatar in the lethal battle game 
‘Slayers’, where his avatar handle is Kable, is made to dance by his seventeen-year-old controller 
Simon (Logan Lerman) amidst gunfire and explosions; in this moment of ludic movement and 
corporeal vulnerability, Tillman incarnates the film’s blood-spattered answer to the discourses of 
disembodiment that once prevailed in the theorization of gaming and virtual technologies, as he 
(as with Kinect) demonstrates that the body, rather than being disposable, is indispensable in the 
engagement of virtual spaces, appropriated in the service of the game (Fig. 16). 
 
 
 
Figure 16. The privileged Simon and his battle weary avatar Kable (Tillman) in 
Gamer. 
 
 
 In both of these examples the body is aligned with the interface, with Kinect and the 
“You Are the Controller” slogan positioning the body as game hardware, and “Who’s Playing 
You?” and Gamer situating the human as software, as the avatar that represents the player in the 
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virtual environment. Positing the body as interface carries multiple implications, from mirror 
neurons and psychosomatics to phenomenological experience and gender constructivism, but the 
technological interfaces for videogames and virtual environments insert a tangible and perceptual 
apparatus between the player and the various modes of embodied engagement with the game 
space. The controller and avatar are objects that not only exist between the physical and virtual 
worlds, but which make the separation of these spaces within the gamic text possible. When the 
avatar is seen as a primarily functional extension of self in game space, and the controller a tool 
for access and manipulation, the interface position is utilitarian; but when the avatarial position is 
inflected back on the user, and the body conscripted into the dance steps that make Dance 
Central an entertaining party game (for the movement it imposes on real bodies), the interface 
becomes symbolic of powerlessness. The menacing tone of  “Who’s Playing You?” is not the 
product of a suggestion of equally matched players meeting as opponents, but for its association 
of the reader or moviegoer with the disempowered avatar – and further for its insinuation that 
there is no existence outside of game space (or ‘gamespace’, as McKenzie Wark puts it).  In 
Gamer, as with Surrogates and The Matrix, avatar ontology serves as a model for ideological 
and informational manipulation, in which autonomy is an illusion within a society of simulation 
(The Matrix), ideologically suspect in a culture of vicarious living (Surrogates), or subject to the 
machinations of a ubiquitous and perverse game culture (Gamer).   
 Steven Shaviro devotes an extensive essay to the latter film, performing a reading of 
Gamer as a film about and existing within a control society, offering a ‘map’ (if not quite a 
critique) of contemporary entertainment as postmodern gamespace and neoliberal capitalism as 
the invisible hand making puppets of it subjects.2 Gamer’s videogame-derived aesthetics and 
manic, impressionistic editing style (which Shaviro defines as ‘post-continuity’) operate in 
                                                
2 Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect. 
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concert with the diegetic setting of a society consumed either by playing games with the bodies 
of other people, or viewing the avatarial spectacle as reality television. In this chapter I ask not 
only what it means to have an avatar, but to be an avatar in terms of the cultural and critical 
discourse by which films that depict avatars and avatarial relationships participate in the 
evolving conceptions of interactivity and virtual embodiment. Gamer’s figuring of post-
industrial capitalism – and the way in which it ‘plays’ with its subjects in more ways than one, as 
I discuss further below – contributes additional layers to the cultural understanding of what 
avatars ‘mean’ and how they pertain to the increasing virtualization of embodiment through 
multiple informational and imaging technologies. Our use and manipulation of, and desire for or 
suspicion of a secondary order of bodies in the image of our own raises the question of how the 
societal forces we feel (as well as enact) upon ourselves might be reflected, reenacted, or 
repudiated in the bodies we create and control. 
 The 2007 game Assassin’s Creed (Ubisoft) bears mentioning here for its illustration of 
the reiterative nature of avatarism. In the game, one plays what is essentially the avatar of an 
avatar, as bartender Desmond Miles is abducted by a corporation determined to locate a number 
of ancient artifacts by which it can exert mental control over people (a recurring theme in avatar 
texts). The corporation forces Desmond to relive the genetic memories of his assassin forebears – 
or, considering both the interface used by the player and the technology of the ‘Animus’ that 
facilitates Desmond’s spatiotemporal entry into his ancestor Altaïr, to play the ‘memory’ 
encoded in his DNA. Success in the game is contingent upon successful reenactment, as players 
are kept on task by a meter displaying the level of ‘synchronization’ between Desmond and his 
avatar/ancestor, which of course is actually a measure of the player’s synchronization with the 
 128 
game. Between missions the game returns to Desmond’s incarceration, which the player 
momentarily shares until linking again with Altaïr.  
 Desmond’s enforced sojourns into virtual reality recall the strange entertainment of the 
Platonic cave, where prisoners exposed to a shadow reality came to prefer it to the blinding 
world outside. Like Tillman, Desmond plays to be free, while their respective users (Simon, the 
player) play for fun, and it in this compulsion the film and game are made. Desmond’s awareness 
of his avatarial status is rare for a narrative-based game, while the player, though positioned to 
identify with Desmond’s plight, essentially operates in the service of the corporation, playing 
Desmond playing Altaïr in order to achieve its objectives; Altaïr, the (unaware) avatar of an 
avatar, is the one upon whom multiple levels of control are exerted. Assassin’s Creed puts into 
play a structure of control that is recursive and compulsory – theoretical territory well-
established in Foucault’s writings on power and subjectivity. For Foucault subjectivity is 
twofold, as one is both subject to discursive influence and the subject of its perpetuation in the 
disciplining of behavior and the body, as can be seen in his concept of panopticism: 
 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for 
the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in 
himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection.3  
 
For Foucault, the answer to the question of ‘who’s playing you?’ is you, as you are ultimately the 
instrument for the inscription of power on yourself. Avatars are bodies subject, like our own, to 
control and inscription, and in avatar films it is the avatar with which we are asked to identify – 
sometimes literally, as with Gamer, and other times through sympathy for characters who are 
victims of an avatarial culture, as in Surrogates, in which the protagonist peers through the 
                                                
3 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 202-3. 
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ideological wool to find that the vicarious lifestyles which were meant to enhance the experience 
of living have drained life of its meaning. While videogames make use of avatars, cinematic 
depictions of avatars are more concerned with how we have become avatars, in narratives that 
can be read in terms of Foucauldian subjection and discipline – or, as recent scholarship 
suggests, relative to control society. 
 Critics of the political economy of gaming such as Shaviro and Galloway have turned 
their attention from Foucault to the illusive utopianism of flexibility, which Galloway cites as 
“one of the founding principles of global informatic control. It is to the control society what 
discipline was to a previous one.”4 Deleuze outlines the ‘society of control’ in which control 
operates as modulation in contrast with the mold of the enclosure theorized by Foucault in his 
description of docile bodies. However, Foucault proves useful in his particular treatment of 
power relative to the discipline of the (avatarial) body, as I demonstrate in a discussion of The 
Matrix and Sleep Dealer. In the following section I turn my attention to two films, The 
Lawnmower Man and eXistenZ that privilege modulation over the mold, and are thus most 
productively approached with control society in mind.   
 Issues of gender undergird any discussion of agency in these films, as agentive action 
primarily falls within the domain of the male protagonist. This in itself isn’t unexpected, as male 
activity and female passivity within the films accord with Hollywood convention; however, the 
association between masculinity and agency accrues additional significance in the context of the 
disempowered avatar, as male characters contend against an encroaching virtuality that threatens 
agency, while their female and raced counterparts, already understood as ‘closer’ to the avatarial 
position and more familiar with the virtualization of the body, become facilitators for the medial 
transitions of the white male, or characters in need of rescue from a virtuality that has consumed 
                                                
4 Galloway, Gaming, 100. 
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them. Galloway’s preference of the term ‘action-based media’ over ‘interactivity’ in his 
theorization of gaming is particularly interesting relative to these cinematic depictions of 
masculinity, as action implies a vector, power applied unidirectionally, while interactivity 
implies greater possibility for bidirectional influence and exchange.5 Recent scholarship has 
problematized conventional notions of interactivity, and the figure of the avatar occupies a 
central place in manifestations of the question of who is playing whom, and when, if ever, we 
can say “it’s just me.” 
 
Re-working the Docile Body 
 Before Neo is Neo, he is Thomas Anderson, hacker and coppertop. The Matrix envisions 
a world in which humans have become a power source for machine overlords; enclosed 
physically in pods and mentally in the ‘neural-interactive simulation’ of the Matrix, humans circa 
2199 are incarcerated in a world of Baudrillardian simulation, but also as exemplary (if 
overdetermined) models of the docile body, which “may be subjected, used, transformed, and 
improved,” as described by Foucault.6 Docile bodies are the bodies of individuals made to 
conform to certain roles and performances through systems of discipline, generally involving an 
‘enclosure’ (an institution or organization) which provides specialized, ideological education by 
separating individuals out for training. With the pod and simulation enclosures facilitating 
docility in the Matrix, the machines separate the physical and mental realms of the subject, 
supplanting the physical body and world with an immersive virtual reality. Thus integral to the 
Cartesian structure imposed by the machines is a form of virtual embodiment that engages the 
                                                
5 Although game developers have recently boosted the number of titles for girls, videogaming has been and largely 
remains a male-dominated pursuit. This chapter attends to issues of white masculinity, while femininity and race are 
covered in the chapter following. 
6 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 136. 
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embodied mind so it should not miss its sleeping body. Emerging from the Matrix, then, 
introduces the mind to its actual physical body. But Neo (Keanu Reeves) does not stay out for 
long, as he soon re-enters the Matrix after working through training simulations in Matrix-like 
virtual spaces. From our own embodied perspective, it is easy to think of his training as learning 
to differentiate physical embodiment from virtual embodiment, but of course Neo had for most 
of his life only experienced the latter, and had been physical only a few days. Thus his return was 
not simply a transition from the physical to the virtual, but a return to the virtual with a new tool: 
interactivity. 
 Christian Krug and Joachim Frenk note that interactivity was key for Neo’s break from 
the simulation of the Matrix; initially freed by a hack, he then becomes a transcendent hacker 
able to exert control over the Matrix. However, Krug and Frenk note that the tie-in videogame 
Enter the Matrix (2003, Shiny Entertainment), which promised to extend the Matrix experience 
and allow fans to enter and interact with the world presented in the films, was ironically linear 
and restrictive, allowing only minimal interactivity outside accomplishing pre-designated tasks. 
Philosophical declarations of determinism in the film extend quite literally to the structure of the 
game, they write, as playing it only brings about story events that were always going to happen 
anyway. The game thus becomes a tool for control, figuring as “just another extension of the 
great game that is the Matrix.”7   
 Character-based videogames in general tend to follow a more or less predetermined 
course through levels and tasks, and a geography that often only yields one correct (or even one 
possible) course. “Video games are computer-and-monitor-supported activities that select a small 
basketful out of all the possible ways that embodied brains may relate to worlds and other 
                                                
7 Christian Krug and Joachim Frenk, “Enter the Matrix – Interactivity and the Logic of Digital Capitalism,” in The 
Matrix in Theory, ed. Myriam Diocaretz and Stefan Herbrechter (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 83. 
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agents.”8 Interactivity in gaming (particularly the popular character-based adventure variety) 
tends to offer a limited form of agency, as linearity predominates, and progression is tied to 
compliance rather than innovation.9 Repetition comes to typify videogame experience as players 
rehearse the same actions multiple times in an attempt to get them right rather than devising 
different solutions to solve problems. “Not only are the conventional limits of the game itself 
revealed at such moments,” writes Andrew Darley, “but so is its pre-programmed character: the 
element of control and choice it seems to offer is revealed as illusory – just as predetermined as 
most formulaic narrative.”10  
 Thus while interactivity within digital media has certainly changed media consumption 
and continues to hold many promises, it is clear that interactivity cannot simply be conflated with 
agency. Lev Manovich argues that in computer culture “authentic creation has been replaced by 
selection from a menu,” and thus the mythos of interactivity must be interrogated to uncover the 
form of agency it provides in any given context.11 Examining the forms that interactivity 
assumes in videogames, we see that while games offer a variety of performative actions 
(jumping, shooting, etc.), repetition is the action that most succinctly defines gameplay. Behavior 
within the game world is disciplined through learning to execute certain actions in a particular 
way, which allows the player to proceed to the next level and reach the (pre-determined, linear) 
ending of the game. The disciplining of behavior is produced through a disciplining of bodies – 
                                                
8 Andreas Gregersen and Torben Grodal, “Embodiment and Interface,” in The Video Game Theory Reader 2, ed. 
Bernard Perron and Mark J. P. Wolf (New York: Routledge, 2009), 81. 
9 Open world or ‘sandbox’ games, of which the Grand Theft Auto series is a notable and popular example, are 
exceptions, to varying degrees, of the linearity that predominates in character-based adventure games.  Puzzle and 
strategy games also allow for a greater degree of freedom in problem-solving, and PvP (player versus player) modes 
in many games remove narrative linearity but typically also limit progression through the game.  However, the 
cinematic influence that has contributed to both the aesthetics and popularity of narrative games becomes participant 
and interactive in the cultural context of avatarial gaming. 
10 Andrew Darley, Visual Digital Culture: Surface Play and Spectacle in New Media Genres (London: Routledge, 
2000), 157. 
11 Manovich, Language of New Media, 124. 
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the correct and precise movements of the player’s fingers and thumbs on the controller, and the 
corresponding (though misaligned) movements of the character body in the game.12 Wii 
controllers, which facilitate greater body movement, and the camera-based system of Kinect 
require more involvement of the body and more analogous movement, and thus greater discipline 
over the body of the player – even as these systems draw on a sense of naturalized movement as 
the basis for their games (or ‘remediate’ analog movements, such as swinging a tennis racket). 
 Shira Chess writes that repetition in videogames is an example of the disciplinary tactics 
that produce the pliable docile bodies described by Foucault: “the game’s controls and interface 
create a system that both facilitates game mastery and produces an environment where players 
can be easily taught.”13 Mastery over the game is thus ultimately connected to the player’s 
complicity in being mastered by the game. This can be seen, as Chess points out, in the way that 
certain game elements (like a map which directs the player where to go) “not only give the 
player more control over their actions, but the game’s designers more control over the player.”14 
Control and being controlled go hand in hand, and between these two points is the avatar body, 
which is both the object of control and the representation of the controlling subject in the space 
of the game.15    
 In contrast to videogames, virtual worlds offer a much less structured interactive 
experience. For some this aspect makes virtual worlds unappealing (videogames remain 
                                                
12 The ‘misalignment’ of movement between player and character is a result of the difference between player input 
(usually pushing a button or manipulating a joystick) and the character movements on screen (such as walking or 
shooting).  However, though the movements aren’t analogous, they do correspond in the basic sense in which one 
movement initiates another. 
13 Shira Chess, “Playing the Bad Guy: Grand Theft Auto in the Panopticon,” in The Meaning and Culture of Grand 
Theft Auto: Critical Essays, ed. Nate Garrelts (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2005), 81. 
14 Ibid., 82. 
15 Hacks, mods, and machinima disrupt game design and appropriate game characters and architecture for uses 
outside of the designer’s intentions.  While there is much here worth exploring relative to cinema, in the context of 
this essay I will note only the strong influence of established design and narrative/linear modes, as mods tend most 
often to extend the model established by the original design of the game (such as adding levels), and can also be 
appropriated in commercial design; machinima subverts gameplay, but generally does so in service of producing 
texts that employ cinematic aesthetics and narrative structure. 
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exponentially more popular), but others are drawn to the relative freedom afforded by graphical 
virtual worlds such as Second Life that function as social networks within an open-ended 
environment. Since avatars in these spaces are generally highly customizable and social 
interaction occurs through or with avatars, the early mythos of the avatar was centered on its 
reflexivity. “Virtual worlds provide people with a mirror,” writes Richard Bartle, and virtual 
world designers “get to make the mirror.”16 Avatar-enhanced communication prompted Sherry 
Turkle’s experiments in identity play, which hinged on a two-way interactivity: the user designs 
the avatar body, the appearance or manifestation of which then influences the behavior of the 
user. While more recent scholarship has contested the degree to which identities can be 
refashioned, anecdotal evidence abounds of users acting differently within avatar guises.17 This 
impact on behavior does not on its surface seem to be the product of a deterministic design, 
leading users along a certain path; but to the extent that virtual worlds (not just avatars) act as 
mirrors, we must also question how experience is structured through the construction of virtual 
spaces, bodies, and interfaces – and the particular nature of their reflections. 
 Idealized notions of interactivity, from avatar design to clicking through a website, imply 
that the user is able to shape his or her experience with digital online media and also shape 
aspects of the medium itself, choosing what links to click on and what options to engage. But 
beyond the ways in which users shape computer space, Manovich is concerned with how the 
computer shapes human experience. For instance, whereas reading a sentence once gave rise to 
any number of associations the reader might make, a hyperlinked sentence feigns depth while in 
fact restricting thought to “pre-programmed, objectively existing associations,” which Manovich 
                                                
16 Bartle, Desiging Virtual Worlds, 164. 
17 Lori Kendall, Hanging Out in the Virtual Pub: Masculinities and Relationships Online (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002) and Lisa Nakamura, Cybertypes: Race, Identity, and Ethnicity on the Internet (New York: 
Routledge, 2002) counter Turkle’s optimism for identity shifts while tracking patterns of behavioral responses to the 
combination of social and technological circuits that contribute to interactivity.   
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aligns with Althusser’s concept of interpellation, in which “we are asked to mistake the structure 
of somebody else’s mind for our own.” He continues: 
 
This is a new kind of identification appropriate for the information age of cognitive labor.  
The cultural technologies of an industrial society – cinema and fashion – asked us to 
identify with someone else’s bodily image.  Interactive media ask us to identify with 
someone else’s mental structure.  If the cinema viewer, male and female, lusted after and 
tried to emulate the body of the movie star, the computer user is asked to follow the 
mental trajectory of the new media designer.18 
 
Graphical virtual worlds ask us to do both, as cognition and experiential embodiment intersect in 
the representations of self within avatar bodies. Thus we can get a sense of the circuitry of 
designer, user, and avatar, mediated through the technologies of virtual spaces. The designer 
creates the parameters and possibilities of the world, the types of bodies it supports and permits, 
the nature of the space in which virtual bodies exist, the amount and type of modifications the 
user is able to make to bodies and space within the virtual environment, the way it appears to the 
user and others, etc. Constrained by these possibilities, the user creates and/or controls a virtual 
body while cognitively and affectively relating his or her own ‘bodily image’ (and sense of 
embodiment) to the body on the screen and the space in which it exists. Beyond the 
technological constraints are ideological concerns, such as capitalistic elements in Second Life: 
functioning as a relatively free space which privileges user creation over owner design, the 
Second Life model is yet founded on land ownership and development, and commerce, fashion, 
and advertising are driving forces in Second Life activity – forces in which avatar bodies are 
                                                
18 Manovich, Language of New Media, 61. 
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caught up.19 (Ideological influences become additionally salient when we consider that virtual 
worlds are increasingly popular with children.)20   
 Ideological hegemony functions in The Matrix as a means of control over the 
unawakened humans, although the machines are less concerned with content than effects; their 
aim is the exploitation of the physical body, and the Matrix in its various iterations (we learn that 
earth life circa 1999 is the one that worked best) is put in place to keep the humans docile rather 
than to instill any particular ideology (while the film itself critiques a cultural complicity with 
simulational culture). The ideal form of the Matrix simulation, which results in the greatest 
degree of control and fewest occurrences of rebellion, is one that not only places humans in the 
‘shared hallucination’ of a large-scale persistent environment, but one that first of all situates 
them in a form of virtual embodiment that they can accept as real. Thus when the awakened Neo 
re-enters virtual space, his success there is dependent on learning to divorce his sense of reality 
from the virtual body that he once simply ‘lived’ as Thomas Anderson and now must perform or 
operate as an avatar. Neo applies a hacker ethic to the virtual body and its environment, figuring 
out how to break through the ‘reality’ of gravity and physical space. “Do you think that’s air 
you’re breathing?” Morpheus (Laurence Fishburne) asks Neo in the simulation, provoking him 
to change his cognitive relationship with his avatar body through repetition and what James L. 
Ford calls “a techno-cyber version of meditation.”21 Meditation is a means of ‘reprogramming’ 
the mind through the discipline of the body, held in quiet repose or the careful movements of 
                                                
19 For a critical view of capitalistic practices in Second Life see Samuel K. Bonsu and Aron Darmody, “Co-creating 
in Second Life: Market-Consumer Cooperation in Contemporary Economy,” Journal of Marcromarketing 2008 28: 
355.  
20 “Are ads on children’s social networking sites harmless child’s play or virtual insanity?” Meg Carter, The 
Independent, June 2, 2008. Accessed July 7, 2011 from www.independent.co.uk. (cf. Maria Rousou, “Learning by 
Doing and Learning Through Play: An Exploration of Interactivity in Virtual Environments for Children,” 
Computers in Entertainment, Vol. 2, Issue 1, January 2004.) 
 
21 James L. Ford, “Buddhism, Mythology, and The Matrix,” in Taking the Red Pill: Science, Philosophy and 
Religigion in The Matrix, ed. Glenn Yeffeth (West Sussex: Summersdale, 2003), 166. 
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martial arts. Following the download of the kung fu program, Neo must translate his computer-
generated ‘knowledge’ to the virtual body that has never performed the movements he now 
knows how to do, while we watch the computer-aided body of Keanu Reeves float across the 
screen, transitioning from photographic body to what Andrew Shail refers to as the gravity-
irrespective ‘cinematic body’ that defines movement in the Matrix.22  
 The discipline of the mind through philosophy, meditation, and training works to 
integrate Neo’s cognitive relation to his avatar body with the phenomenological experience of 
his embodiment. It is not his physical body that learns kung fu (he doesn’t fight in the real world 
like he does in the Matrix23), but his embodied mind, through the interactive embodiment which 
controls his avatar or ‘residual self-image’ (an image that wasn’t really imported from the 
physical world – otherwise it would be shorn and pale – but from another virtual space, where he 
once performed his avatar body differently).   
 In The Matrix, hacking computers is visually translated to martial arts fighting, rejecting 
the disembodying informational computer space that provides the menacing context for other 
cyberspace texts in favor of the movement and mastery of the stylized body. David Gabbard 
identifies a ‘double-enclosure’ in The Matrix that corresponds to Foucault’s definition of the 
enclosures that produce docile bodies: the Matrix as a ‘prison of the mind’, but also the enclosure 
of the body. The avatar gives form to the abstractions of embodiment, but also enables, restricts, 
and colors embodiment through its particular modalities. Learning to use an avatar, whether in a 
videogame or virtual world, means learning to be embodied in the new space and body, and 
learning to use one’s own body to facilitate the new embodiment – the combination of buttons to 
                                                
22 Andrew Shail, “‘You Hear About Them All the Time’: A Genealogy of the Sentient Program,” in The Matrix 
Trilogy: Cyberpunk Reloaded, ed. Stacy Gillis (London: Wallflower, 2005), 25.  
23 Neo’s rough, injurious fight with Bane in The Matrix Reloaded is a stark contrast with the graceful, bloodless 
violence in the Matrix. 
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jump and kick at the same time, for instance, or the best time to flick the Wii controller to adjust 
for the slight delay in response. The bodies of jacked-in characters in The Matrix are for the most 
part inert, and thus the step of moving one body to control the movement of another is 
eliminated; however, Neo still moves with his residual ‘body’ – or residual sense of embodiment, 
rather than simply the body image – which is then trained to become a powerful avatar. 
 In the film, humans are exploited in pods while their avatars are free to roam within the 
virtual simulation – or in the ‘reality’ of this virtuality – free to work at their virtual jobs, for 
avatar bosses who penalize for tardiness (even though no one has left the pod).  This double 
exploitation – of humans by machines, and humans by other humans – places bodies at the center 
of ideological and systemic pulls, with the machines on one end and a capitalist system of labor 
on the other, and human bodies and their avatars doing double work to sustain both. In their 
docility these bodies become both “subjected and practised,” as  
 
discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes 
these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the 
body; on the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a ‘capacity’, which it seeks to 
increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might 
result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection. If economic exploitation 
separates the force and the product of labour, let us say that disciplinary coercion 
establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an 
increased domination.24  
 
 
In the avatarial relation, bodies are situated interstitially, as connecting links: between the 
videogame player and the game designer, or between player and the game world to be 
conquered; between social relationships among users in virtual worlds, the user and his or her 
perception of self, and the user and the image culture that informs the construction of avatar 
                                                
24 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 138. 
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bodies; and in avatar films often between character and diegetic growth or fulfillment, as a 
facilitator or an obstacle, or both. In The Matrix, to assume the avatar from outside the pod is to 
hack and re-work the docile body, converting it from anesthetized cubicle worker (a passive 
power source) to a dynamic virtual agent of the user. Interestingly, it becomes the task of the 
character to discipline his or her own body, as we see in Neo’s training. He has been fitted with 
new knowledge, and is guided in his training by Morpheus, but Neo must do the final and most 
personal work in disciplining the body, that it might operate at greatest capacity in the tasks for 
which it has been enlisted. 
 Trinity becomes the mirror to his quest, intimately tied to him (and his double in 
appearance), but never able to be the One, as her proficiency in the Matrix only makes her a 
better ‘two’; her name alludes to the irresolvable assemblage of deity that is never quite one 
because it is always also three. Neo’s white masculinity positions him as antagonistic to his 
bifurcated avatarial position (a dilemma he shares with Cypher [Joe Pantoliano], who opts to 
return to the false unity of ignorance in the Matrix), and his agency is directed toward 
overcoming the virtuality of the Matrix by defeating its source and freeing the humans from their 
enclosures. Trinity serves as helpmeet, furthering Neo’s trajectory toward transcendence and 
unity – which we must note, however, he never fully achieves, his sacrifice instead resulting in 
stasis.25 
 Sleep Dealer explores the utility of the docile body, and the exploitation not only of 
bodies but of the avatarial relation itself. The film interweaves boundary transgression and 
border crossing in a story about Mexican workers who are employed in the U.S. but never leave 
                                                
25 Deleuze identifies equilibrium as a defining element of the factory and, by extension, the disciplinary society; it is 
interesting then that the battle against hegemony results in its balanced and pacific perpetuation – a disciplinary 
ideal. I take up the equilibrium at the end of The Matrix Revolutions in Chapter 5. 
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Mexico. With nodes implanted in their arms and necks they manipulate high-tech robots in the 
U.S. from Tijuana factories – the ‘sleep dealers’, so-called for the tendency of workers to lose 
themselves during long shifts and eventually collapse (Fig. 17). In the story, Memo (Luis 
Fernando Peña) leaves his family’s milpa after the death of his father, which results when his 
own amateur hacking attempts are picked up by authorities. He gets a job as a virtual 
construction worker in San Diego and, standing in a long line of workers connected to cables and 
oxygen masks, performs his labor by pantomime in a dark yet oddly beautiful dance of 
particularly alien(ated) labor. 
 
 
  Figure 17. Telepresent labor in Sleep Dealer. 
 
 The film does not explain why the robots in this futuristic world do not work 
autonomously, though one can infer that, in what seems to be a keen observation on the 
economics of advanced technology, foreign workers remain cheaper than advanced AI. The work 
is long and draining, producing a loss of essence or vitality: “sometimes you control the 
machine, sometimes it controls you,” warns Luz (Leonor Varela), the young woman who gives 
Memo his ‘node job’ – another feminine facilitator. The economic hold of the job over the 
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worker is instantiated in the images of Memo’s labor, as the glowing interface cables that stream 
from the ceiling to the arms and wrists of the workers form an image of strange marionettes, 
puppets on vascular and neurological strings. 
 Indeed, the placement of the nodes on the body are situated to evoke manual labor, with 
multiple points at the hand, arm, and shoulder rather than the Matrix-style single spike to the 
brain (those freed from the pods actually have multiple nodes distributed across their bodies, but 
these are neglected in their return to the Matrix). The spike produces a cerebral virtuality that 
leaves the physical body inert, while the virtual movements in Sleep Dealer require an enactment 
of the labor, its movements without its materials. Strapped to wires and limited in this way, the 
virtual worker could scarcely perform, say, acrobatic kung fu, as in The Matrix; nor could he or 
she, tethered to an assigned robot, live vicariously through a cosmetically ideal body, as in 
Surrogates. In the movies not all virtualities are equal – a condition that parallels Jennifer 
Gonzalez’s observation of historical cyborgism, wherein “those who had access to certain 
machines were privileged, those who were expected to behave like certain machines were 
subjugated.”26 Inequality is evident in the various interfaces employed by cinematic avatar users: 
the prongs and sockets that mark the bodies in Sleep Dealer and The Matrix, the softer interface 
that lays over the eyes in Surrogates or lightly on the face in Avatar, and the hypermedia womb 
of the spoiled rich boy in Gamer. The marginalized and poor bear the marks and components of 
technology and are subjected to the physical penetration of a hard connection; the consumer class 
wears it gently on the skin while in repose; the privileged user, for whom the interface has 
become purely a screen, doesn’t touch the equipment at all.27 The vascular cabling and multiple 
                                                
26 Jennifer Gonzalez, “Envisioning Cyborg Bodies: Notes from Current Research,” in The Cyborg Handbook, ed. 
Chris Hables Gray (New York: Routledge, 1995), 269. 
27 David Cronenberg’s ExistenZ, which I address later in this chapter, to some extent contradicts this pattern, as the 
main characters are middle class and, in the case of Allegra, socially prominent, yet are subject to penetrating hard 
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node sites in Sleep Dealer also illustrate the requirement of the worker to give not only time and 
energy over to the labor of the avatar, but the vitality of the biological body as well. The contact 
points embedded in the hand, arm, and shoulder reflect the role of these parts as embodied tools 
of the worker – unusual in an avatar film, where the movements of one body are typically 
divorced from the other (Fig. 18).   
 
 
  Figure 18. Vascuar cabling in Sleep Dealer. 
 
 The worker in Sleep Dealer is both puppet and puppeteer, virtual and embodied, alien 
and alienated. In a Foucauldian diffusion of power the virtual laborer produces a miniaturized 
enactment of the influences of power on his own body transferred onto another. Power is not 
simply conveyed, however, as if Memo as the intermediary subject were merely a conduit, but it 
becomes part of his subjectivity, so that in the instantiation of power the subject finds himself 
alone – Memo is compelled to work the robot body as a condition of his employment, but the job 
only creates the conditions for the intimate power he must exercise in the uncanny dance of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
connections. However, their appearance as revolutionaries of a sort in the end of the film suggests that they occupy a 
marginalized position outside of the ExistenZ game. 
 143 
two bodies. In the economics of alienated labor, this exercise of power leaves him powerless 
still. The film’s ending leaves him in Tijuana, presumably still employed at the sleep dealer, 
having more or less accepted his (unjust) fate. Luz, who uses her own nodes to upload the 
memories she sells to make a living, is portrayed by the film in a very different light – not as a 
victim acquiescing to the reality of the virtualized economy, but as profiting from it (if only 
marginally) as a ‘writer’ of sorts, much more in her place than the emasculated Memo. 
 
Avatars of Technology  
 The virtualization of the economy occupies a central place in Deleuze’s description of the 
society of control, where corporations exist as nebulous, fluid entities in contradistinction to the 
rigidity of the factory. While Memo’s work is wired and futuristically telepresent, the setting for 
labor perpetuates the model of the factory, even bolstering its Fordist capacities by conforming 
mobile jobs such as picking fruit and driving a cab into an assembly line model. Race and 
nationality clearly inform this vision of twenty-first century upgrades to a nineteenth century 
system, as factory work in our present era is increasingly farmed out to third world countries for 
lower wages. The corporation, which Deleuze refers to as a ‘spirit’ or a ‘gas’, floats above these 
labor realities as an amorphous, flexible body disassociated from the physical body of the 
worker.   
 Control society is also defined by its flexibility, as it modulates itself in response to 
changing conditions rather than seeking to establish conformity. The machine of the control 
society is the computer with its capacity for efficient alteration amidst the fluidity of informatics. 
(It is notable that the dominating technology in both Sleep Dealer and The Matrix is robotic 
hardware, which is itself rooted in the clockwork ideal emblematized by the automaton.) 
Computers, VR interfaces, and avatars are the potent images in The Lawnmower Man, where 
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virtual technologies are presented as promise turned pathogen, metastasizing through the 
avatarial body. Jobe (Jeff Fahey) transforms from feminized simpleton to intelligent hard body 
through the disciplinary regime imposed on him, but doesn’t stop there, growing cancerously 
instead into an unfettered cyber-god. eXistenZ places its characters in a VR game with shifting 
logic and biological hardware that makes it difficult to discern where agency and bodies begin 
and end. While the direction of control in eXistenZ is clearly manifested in a one-to-one relation 
between player and avatar (a relationship also particularly indexical, as the appearance of the 
actors doesn’t change across the interface), the Cronenbergian horror of the game lies in its 
iterative nature, as every player is also an avatar, and thus agentive control imposed on one’s 
character may simply be a reflection of the control imposed on oneself. 
 
 
Figure 19. Chimp POV in a training simulation in The Lawnmower Man. 
 
 The Lawnmower Man begins with a Foucauldian image of the soldier, which Foucault 
uses to typify the docile body. Whereas men who demonstrated certain qualities were once 
plucked from the populace to be soldiers, training regimens came to supplant selection with 
production as soldiers were made rather than found. The Lawnmower Man opens with an 
interesting play on the soldier made, as a VR interface and a game-like battle simulation are used 
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to turn chimpanzees into killing machines (Fig. 19). The chimp successfully performs in the 
simulation, but the VR training and psychotropic drugs have produced a surplus of aggression 
and the chimp goes on a rampage, shooting guards and mounting a failed escape from the 
laboratory compound where Dr. Angelo (Pierce Brosnan) conducts his experiments. 
 Although through this incident Angelo has recently witnessed the negative effects that 
mind control can have on bodies, his first impulse upon getting to know the mentally 
handicapped Jobe is to give him a similar treatment, with some adjustments to temper the 
aggression (which ultimately fail). He promises Jobe that he can make him smarter while 
bettering his social standing, preventing people from taking advantage of him. The training 
begins with videogames, and while Jobe performs poorly in a computer-administered 
intelligence test he does better in a flying game, where we see his first engagement with virtual 
space through an avatar. Going deeper, Angelo introduces him to more advanced VR 
applications which Angelo sees as “the key to the evolution of the human mind,” reflecting the 
longstanding assumption that new ways of seeing and organizing space produce new 
epistemological possibilities (which the film ultimately counters with the paranoia of information 
technology producing new ways of being influenced and controlled). Jobe’s training progresses 
with his acclimation to virtual space, and then to the sort of downloaded education that would 
later appear in The Matrix – except for Jobe it brings pain rather than a rush.   
 Pain becomes a defining aspect of Jobe’s transformation, and it is pain he later 
vindictively inflicts on others. The intense drug regimen and accelerated mental enhancement 
seem to be literally restructuring his neural network, manifest in the torment and perspiration on 
his face. The discipline of the mind exacts a toll on the body, and Jobe’s increasing mental power 
is also marked with bodily shifts. Claudia Springer notes that initially Jobe is coded feminine, 
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with his long hair and submissive personality, but after the VR treatments becomes 
hypermasculine, with taut muscles and a cowboy’s swagger – thus rejecting the possibility that 
biological gender might give way to more fluid definitions. His physical transformation thus 
serves a compensatory role in re-establishing gender roles, and I would also add that it 
compensates for the inertness of the body in front of the computer monitor – like Neo, Jobe is no 
desk jockey. Rather than the power of information on a server or network, power is located in the 
body, and the muscles signify his power (or the power enacted through him) corresponding to the 
avatar bodies he assumes in the virtual world, which evolve in their iterations from innocuous to 
menacing (Fig. 20). Virtual embodiment is what distinguishes his experience from more 
conventional computer use, aligning the power of the computer and the locus of the embodied 
self in a dangerous and unstable fusion. Eventually, virtual embodiment in the avatar is not 
enough, and Jobe seeks a new body – a body of cables and computers and endless virtual space, 
in the hardware and software of networked technology itself.   
 The training that Angelo institutes for Jobe thus reintroduces the problem encountered 
earlier with the chimp: endowing the subject with greater capacity for self-determination results 
in decreased control over the subject. But Jobe’s increased agency is not only a problem for 
Angelo, it also brings difficulty for Jobe, whose transformation as a result of his use of VR is not 
simply an IQ bump but a complete psychological and physiological change. Notably, it is not 
until he becomes more aggressive as a result of the training and drugs that Jobe even begins to 
assert himself within virtual space, as previously he was always guided by Angelo and subjected 
to the technological re-education facilitated by the program. In the question of who is in control 
and who is being controlled, Jobe never enjoys the sense of interactive control promised by the 
technology until it has already exerted control over him, and thus the trajectory of his character 
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from one of limited to ultimate agency is imbued with the technology that produces him – that is, 
it is no longer Jobe’s story, it seems, but the story of the technology that forms the new Jobe, 
instantiated in Jobe’s old body before it is finally shed. 
 
 
  Figure 20. Jobe’s avatars grow increasingly menacing in The Lawnmower Man. 
 
 Even as Jobe begins to exert his destructive power over other characters, he is yet a 
victim, as Paul Young sees him – but a victim in that he (and we) are part of a society in which 
information systems have thoroughly permeated contemporary life. Thus Jobe is a “victim of 
VR’s encroachment on the real, rather than a victimizing hacker pure and simple,” who “turns 
into a fascistic monster in part because he is too mentally immature to understand the 
implications of the powers he wields” – a Frankenstein for the digital age.28 Young further points 
out that the origin of the telepathic and telekinetic powers Jobe develops are given no 
explanation other than being generally associated with his use of VR, and in this the film exudes 
a paranoia of virtual technologies while at the same time granting them mystical powers – not 
only for use in controlling others, but comprising forces that threaten to control the user as well. 
The Lawnmower Man exemplifies what Young calls the ‘hacker myth’ (computers offer 
                                                
28 Young, Cinema Dreams its Rivals, 200, 199. 
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uncontrollable power to irresponsible subjects) and the ‘myth of total media’ (the fear that 
computer media will completely penetrate reality) in that Jobe the hacked becomes Jobe the 
hacker, who accesses minds and disintegrates bodies on his way to diffusing himself within the 
network, taking over the global telecommunications system. However, the genesis of Jobe the 
techno-god lies with Dr. Angelo and VR; since Angelo’s intentions were relatively good (if 
misguided), the film places culpability on the technology itself, for “ultimately the technology 
provides the conduit and powerfully determines its own use; human input is neither requested 
nor desired.”29 The cinematic response of The Lawnmower Man to the competing technology of 
computer media is to characterize interactivity as an unpredictable, mysterious force, where the 
agency and control facilitated by interactive media threaten both the public and the individual.   
 VR in the popular imagination augurs a possible future modality for interactions with 
computers and digital media that would be defined by senses of immersion and direct perception. 
VR collapses the distance between users and the mediated images and information that are 
presented for their ‘experience’, rather than simply for viewing. Ken Hillis argues that “virtual 
technology achieves a new form of spatialized power, based on unseen computational abilities 
with which my body is rendered complicit.”30 Whereas in embodied reality perception precedes 
conception – I perceive my environment and base my comprehension on what I see or sense – in 
VR the conception of the designer of a virtual space precedes the user’s perception, which 
suggests “the loss of my perception’s primacy, and by extension, loss of self-reflexive 
abilities.”31 The conjunction of a highly constructed media environment with a user position 
(overly) near the medium, which prohibits or diminishes the ability to maintain a critical or 
                                                
29 Ibid., 201. 
30 Ken Hillis, Digital Sensations: Space, Identity, and Embodiment in Virtual Reality (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), 71. 
31 Ibid., 72. 
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thoughtful distance, produces the potential for ideological control (the same potential theorized 
in the cinematic apparatus).32  
 The feminized Jobe is subsumed by the technology because he is unable to achieve an 
objective distance, instead receiving its effects in his body as much as his mind.33 The more 
intelligent Angelo is able to maintain a critical distance in his own use of VR, saving the full 
treatment for his hapless subject in the Dr. Frankenstein role he assumes – recklessly playing god 
(and creating one). Jobe’s inexperience with virtual technology makes him vulnerable, as his 
adeptness with machines is limited to the mechanical, casting him as a machine age relic who is 
unprepared for a technology that manifests itself in computer-generated images and 
informational abstraction. Technology no longer appears as what it is, but dissimulates itself 
behind screens as it channels information; Jobe, failing to discern the difference, flies too near. 
Also, as with the cinematic apparatus, the sense of direct perception in VR is associated with a 
subconscious level of reception: “The VR experience eludes cognitive defences and directly 
stimulates the subconscious,” concludes one paper on VR and psychotherapy.34 In the film, direct 
stimulation becomes a portal to the brain through which information can be transferred. As with 
The Matrix, traditional learning is superseded by the download, but access to the mind leaves 
marks on the body. 
                                                
32 Jean-Louis Baudry’s model of the cinema as an ideological machine was dependent on this conflation of film-
viewing and direct perception. By this model of spatiality, VR (at least in some idealized form) has even greater 
potential for ideological influence, as digital media can transmit information with much more flexibility than 
photographic media, and the immersive wrapping of the image in VR prohibits the user from looking outside of the 
screen.   
33 This over-closeness evokes the theorization of femininity by Mary Ann Doane and others as too close to the body. 
I take up this thread further in Chapter 6. 
34 Gabriel Optale, et al., “Male Sexual Dysfunctions: Immersive Virtual Reality and Multimedia Therapy,” in 
Cybertherapy: Internet and Virtual Reality as Assessment and Rehabilitations Tools for Clinical Psychology and 
Neuroscience, ed. Giuseppe Riva, et al. (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2004), 168. See also Binik, et al., “From the Couch 
to the Keyboard: Psychotherapy in Cyberspace” in Culture of the Internet, edited by Sara Kiesler (London: 
Psychology Press, 1997). 
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 In The Matrix the plug penetrates, but Jobe receives his information through the eyes in a 
sort of inversive gaze, as he is penetrated ocularly by the VR interface that forces information 
into his brain. It is interesting to note, then, that the first manifestation of his growing aggression 
takes feminine form as he inflicts a version of the technological suffering he has endured, 
repeating his victimization. His cybersexual encounter with Marnie (Jenny Wright) is initially 
pictured as an ideal of cohesion and harmony as the two bodies become one, melding into a two-
headed dragonfly; after they have disjoined, however, he takes monstrous form and rapes her 
mind, leaving her debilitated.35 No particular action by Marnie provokes this reaction, and so it 
seems to come from somewhere deep inside him, from a place that he himself is not entirely 
aware of. Springer describes his transmuted form as a “roaring monster from the id,” the “rage of 
the patriarchal unconscious,” but overlooks the particularly vaginal shape of his monstrous 
mouth.36 In a visual contrast to a penetrative characterization of cyberspace (such as that made 
by Alluquere Rosanne Stone, attributed to an “inarticulate longing of the male for the female,” 
Marnie (and the viewer) are swallowed up by an enveloping orifice.37 Situated as mouth the 
orifice suggests incorporation, but its smoothness and roundness imply a different violence, of 
being consumed by a (toothless) vagina dentata that surrounds and overwhelms rather than 
penetrates. Jobe rapes by envelopment and subsumption, stealing Marnie’s mind into himself 
while evoking the mental penetration enacted on him in his training, in which Angelo rapidly and 
repeatedly forces information into Jobe’s brain; in other words, he rapes from the position of 
victim. 
 Eventually, Jobe ‘becomes’ his avatar, leaving his physical body behind and existing only 
in the virtual world or the body of the network, obliterating the avatarial relation between two 
                                                
35 Cf. Hitchcock’s character of the same name who is raped by her husband in Marnie (1964). 
36 Springer, Electronic Eros, 93. 
37 Stone, “Will the Real Body Please Stand Up?” 108. 
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bodies through the destruction of one of them. What is monstrous in The Lawnmower Man, 
however, is triumphant in Avatar as Jake exchanges his human body for his avatar body, and a 
life incomplete for one fulfilled. In each case the photographic physical body is traded for a 
digital one, but whereas the aesthetic of Jake’s lithe new body is naturalistic and smooth, Jobe’s 
avatar is caught up in the spectacle of itself as a digital effect, exuding an otherness that must be 
diegetically contained and destroyed. The evolving Jobe considers his physical body restrictive 
and his docility past its usefulness, and thus a new body is needed in order to accommodate his 
increasing modulations.   
 Jobe’s transformation encompasses dual myths of disembodiment, as both a transcendent 
victory over his handicapped, feminized body, and as a monstrous, dehumanized void.  
Abstracted from his fleshy body, Jobe becomes dependent on the mainframe computer that 
contains the essence of the self that he has withdrawn from his body. The fact that he is 
threatened by the bombs that destroy the laboratory demonstrates that Jobe’s ‘body’ remains in 
some sense physical – that he cannot simply become pure information. His escape into the 
telecommunications network can thus be seen as the assumption of a new body, distributed and 
dehumanized but still physical. Throughout the film, Jobe’s increasing presence in the virtual 
world and his violations of physical law are consistently grounded in the material body – in his 
muscles and sexuality, his pain and perspiration, and finally the body of the computer and 
network. Jobe manages to escape the mainframe’s firewalls and execute his birth cry of making 
every phone in the world ring simultaneously, but since we never return to his digital avatar 
body, the ringing of the phones becomes the singular expression of the networked being; thus at 
the conclusion of the film he is not quite an entity contained within a technological system, but 
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one seemingly absorbed by it, the two becoming one – the technology that he has become, or that 
has overcome him. 
 A disturbing nearness to technology also permeates David Cronenberg’s eXistenZ (1999) 
in the biotechnologies that facilitate access to the game and resurface in its play. The organic 
MetaFlesh game pod, made from mutated amphibian parts, connects to the player via a Bio-Port, 
located at the base of the spine. The UmbyCord (as in ‘umbilical’, which it resembles) carries 
game information from the pod to the user, but also the energy and emotion of the user back to 
the pod (Fig. 21). The strange, organ-like flesh of the game pod makes the connection between 
human and machine at some indeterminate animalistic point in between; when Donna Haraway 
broke down boundaries between humans, animals, and machines, she perhaps could not have 
anticipated this strange image of the conflation of all three. 
 
 
  Figure 21. Players linked in to the game eXistenZ via UmbyCords. 
 
 Not only are the players of the game eXistenZ situated biologically near their technology, 
the technology is too intimate with them. Steve Keane writes of the MetaFlesh pod, “it plugs into 
the players, rather than vice-versa,” interiorizing gamespace in the collective minds and bodies 
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of the players.38 The game pod is an odd interface in that it does not feature buttons or other 
traditional input devices for controlling the game, but is rather controlled by suggestive stroking 
– a sort of pseudo-sexual coaxing – rather than concise input. The connection between body and 
technology is thus mediated by an uncanny organism that incorporates aspects of each and yet 
seems to be incomplete or malformed, while connecting to the game seems closer to a blood 
transfusion than a download. When Pikul (Jude Law) expresses concern about having a hole put 
in his body, Allegra (Jennifer Jason Leigh), the game’s designer who is in certain ways just as 
lost in it as the neophyte Pikul, offers cold comfort by opening her mouth wide, doing less to 
naturalize the new umbilicus than to serve as a reminder that mouths, too, are openings for 
contagion. The implication is that as the pod (and by extension the game) becomes infected or 
corrupted, so the body and mind of the player are at risk. As a quasi-living thing, the pod is not 
an instrument but an entity, and to connect to the game is to give oneself over to it. Thus in 
eXistenZ, as with The Matrix and The Lawnmower Man, immersion in virtual environments is 
equated with “the psychosomatic nightmare of losing control of the body” – a theme which 
characterizes much of Cronenberg’s other work as well.39  
 The loss of the body and the loss of reality run frequently on parallel planes, as we have 
seen; the ability to control the virtual body is diegetically restorative, a means of dominating the 
game environment and reasserting masculinity. Neo’s discipline allows him to use his avatar 
body as a hack, operating not outside of the logic of the Matrix, but achieving virtuosity within it 
and affecting its reality from the inside; Jobe on the other hand is from the outset lost in his 
alienating graphical body, while his physical body acts as an interface or opening of sorts for the 
                                                
38Steve Keane, “From Hardware to Fleshware: Plugging into David Cronenberg’s eXistenZ,” in ScreenPlay: 
Cinema/Videogames/Interfaces, edited by Geoff King and Tanya Krzywinska (London: Wallflower, 2002), 151. 
 
39 Ibid., 151. 
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infection of the real world by the virtual. Jobe’s supernatural control is equated with a loss of 
control – a lack of discipline. ExistenZ’s MetaFlesh controllers move control of the body to the 
metonymic abstraction of an externalized organ, and succeeding in the game is in a certain 
respect dependent on properly coaxing the pod and keeping it healthy while at the same time 
being subject to its whims; control is circuitous and shared rather than vectorial, for both 
gameplay with the pod and in the iterative game space in which there is no clear direction of 
control (Fig. 22). 
 
 
  Figure 22. Controlling the game by subjecting oneself to the pod in eXistenZ. 
 
 The game space in eXistenZ is simultaneously transparent and opaque, as what appears at 
first to be a clear logic of avatarial engagement has by the end become ambiguous; Pikul and 
Allegra, having ascended through a game within a game, are at the end of the film faced with the 
desperate question: “Are we still in the game?” Cronenberg creates this opacity precisely by 
omitting the kinds of distinctions between the real and virtual worlds that we see in other avatar 
films. As Pikul and Allegra occasionally enter and leave the game, their physical and virtual 
bodies and the physical and virtual spaces are analogous – same actors, same appearance, with a 
relatively similar palette in the visual look of the film on either side of the interface. Even when 
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the characters find themselves in rather unusual settings, including a factory for the game pods 
themselves (placing them for a moment on the production side of the pods they are presently 
jacked into, as if the pod reflexively ponders its own malformed existence), Cronenberg’s 
restrained, unvarnished treatment avoids the cues that in other films accompany moves across the 
interface – the digital graphics in The Lawnmower Man, the green tint of the Matrix, the 
airbrushed smoothness of the bodies in Surrogates. In this he disavows any sense of a computer 
game in favor of a ubiquitous cinematic modality – cinema is the real, and the virtual too. The 
bodies of the characters (and actors) thus become disguises in a bit of cinematic trickery, as the 
audience is given no means for distinguishing between the physical and the virtual at the level of 
the image; when Cronenberg pulls the rug out from under the diegetic logic that has separated 
the various spaces, the uniformity of their visual mode becomes pronounced. Every player is the 
avatar of another within a perpetual cinema that can only move up or down levels into more 
cinema, which situates the film medium itself as a sort of interface between the virtual and the 
real.   
 The answer here to the question of ‘who’s playing you’ seems again to be you, as the 
characters seem to be playing themselves – but a you that you don’t know and can’t see, with an 
agenda that is invisible to you. In addition, the characters seem to be played by the film in a 
manner recalling Godard’s Weekend (1967), in which the beleaguered characters ask passersby 
whether they are in reality or a film; discovering that they seem to be in the latter provides no 
relief or escape however, as they are eventually captured (and eaten) by cannibalistic 
revolutionaries, never able to overcome their subjection to the film. Cronenberg translates this 
ethic to an age of virtual reality, and the film is interesting for its malefic imposition of film form 
on the game, obliquely exposing the invisible hand of control that is here ‘played’ by the 
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director.  In the final scene of the film Pikul and Allegra shoot the designer of the game (a stand-
in for Cronenberg, and the position held by Allegra within the other game iterations) for 
deforming reality, but their fire misses the mark as Cronenberg has stepped aside, leaving the 
audience in the position of the ‘player’, complicit in the manipulation of the characters on the 
screen. 
 
Playing the Player 
 Virtual reality theorist Michael Heim once diagnosed the sensory discord following the 
use of a VR device as ‘Alternate World Syndrome’, a “technology sickness, a lag between the 
natural and artificial environments” that shows “the human being merging, yet still out of phase, 
with the machine.”40 Lag as pathology is reconfigured in Gamer as the ‘ping’, the infinitesimal 
delay in (the inevitable) compliance to the voice of control, but the sickness is a societal 
complicity with the mechanisms of a control that consumes and manipulates its subjects, moving 
from a VR fantasy of imaginary worlds to a dystopian vision of play as sadism. The 
schizophrenic Gamer comes across as a hypocritical didacticism, chastening videogame culture 
with a cinema of exploitation and violence of the sort that provided the aesthetic foundation for 
the kinds of games the film is critical of. The film generates sympathy for the avatar, but also, 
like eXistenZ, places the audience in the player position as we must to a certain extent go along 
with the way the directors play with their characters. Tillman is given the capacity to resist, but 
Angie is trapped in her own body as a Society avatar played by a slovenly, obese man whose 
enjoyment in debasing her is matched only by his bored disregard for her life. All of the Society 
players are depicted as depraved and cruel, featured in anonymous close-ups as disembodied 
                                                
40 Heim, “Design of Virtual Reality,” 68. 
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faces with lecherous expressions, but Angie’s player Gorge (Ramsey Moore) inspires the 
greatest contempt (Fig. 23). 
 
 
  Figure 23. Angie’s player Gorge, in Gamer. 
 
 Here again the filmmaker seems to have a stand-in in the film – or rather two, in Simon 
and Gorge, one for each co-director. The gleeful cynicism that permeates Gamer seems rooted in 
the way that Neveldine and Taylor ‘play’ the film, from their renegade approach to editing to 
their embrace of the portable Red One camera that allowed them to shoot action sequences on 
rollerblades. The avatarial predicament of their characters puts the characters at the mercy of the 
film via their players: the over-privileged gamer Simon who plays for sport, and the 
reprehensible Gorge who delights in manipulation. Neveldine and Taylor combine the force of 
the gaze with the power of the controller, subjecting their characters to eye and thumb while 
subtly displacing their own sadism onto Simon and Gorge. That is, if Gamer operates as an 
allegory of control as Shaviro asserts (and I agree that it does), its success in doing so appears 
largely attributable to the pleasure of game-like control the filmmakers derive from its 
production – a dark pleasure that saturates the film. The excessive repulsiveness of Gorge seems 
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designed to throw us off the scent, and shame us for enjoying Angie’s subjection as much as they 
have. 
 As with the iconic images of cyborgs in cinema that helped constitute the discourse of 
technology and the body in the popular imagination in an earlier era (as well as prefiguring some 
of the technological developments to come), it is important to recognize the place of avatar films 
as visual and narratological expressions of evolving conceptions of virtuality – and particularly 
as it is instantiated in a filmic medium that is redefining itself in the digital era. These films 
thematize darker counterparts to the liberatory rhetoric promulgated in the marketing and 
technophilia surrounding interactive technologies. Relative to these allegories of discipline and 
control, you are player, controller, and avatar all at once, raising not only the question of who’s 
playing you, but also, given the recursivity of discipline and control, and the materialization of 
gamespace in our wireless, entertainment-driven society, who are you playing? 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
VIRTUAL MORTALITY 
 
 
The greatest thing in the world is to know how to belong to oneself. 
  Michel de Montaigne 
 
 
The existential anxiety of the double is to some extent a matter of possession – the secrets 
a character possesses and hides from himself (or herself), which come in the end to possess him. 
When one has an avatar, what exactly does one possess? At what point does self-difference bleed 
over into self-possession, and what is the difference between encountering the double and 
possessing it? The cinema itself is a mechanism of the double: reproducing the world, forming a 
temporalized copy of events, displaying the image of the actor who is no longer there. The 
double in cinema makes this implicit doubling explicit as film’s indexical relation to the real 
world is troubled by the illusion of correspondence. In avatar films this plays out slightly 
differently, as the condition of diegetic doubling is typically assumed at the outset, with societies 
already caught up in or at least accepting of avatarial doubling, and thus characters must contend 
with ideological aspects of the double as much as technological or ontological ones. The 
disruption of the index in avatar films is then figured not simply in the appearance of the double, 
but as a problem of lost reality, of characters’ inability to see the double for the disruption it is. 
While doubles are taken for granted, however, the body remains the scene of contention over 
indexicality as the body stands in for the index, and the index is grounded in the body. That is, 
avatar films frequently rely on the body of the actor as an indexical point of contact with the real 
world in order to sustain their fictions of indexical rupture.  
Of course, this fundamental mechanism has been called into question since the advent of 
cinema, as Mélìes popped off his head, disappeared and reappeared, and produced a half-dozen 
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copies of himself using spatial and temporal disruptions of the body (it was most often the body 
that was transient and severed, as the majority of his tricks relied on a static backdrop and a 
minimum of visible cuts). But while Mélìes’ iterations used the body to demonstrate the unique 
capacity of cinema, avatar films use the doubling capacity of the cinema to investigate the 
interative aspects of the body. These texts straddle the varied aspects of a digital culture, 
engaging not only information technology and futuristic machines, but also and especially a 
return to the body (the body as surplus) and its ontology within a proliferation of images. The 
Matrix trilogy stands astride this juncture at points oppositional as well as transitional, between 
film and digital, body and embodiment, machine/technology and image. The Wachowskis 
formulate these dichotomies as equations, and within the equations Neo represents balance, 
which he must accomplish by balancing his own schismatic embodiment – a balance ultimately 
achieved in his mortal transition, as passage. Also, Neo’s positioning as what Andrew Shail 
refers to as a ‘cinematic body’ – a body whose movement concords with cinematic movement, as 
through the film’s visual effects work the body is at points essentially played by the film as much 
as the actor – serves as an intermediary point between the analog avatar played by an actor in 
two ‘roles’ and the CG character which is played from ‘within’ the image body superimposed 
upon the actor. 
 
A Spectatorship of Death 
 
It is no longer a question of survival after death, but of a larger concept, the creation of an 
ideal world in the likeness of the real, with its own temporal destiny. 
  André Bazin1  
 
The Charlie Kaufman-penned, self-referential twin film Adaptation (2002, Spike Jonze) 
includes a dedication to Kaufman’s fictional co-writer, Donald Kaufman, who in the film is the 
                                                
1 André Bazin, What is Cinema? trans. Hugo Gray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 10. 
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Hollywood sell-out doppelgänger to the character Charlie Kaufman (both played by Nicholas 
Cage), which reads “In loving memory of Donald Kaufman.” The passing of the double – 
Donald dies in the film – whom the Hollywood-averse, real-life Kaufman never wants to be, 
seems an exorcism of sorts; the character Charlie, standing in for Kaufman, envies Donald’s 
success, even, to his shame, entreating celebrity screenwriting guru Robert McKee in order to 
become more like Donald. Donald’s death removes the double, clearing the way for Charlie to 
find success and become his own man – but of course Charlie is already (and inseparably) 
Kaufman’s double, even if he doesn’t know it, and thus the film becomes a play of the 
recursivity of postmodern doubling and simulacra (no longer original and copy, but a series of 
copies or variations) as well as a game of façades, as Cage plays each of Kaufman’s 
doppelgängers. 
 Kaufman’s fascination with the avatarial is even more pronounced in his first feature, 
Being John Malkovich (1999, Jonze), in which Malkovich, playing himself, is manipulated by a 
series of characters, including failed puppeteer Craig (John Cusack), who enter a portal into his 
mind located in a back room of an office building. Eventually, Craig takes over Malkovich 
completely, controlling him as one of his puppets on his way to becoming a revered puppeteer. 
By making the avatarial object an actor, and a famous theatrical one at that, Kaufman again 
critiques the entertainment establishment. Cusack plays Craig, who plays Malkovich – while 
Malkovich the actor plays Cusack/Craig playing his body, with Kaufman’s presence permeating 
the whole self-loathing charade. The actor in a Kaufman film occupies a surreally avatarial 
position, as if played by the character, rather than vice versa.  
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  Figure 24. A pair of doubles in Synecdoche, New York. 
 
 
 In Kaufman’s most recent work, Synecdoche, New York (2008, Kaufman), character 
plays out recursively across multiple bodies, and indeed it seems that character is infinitely larger 
than any single actor. Caden Cotard (an allusion to the Cotard delusion, a mental disorder in 
which people believe they are dead or do not exist), played by Philip Seymour Hoffman, creates 
an expansive, fractal theatrical piece that mirrors the world outside the enormous warehouse in 
which it is staged, and in smaller iterations repeats the simulation as the play becomes 
increasingly self-referential. Caden enlists an actor to play him, and eventually Caden’s double 
also enlists a double in order to better inhabit the (already doubled) character of ‘Caden’ (Fig. 
24). In one sense, then, Kaufman produces iterations, but in a more profound sense, 
instantiations. Caden in the end is not the original to the copies, for he cannot even locate 
himself, does not possess himself. The duplicates seem to imply that the abstract character of 
‘Caden’ is greater than Caden the individual, and thus the theatrical setting of the film is apt, as it 
is in the theatre that character is never fixed in a single body or performance, but lives eternally 
through the many bodies that play it, never fully possessed. As the film progresses Caden 
becomes increasingly dispensable, yielding both his directorial position and the role of ‘Caden’ 
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to the actors who now comprise the population of his world. From the new director, with whom 
he exchanges roles, he takes his cues as the cleaning lady for the model of his estranged wife’s 
apartment (the Lacanian-monikered Adele Lack), leading up to his final direction, “Die.” 
Kaufman offers a collision of theatrical tradition and postmodern desperation in exploring the 
roles perpetuated by the system, and the fragile mortality of those who play (or are played by) 
them. Caden dies, but the collection of neuroses and dispossession which comprise ‘Caden’ does 
not. 
 In “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” André Bazin conflates photography with 
death – with ‘time embalmed’, rescued from its ‘proper corruption’ as it is relegated to another. 
One of Bazin’s most vivid comparisons appears in a footnote in which he mentions the automatic 
process of the death mask, to which photography bears some relation in its impressions of light; 
Bazin’s characterization is not simply one of disappearance, of course, but of immortality 
through preservation, for death and immortality are closely linked.2 The metaphor of the death 
mask is illustrative in its juxtaposition of the active decomposition of the body and the fixity of 
the quick-drying plaster, as well as in its particular manner of preserving death in an impression 
of a body that is already a shade of its former animated self. D. N. Rodowick also sees quietus in 
the film medium, albeit from the perspective of the impermanence of film itself, stating that “one 
may say that the material basis of film is a chemically encoded process of entropy. This is one of 
many ways in which watching film is literally a spectatorship of death.” The virtuality of the 
cinematic image can be most poignantly found, he suggests, in “in the sense that what it 
documents is the disappearance of its object” – not only the temporal absence of its subjects, but 
its own mortality as a medium.3  
                                                
2 Ibid., 12. 
3 Rodowick, Virtual Life of Film, 20. 
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 Thus when Rodowick remarks that “while film may disappear, cinema nonetheless 
persists,” we must ask, in what form, what substrate?4 While in the digital era we have become 
more keenly aware of the active decay of film stock and photo paper – the active decomposition 
of the picture in which time is embalmed – digital images, with their (mostly) lossless 
duplication and their (seemingly) immaterial form, have been perceived as a sort of solution to 
the entropic effects plaguing photographic images – many of which have been scanned into 
digital format for preservation. However, the susceptibility of digital formats has come 
increasingly to light as digital photography enters its third decade and digital elements in movie 
production and distribution have proliferated, with preservation becoming a pressing issue.5 
However, digital imagery, with its crispness and eminent flexibility, a novelty kept fresh by 
regular advances demonstrated with sleek devices and dazzling effects, and a close association 
with computer technologies that are increasingly characterized by screens and media, is 
positioned in the cultural imagination as something like a vital alternative to the death drive of 
the photographic.6 
 Rodowick argues that the digital image is not a record of the past but an object of the 
present, while Mark Hansen defines the digital image as as “a processual and necessarily 
embodied entity,” stating that “the image can no longer be restricted to the level of surface 
appearance, but must be extended to encompass the entire process by which information is made 
perceivable through embodied experience.”7 Digital images are always in process, ever subject to 
                                                
4 Rodowick, Virtual Life of Film, 30. 
5 David Bordwell outlines some of the issues of storage already facing studios and archivists on his blog, noting that 
in many cases the most reliable form of preservation for a digital film is in an analog print. On a much smaller scale, 
home use of digital photography faces similar issues with corrupted or lost data and outmoded formats, as well as 
rapidly fading inkjet prints. David Bordwell, “Pandora’s Digital Box: Pix and Pixels,” Observations on Film Art, 
February 13, 2012. www.davidbordwell.net.  
6 While a (shrinking) majority of Hollywood productions are still shot on film, digital processes have become 
ubiquitous in post-production, and digital exhibition is a significant and ever-growing presence.  
7 Hansen, New Philosophies for New Media, 10. 
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remaking and thus never complete. Situated always in the present, vivified on electronic 
displays, digital images are culturally positioned counter to the demise of film.8  
 It is perhaps no coincidence then that Avatar, the highest grossing film to date, presents 
the digital in the form of abundant life – pointedly antagonistic, it seems, to the photographic 
media increasingly positioned as relics of another era, having preserved their own ‘death’. The 
desolation of the real in the Matrix trilogy, on the other hand, while perhaps fostering a hope in 
renewal at the end of the series, in fact presages only death. Why Neo dies and the Matrix 
persists, and how this relates to cinema and avatars and the death of the photographic, are the 
subjects of this chapter’s postmortem. Much of this has to do with the way in which the 
electronic image is not ‘one’ with itself, as Rodowick puts it, and the troubling of the index 
brought about by the double, from Balduin to Donald and Caden, and here to Neo, the ‘One’ in 
whose dying body the avatarial dyad balances itself out. 
 Chapter 2 began with a slogan from promotional materials for Second Life, and here I 
add another: “Become Your Avatar.” As with the first, we see two pictures juxtaposed in the 
style of before-and-after photos, the young woman (they are usually women) and the avatar she 
has ‘become’. The text goes further than the ludic engagement of the slogan for Sony’s 
PlayStation – ”Live in Your World, Play in Ours” – to the more ontological implications of 
becoming. While the Second Life site promotes in-world activities and places to visit, the 
campaign is centered on the avatar, fashion-driven notions of beauty, and an ethic of becoming. 
In contrast with avatar texts that begin with characters already in an avatarial state, The Matrix 
and Avatar are also about becoming. Neo progresses through four identifiable stages on his way 
to becoming avatar: the initial acceptance of an avatarial state (achieved with some difficulty), 
                                                
8 Rodowick clarifies: “Digital records may be printed, of course. But their ‘natural’ ontological state is to be 
manifested on electronic displays.” Virtual Life of Film, 135. 
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learning to skillfully use the avatar, acquiring a greater understanding of what it means to be 
truly avatarial, and making a final transformation in accordance with this new knowledge. Jake 
moves through the same four stages on his way to becoming, but while his transition is 
imaginally transformative (at least according to Cameron’s own myth of a total digital cinema), 
in The Matrix, balance is paramount – the double cancels itself out, and Neo must die.  
 
End Program 
 
This illusion of unity, in which a human being is always looking forward to self-mastery, 
entails a constant danger of sliding back again into the chaos from which he started; it 
hangs over the abyss of a dizzy Ascent in which one can perhaps see the very essence of 
Anxiety. 
  Jacques Lacan9 
 
The ubiquitous simulation of the Matrix doesn’t produce an ideal world, but rather the 
fantasy of our world as game space with cinematic bodies that float balletically and violently in 
slow-motion, undergirded by a machine logic that at least makes some sense of the chaos. 
Instead of characters entering an idealized space, as is common in fantasy films, The Matrix 
shifts idealization to the body and its performative capacity as a cinematic ideal within a world 
that looks for the most part like our own. In a dystopian future of machine dominance, to be an 
avatar is to survive, either in captivity, blissfully ignorant of the terrible reality in which humans 
have become sources of electricity for the machines, or by fully embracing and utilizing one’s 
avatarial capacities to combat the machines from inside the Matrix, as Morpheus (Laurence 
Fishburne) and his crew do. 
Neo looks with eyes closed, enters by sitting still. He jacks in for the same reason audiences 
are drawn to the movie, to enter the heightened cinematic space of the Matrix. In what seems to 
                                                
9 Jacques Lacan, “Some Reflections on the Ego,” The International Journal of Psychoanalysis 34: 11-19 (1953). 
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be a reproduction of classic cinema spectatorship, Neo sits quietly, individuated, and engrossed – 
on the one hand acting in the avatar body, but on the other a spectator, even standing in for us, 
entering for us. The videogame logic imposed on this mode of spectatorship, with Neo 
controlling his avatarial self with his mind through a form of direct, first-person, proprioceptive 
mental action, does not of course turn our experience of the film into interactive entertainment, 
but rather appropriates interactive media within the conventions of classical spectatorship. Paul 
Young sees such appropriations as a dual reaction from the Hollywood establishment, as both an 
apprehension toward the encroachment of interactive technologies into the mode of classical 
spectatorship (hence interactive technologies have often been demonized), while at the same 
time capitalizing on the new media culture that studios have already invested in and to which 
many popular titles are tied. Neo at the interface becomes the picture of a cinema of experience. 
With eyes shut, he enters a new cinema no longer reliant simply on the look.10 This is cinema 
playing the ‘real’ with the logic of the game. 
The final confrontation that such logic dictates ends more or less in a stalemate, with 
neither the machines conquered nor the Matrix abolished, as Neo’s personal battle with Agent 
Smith (Hugo Weaving) and his agreement with Deus ex Machina, the ‘face’ of the machines,11 
produce only a ceasefire and the promise that those who want out of the Matrix will be released – 
which one can assume isn’t many, as the psychological difficulty of emerging from the Matrix is 
                                                
10 Surround sound saturates the theater (cineplex or home), pounding audience members from all sides; product tie-
ins insinuate elements from the movies into life outside the theater; hit songs get radio play, stars walk carpets and 
get write-ups in magazines, and once the DVD comes out there will be plenty of extras on the disc. Of course 
theatrical grandiosity is nothing new, and extra-textual publicity has been well-established through the classical era. 
But the Matrix trilogy took the cinema of experience to a greater level of both immersion and diffusion with its 
multi-platform narrative that spanned films, anime, videogames, a virtual world, and web material, so that the full 
story could only be accessed through multiply mediated encounters. This apparatus expands far beyond the pseudo-
dream state posited by Baudry, even if Neo (and Jake even more so) assume states of semi-slumber that prefigure 
the ‘death’ of each.  
11 Deus ex Machina is depicted as a large face composed of small robots – a CG machine ‘interfacing’ with Neo in 
human expresion rather than machine language, by speaking and emoting. 
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evident in Neo’s transition. The preservation of the Matrix in the final film of the trilogy is an 
unexpected ending and, I suggest, a percipient narrative choice by the Wachowskis that helps 
redeem the series from its descension into its own clichés of philosophical obfuscation and CG 
action, for the persistence of the Matrix represents the endurance of avatarial existence. Reading 
the Matrix trilogy in terms of the avatar, the ending is significant for understanding its multiple 
avatarial levels as we observe how Neo fully becomes his avatar – especially as his character 
trajectory moves toward non-image (death) in contrast with Jake’s imaginal embodiment and 
digital ressurection in Avatar. 
 As a battalion of sentinels storm the subterranean enclave of Zion in the final act of The 
Matrix Revolutions, Neo and Trinity are on their way to the Machine City. Slipping above the 
cloud layer to avoid the sentinels, they plummet into the inky, lifeless metropolis. Trinity 
perishes in the crash landing, while Neo is brought to Deus ex Machina, where he offers to rid 
the Matrix of the viral Smith who has overtaken it, in exchange for peace. The machine entity 
accepts his terms and connects him, and Neo appears amidst endless iterations of Smith, who has 
taken over every body in the Matrix. One emerges, declaring that he has seen the end – a 
provocation that recalls the Oracle (Alice Kay), whom he has assimilated – and the highly 
physical battle between Smith and Neo commences. The impacts are bigger and more 
spectacular than those previously in the series, often resembling atom-smashing more than two 
bodies contending with one another. In the process Neo is overcome, reaching his nadir while 
lying nearly unconscious in an impact crater pooling with green water. To Smith’s exasperation, 
however, he rises again. 
 “Why keep fighting?” Smith demands to know, and launches into a diatribe about the 
purposelessness and artificiality of human existence. Neo’s reply, “Because I choose to,” seems 
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well-situated within conventional affirmations of agency in Hollywood cinema, but the nature of 
this choice begs closer scrutiny within the contest of Neo’s destiny and Smith’s inevitability. The 
fight resumes, with Smith again gaining the upper hand, but at the decisive moment the 
premonitory sense he acquired from the Oracle kicks in, replacing Smith’s typical 
pronouncements with an unsettling bit of déjà vu: “Wait, I’ve seen this,” he begins, and then 
repeats something the Oracle had earlier told Neo: “Everything that has a beginning has an end, 
Neo.” Smith the virus becomes aware that he himself has been momentarily hacked, but shirks it 
off and again lunges for Neo, who, struck by the Oracle’s words, allows himself to be 
assimilated.  
 In this moment, it becomes unclear for the first time whether Smith has absorbed the 
Oracle, or whether the Oracle is playing Smith. Withdrawing his stiff-handed plug from Neo’s 
torso, another iteration of Smith appears, a clean (digital) copy relative to the embattled Smith 
who, dirty, wet, and without his sunglasses, now appears more human and desperate than ever. 
But this iteration doesn’t last long, and as the Neo in the Machine City is injected with energy, 
light bursts out of the eyes and mouths of both Neo and his Smith, tearing the Smith apart. The 
remaining Smiths follow suit until the last one disintegrates, and in the Machine City the Deus ex 
Machina proclaims “It is finished,” after which Neo’s lifeless body is carried away. The Oracle 
wakes in the crater from which Smith disappeared, released from his forcible subsumption, and 
in the final scene rests on a park bench on what seems like a pleasant summer morning in the 
Matrix. The Architect (Helmut Bakaitis) approaches and they share a testy exchange in which he 
asks how long she thinks the peace will last, letting her know that she has “made a very 
dangerous game,” while the young Sati (Tanveer K. Atwal), a program ‘born’ in the Matrix, has 
made a beautiful sunrise for Neo.   
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 The typically subtle, cryptic intervention of the Oracle into the destinies of the human 
rebels is in the final battle replaced by a more direct intercession as she works avatarially from 
the inside of Smith, who had already taken over the avatar bodies of everyone in the Matrix 
(Smith in this sense operates more like a biological virus that seeks host cells for replication 
rather than a digital virus that can copy itself indiscriminately). In turn, the illegitimate player, 
Smith, is played by the Oracle, so that Neo, who is at that moment fighting on behalf of the 
machines, sacrificing himself for the humans (in similitude of Christ, the avatar of God), and 
fulfilling his destiny as the One, can relinquish himself to assimilation by the Oracle-played 
Smith. Through the conduit of Neo’s physical and virtual bodies, the ungovernable program 
Smith is deleted by the machines, and in the process Neo expires as well. In Zion the humans 
celebrate, but the triumph is not really theirs; they have only managed to survive, and in their 
better moments believed in something bigger than themselves that they hoped would save them. 
On the contrary, the final moments of the film belong to the real players: the Oracle, the 
Architect, Deus ex Machina, and, more abstractly, the intangible (virtual) force of the One. At 
this moment it becomes fully clear that the characters we have followed as protagonists have 
been pawns in a larger game, while the Matrix as the instrument of mass control through which 
people exist as avatars of themselves, remains in place. 
In other words, the avatar Neo had was only ever a reflection of the avatar Neo was, even 
though his ‘player’, the One, is an abstraction. Neo’s declaration of agency, “Because I choose 
to,” is further complicated in light of what he and we learn earlier from the Architect, that Neo 
has been preceded by not one, but five Ones – that, like Smith, he is an iteration. It’s not clear if 
there have been five Thomas Andersons, or if Thomas Anderson is simply the latest avatar for 
the One, but in either case Neo’s choice to fight must be contextualized within his multiply 
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avatarial status, and relative to the contest between the meta-figures of the Oracle and the 
Architect as echoing the inter-Pantheon squabbles of an earlier epoch, which often made pawns 
of men. Who exactly is doing the choosing, and how is this choice enacted? 
 Interestingly, it is with the body that Neo (the machines, the One) finally defeats Smith – 
not by overpowering him, for Neo has failed at that, but through the sacrifice of the body. 
Having been freed from the Matrix mentally and the harvesting fields physically, his trajectory 
moves through self-fulfillment in his obtaining of a spectacular avatar body, finding love, and 
accepting his role of savior; in the end, however, he faces Deus ex Machina physically, having 
lost his love, and realizing that his fate will require his own destruction. The cinematic kung fu 
skirmishes by which hackers and programs do battle in the Matrix no longer proves effective for 
Neo as Smith becomes the firewall he can’t hack. After offering himself to the machines, then, 
he finally uses a similar tactic in the Matrix, only defeating Smith by allowing himself to be 
taken over. His assertion of will in the crater actually becomes moments later an abnegation of 
agency, as he gives himself over bodily to the unstable aggregate of Smith-Oracle-Machine-One 
and then bursts apart. I suggest that at this moment Neo fully accepts his avatarial status and 
stops fighting, stops resisting – and that becomes his strength. The realization of his destiny, the 
fulfillment of his character, and the resolution of the main tension carrying across the trilogy are 
contingent precisely upon the disappearance of character and the destruction of the body. Having 
become fully avatar, he faces an avatar’s fate: disconnection. 
 The meta-figures in the film are also avatarial in a sense: the Architect is the face of the 
machines, and the Oracle takes on different shells.12 The One, however, sustained by belief, 
                                                
12 This was primarily the result of the death of Gloria Foster after the second film, but when asked about the switch 
the Wachowskis indicated they were already considering the possibility of her acquiring a new shell. Perplexingly, 
however, if a switch had been planned, it seems to make little sense to replace Foster with Alice, as they closely 
resemble each other and the change adds nothing new to the character.  
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manifest in various bodies or iterations, is the most metaphysical and abstract of the meta-
characters, and the most difficult to distinguish from its instantiation in Neo. The One is also the 
anomalous (and absent) singularity in a film that is all about the dyadic. Neo becomes the One 
when he stops being two – or rather when the two (or more) become one in a multiplicity that 
problematizes Neo’s individualistic destiny (is it his destiny to become the One, or his destiny to 
lose himself to the One? is there a difference?). The singular path he takes, if it ever was so, 
comes to an end when he is assimilated by Smith, whom the Oracle has informed Neo “is you, 
your opposite, your negative,” his exact other. In the conjunction of Neo’s self and his other, is 
the sum zero, or One? The other is that necessary alterity for the existence of self, the “mark of 
self-difference, opening up a space for the self to relate to itself as a self, a self that is perpetually 
other.”13 Smith is the zero to Neo’s One, the off to his on, the multiplicity that will complement, 
diffuse, and ultimately complete Neo’s/the One’s singularity (by canceling out the binary). 
 As the anagrammatic prolepsis implies, and although it perhaps it does not fully occur 
until his death, Neo becomes One. In this he can be distinguished from the free-born Tank and 
Dozer who have never known what it is to be two and thus can never ascend to a multiplanar 
unity, and from Cypher’s wish to escape into the false singularity of illusion. Neo is One in the 
way he is performed by one, as Keanu Reeves plays Neo’s avatar and Neo as an avatar, the 
doubting Thomas Anderson and the One who makes a whole of recursivity. On a practical level, 
the One exists at the same time across different cinematic modalities, sliding between the digital 
and the analog, operating on multiple layers at once as is is both a body in cinema (an actor 
filmed) and a cinematic body (the body performed ‘by’ cinema, and digital cinema in particular), 
while at the same time produced offscreen as a virtuality, never appearing directly, but obliquely 
through various forms of doubling and a play of images and bodies. That this is transacted across 
                                                
13 Fuss, Identification Papers, 2. 
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an interface works as a demonstration of the fundamental multiplicity of the One, as Neo learns 
not only to navigate multiple planes of existence, but synergizes them so that ability in one 
(stopping bullets, seeing the Matrix) translates to the other (stopping sentinels, seeing the golden 
glow of the Source). Where Jobe’s abilities in the physical world implied infection or corruption 
in The Lawnmower Man, Neo’s suggest convergence; where Jobe chooses one bodily form over 
another, the death of Neo’s physical body is not the result of divestiture, but the detritus of the 
fusion between user and avatar. The singularity of the One is then ultimately a myth; in this 
world of the dyad, to become one is not to become whole but to disappear.  
 Neo’s transformation into a fully digital character during two brief moments in the trilogy 
serves as a visual counterpoint to his death. Both occur during battles with Smith (the ‘Burly 
Brawl’ in Reloaded and the ‘Super Burly Brawl’ in Revolutions), in which Keanu Reeves is 
replaced by a digital recreation, which Dan North refers to as his ‘avatar’.14 In my own viewing I 
found these moments initially bothersome, as the rendering was unconvincing and artificial. But 
the transitions into and out of this digital version are so smooth and seamless that, in the context 
of everything the One represents in the dyadic film, these moments seem to contribute an 
additional layer of connectivity. As both occurrences take place during moments of intense 
combat, it seems almost as if in cinematic climax this body operating in a digital, imaginal world 
takes on the digital image in an ephemeral transubstantiation, as the two modes are compressed 
into one – adding yet another dimension to the Reeves-Anderson-Neo-One complex. While the 
digital rendering, subject to the technological limitations of the time, is ultimately unconvincing, 
in the transitions one can find something of the virtual, another embodied correspondence 
                                                
14 Dan North, Performing Illusions: Cinema, Special Effects, and the Virtual Actor (London: Wallflower Press, 
2008). 
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between the two states of analog and digital that are already mulitply connected and opposed 
within the series. 
Incidentally, the digital body has a technological affiliation with the digital avatars of the 
three games ancillary to the films in the Matrix franchise. These games (Enter the Matrix, The 
Matrix: Path of Neo, and The Matrix Online), with material filmed or captured during the 
production of the latter two films and featuring movements and performances from several 
actors, make the characters, as well as the signature body movements of their actors, available 
for fans to play in another iterative manifestation of players and avatars. In Path of Neo (2005, 
Shiny Entertainment), in which the player controls Neo on his way to becoming the One, the 
sense of the ‘true’ One as an abstracted force controlling Neo’s destiny echoes unambiguously 
through the game – the One as the Player, misperceiving him- or herself as ‘one’ within a dyadic 
world, ‘creating’ the game in the moment of conjunction with the machines (the game 
technology) that ultimately produce and control it (Fig. 25). The game in this sense becomes the 
final site for avatarial understanding, where unity can be understood as multiplicity – or, 
alternately, where the hidden insights of the films are lost to the logic of the game which 
‘redeems gamespace’, recalling McKenzie Wark’s juxtaposition of games to the postmodern 
world of gamespace as those constructs that impose an illusionary order (and, implicitly, an 
illusionary unity) on the chaos and fragmentation of real world subjectivity. That is, the site 
where we understand ourselves to be already avatarial, or where we once again turn off the game 
and return to our delusions of wholeness. 
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  Figure 25. Neo the avatar in The Matrix: Path of Neo. 
 
 
 In its movement from avatar antitheses in Thomas Anderson and Neo to the avatarial 
synthesis of the multiple ‘One’, the Matrix trilogy demonstrates a further move into new media 
paradigms, from connectivity to compositing. In practice, compositing involves the digital 
combination of photographic elements either with each other (for instance, a photographed 
background with actors filmed in front of a green screen), or with CG elements which are 
blended into the photographic material in such a way that the shot seems to be all of a piece. 
Compositing also refers the layering process whereby CG imagery is rendered with more nuance 
and complexity or made to look photorealistic. “Throughout the production process, elements 
retain their separate identities,” writes Lev Manovich, but “when the object is complete, it can be 
‘output’ as a single ‘stream’ in which separate elements are no longer accessible.”15 Manovich 
understands compositing not only as a characteristic practice within digital media, but a key 
aesthetic component in the evolution of digital culture. In the eighties, he notes, postmodernist 
                                                
15 Manovich, Language of New Media, 139. 
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productions emphasized the boundaries between disparate elements, but in the nineties 
compositing “supports a different aesthetic characterized by smoothness and continuity. 
Elements are now blended together, and boundaries erased rather than emphasized.”16  
This doesn’t necessarily mean that we take the composited image for a whole, however, 
even as we neither perceive it in pieces. With Photoshop and contemporary Hollywood 
techniques, we have grown accustomed to seeing composited images, but how do we receive 
them? North argues that rather than taking these images at face value, we find pleasure in 
locating the ‘seam’ between digital and analog components. While this is certainly possible, I 
argue that the greater experiential or even phenomenological impact of composited images is in 
the ambiguity of their boundaries, the semi-opacity of their layers. Thus while the pleasure of 
‘seeing’ an object or creature we know to be impossible in the real world can be deflating (once 
it appears on the screen it becomes too visible, removed from registers of imagination and 
suggestion), the well-rendered image itself, in which digital impossibility integrates seamlessly 
with photographic indexicality, becomes the more potent enchantment. We perceive the layers 
not visually but experientially or even bodily, as images are framed according to our experience 
of the materiality of pictures and the world. We take pleasure in the confusion of boundaries, but 
at the same time in the smoothness and seamlessness of their integration; in the final product 
boundaries no longer exist except through our cognitive efforts to reproduce them (to make 
connections), even though we know we’ll never be able to catch them all. Using a cinematic 
device as metaphor, one might think of this sort of production and reception in terms of 
superimposition, in which viewers are presented with a surface that is known to have greater 
‘depth’, comprising not only various images but also very different imaging technologies in the 
formation of a unified ‘picture’. 
                                                
16 Ibid., 142. 
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Two Wholes Don’t Make a Half 
 
In superimposition, one image is laid over another so that both are visible at the same 
time, in contrast with the implicit opacity of superposition, in which one element covers another. 
Superimposition, as I relate it here to the image bodies of avatars and CG characters, is as an 
imaging practice is counterposed to the ethic of the cyborg, for instance, which relies on a 
prosthetic hybridity of contiguous or juxtaposed human and machine parts, or superposed figures 
in which either the human or machine element covers the other, as in the Terminator’s synthetic 
skin and human appearance concealing the robot underneath, or the seemingly human 
consciousness trapped in a robot body, as in Isaac Asimov’s novelette The Bicentennial Man and 
film of the same name (Chris Columbus, 1999). Superimposition is a way of thinking about 
physical and virtual aspects, particularly as pertaining to the body, as coexisting and 
simultaneous, even if not quite always in view – the difference, perhaps, between seeing and 
perceiving when it comes to the human processing of digital images. 
The Matrix trilogy, like The Thirteenth Floor, demands such a way of ‘seeing’ character, 
necessitating an active perception of multiple character instantiations in a single body. (I also 
address a more technological implication of superimpositional perception in the motion-capture 
CG character in Chapter 6.) As an illustration of this notion of superimposition, I have found in 
the music video for Björk’s 1996 single “Hyperballad,” directed by Michel Gondry, a short 
avatarial text that refracts hidden layers or ‘selves’ beneath the surface through the 
superimposition of contrasting image technologies. With this strategy, “Hyperballad” produces a 
dialectic of materiality and virtuality, splitting the representation of the body into different 
planes, media, and performances overlaid so that they are all present in a single ‘picture’ of the 
body (Fig. 26).  
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Figure 26. The videographic Björk superimposed on the filmic Björk in 
“Hyperballad”. 
 
 
 In the video, Björk lies slumbering in a miniature, fabricated mountain range. As the 
camera moves around her she is enveloped in blue and green video static that appears on a plane 
that seems to be behind her, and for a moment in front of her as well, but is disconnected from 
the uneven ground on which she lays. A face is superimposed over hers, which in fact is her own 
face in a washed out, high-contrast video image that differs sharply from the warm skin tones of 
what might be referred to as her ‘filmic’ body, as the ‘videogaphic’ Björk begins singing the 
song.17 The superimposition aligns the faces vertically, even as they are out of sync laterally and 
performatively – the videographic face is active and expressive while the filmic body remains in 
slumber. The ghostly effect fades in and out as the motion-controlled camera rocks from side to 
side, following a steady half-arc over the body that reveals the different planes in which the two 
bodies exist – the three-dimensional space of the filmic body (and the camera) contrasted with 
                                                
17 The filmic Björk, in a still repose for most of the video, takes on an additional measure of plasticity as a result of 
her lack of movement – a further contrast with the ethereal video body. 
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the two-dimensional plane of the video image, seemingly hovering just over the filmic body so 
that the image is foreshortened as the camera approaches a profile of the filmic body. These 
dimensions, however, are not so clear cut, as one bears in mind that the filmic image is also 
materially two-dimensional, while the video image is a flat projection of an image in three-
dimensional space. The different planes, media, and actions of the two bodies bisect the ‘Björk’ 
in the picture into two bodies, while the motion-controlled camera keeps them unified in space.   
It is not insignificant that the camera that shot this video was controlled by a computer, 
and equally pertinent to note that Gondry produced the superimposition in-camera, on a single 
400’ roll of film. The old-school technique of rolling back the film is simple enough, but the 
dimensional effect of the bodies in different planes could only be produced through a computer-
facilitated practice of precise frame control and camera movement that is today commonly 
associated with digital production – particularly in the compositing of analog images and digital 
effects. The separate image planes can be thought of as a way to visualize embodiment as 
superimpositional and planar, existing in the different ‘mediations’ of biological flesh, visual 
media, digital culture, discursive formations, the experiential imaginary, etc. The computer 
allows the planes to be simultaneously separate and together, facilitating the coincidence and 
overlay of images. In avatar use it is the computer that links cinematic seeing, the informational 
avatar body, and the organic body of the user in an experience that produces the encounter with 
the virtual. In the video, the ethereal abstraction of the video image floats above the filmic body, 
which also stands in for the body of the film – a seemingly bodiless image superimposed on (and 
simultaneously captured in) the image body. One sleeps while the other cries out, one is 
naturalized while the other is obviously mediated, the filmic body is flesh to the videographed 
spirit.  
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Eventually escaping this bifurcation, Björk enters another. Morphing into a coarsely 
pixelated avatar who dodges transmission towers produced with vector graphics, she has been 
transformed into a digital avatar body and inserted into a videogame. The vulnerability of the 
avatar is on full view here, as she desperately runs before finally tumbling off a cliff and 
shattering at the bottom. Here we return to the filmic body – the real body, or real ‘image’, for 
which the avatar body was a digitized other (or is the filmic body other to it?). The sleeping 
Björk opens her eyes, and the video ends with increasing levels of superimposition applied to the 
now alert filmic body until it finally disappears under a cascade of video layers.   
“Hyperballad” is a song about a double life, and the ritual performance of a virtual 
suicide each morning before the lover awakes in which she throws objects off a cliff and 
imagines her body in their place, so “I can be happier / To be safe up here with you.” The video 
reinterprets this doubling as a contrast between mediating forms that are overlaid, producing 
tension between the half and double. Björk’s later single “All is Full of Love” (1998), in 
comparison, is a song about disconnect and the inability to experience the love “all around you” 
because “your phone is off the hook.” Chris Cunningham’s video for the song takes a cyborg 
approach with a robot Björk being repaired or assembled when an identical robot joins in her 
melancholy tune. The two robots are then fixed in a mostly static but seemingly tender kiss, 
accompanied by gentle caresses while the robotic arms continue work on their bodies (Fig. 27). 
This attention to the body in the form of robot love attends a doubling that, even in a self-
embrace, is disconnected still; the ‘touches’ of the robot arms doing the repairing are as sensuous 
and intimate (if not more so) as the cold kiss.  
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  Figure 27. Clone embrace in “All is Full of Love”. 
 
 
Cyborg doubling here takes place in the form of replication, in the recursive production 
of multiple bodies; the demonstration of self-love through the kissing robot clones becomes an 
indication of the failure of the replicated bodies to reunite into a single entity, for there is no half 
in the equation. In contrast, the half-man, half-robot hybrid body in RoboCop represents an 
attempt at joining two incompatible halves into a whole, with no double for the singular 
amalgamation. Murphy/RoboCop (Peter Weller) is neither a fully functioning robot nor a fully 
functioning man, but an assemblage of halves into an uncomfortable, bifurcated entity – “a 
fragmented collection of disconnected parts that achieve the illusion of coherence only through 
their display as spectacle,” as Nigel Clark notes.18 The cyborg faces the problem of material 
difference and incompatibility, while the avatar reframes the difference of the virtual and 
material as two halves of the same thing, which is only destabilized when one is superposed over 
the other or they are understood as existing separately.19 
                                                
18 Clark, “Rear-View Mirrorshades,” 126. 
19 Another interesting variation here is the sentient AI entity in Mamoru Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell (1995), in which 
the entity, called the Puppetmaster, ‘hacks’ the brains of both humans and other intelligent androids, controlling 
them avatarially to do its bidding. Major Kusanagi (Atsuko Tanaka), a female cyborg, pursues the Puppetmaster, but 
when she finally confronts it (in the form of another female android), the Puppetmaster reveals that it has been 
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The tension of the cyborg with itself is thus partly attributable to its instantiations as 
doubles without halves, and halves without doubles; “Hyperballad” represents the conflation of 
the half and the double in a multi-plane whole. Katherine Hayles argues that “by adopting a 
double vision that looks simultaneously at the power of simulation and at the materialities that 
produce it, we can better understand the implications of articulating posthuman constructions 
together with embodied actualities.”20 Joining the virtual and material is largely a matter of 
perception, a way of seeing the the virtuality of the material and the materialization of the virtual, 
in order to see how halves and doubles interconnect. Hayles draws a lengthy comparison 
between the posthuman and the liberal humanist subject, that Cartesian figure long regarded as 
exemplary of human being. The Cartesian subject is a Platonic creature of halves – mind and 
body, spirit and flesh – in which one half is privileged over the other, and this ‘immaterial’ half 
conceptualized as an idealized whole. The posthuman for Hayles is a figure that embraces the 
disappearance of its own body into information, and thus it has a (relatively) ‘immaterial’ aspect 
which on the one hand offers the potential for the disruption of discourses of embodiment that 
emphasize the flesh, but on the other is subject to the idealization of the half; the posthuman 
“shares with its predecessor [the liberal humanist subject] an emphasis on cognition rather than 
embodiment,” writes Hayles, and thus “to the extent that the posthuman constructs embodiment 
as the instantiation of thought/information, it continues the liberal tradition rather than disrupts 
it.”21 Hayles’s image of the posthuman thus also faces the problem of halves without doubles.   
Superimposition proposes an integration between the virtual and material selves to 
produce a kind of unity achieved not through disavowal, but by having multiple planes of 
                                                                                                                                                       
seeking her, desiring to fuse with her in order to reproduce. When she asks why it doesn’t simply replicate itself, the 
Puppetmaster indicates that while replication increases numbers, it doesn’t advance the species; in order to evolve, it 
must breed in difference. Kusanagi agrees, and when she wakes up in a new body (her previous one having been 
mostly destroyed), her consciousness has also transformed. 
20 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 47. 
21 Ibid., 5. 
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existence ‘in view’ at once. “Hyperballad” lends itself to the conception of an avatarial 
‘embodiment’ of the text, incorporating bodies, images, and the materiality of the medium into a 
representative form that is not only self-reflexive regarding its media, but this reflexivity is also 
tied to the image of the body. When the filmic Björk fades out under the superimposed layers 
that conclude the video, she seems to dissolve into the body of the film (the medium) itself. The 
filmic body is closest to the physical body by virtue of its celluloid materiality, photochemical 
inscription, and analogical images, and thus this ending corresponds with a tendency within 
avatarial texts to tie the representation of the human body to the body of the image in which it is 
instantiated, that each sustains the (disappearing) materiality of the other.  
Superimposition as a device for seeing in multiple planes simultaneously not only has a 
long cinematic history, but is also a key component of contemporary mobile technologies that 
produce a layered view of the material world – what might be thought of as a sort of 
phenomenological informatics. Superimposition can be found in augmented reality (AR) 
applications available for smartphones and tablets, devices that bring together cameras, displays, 
and computers in single handheld units that can be positioned between the viewer and the world 
– that is, made part of the immediately perceivable world of the viewer – or even reflecting 
images of the viewer back to him or herself. The AR feature on the Blue Mars augmented reality 
app (Avatar Reality), for instance, allows the user to ‘place’ his or her avatar from the Blue Mars 
virtual environment into material space, as viewed through the tablet screen, where it might 
dance on the table or stand on a street corner. Another app, “Skinvaders” (Total Immersion), 
places cartoonish blotches on players’ faces that become game elements; losing rounds result in 
the face marked with virtual features such as bulging eyes or big ears – features that stay 
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‘connected’ to the body as it is reproduced on the screen as the tablet follows the body 
movements of the user.   
AR serves as an effective device, both visually and technologically, for conceptualizing 
the intersection between the physical and virtual aspects of space, and particularly in the way the 
program makes use of images that appear to be ‘disembodied’. AR refers specifically to the 
overlay of images or information on physical space through a mobile device. In an article on AR, 
Manovich points out that architectural spaces have long been covered with information, from 
cave paintings to frescoes to contemporary signage, but AR gives the information fluidity, so that 
it might change for different users or be updated as needed. In this, AR superimposes rather than 
superposes, so that virtual content retains the phenomenological and technological quality of 
being virtual; that is, information on a storefront or cathedral could be considered virtual in that 
it is a cultural or linguistic signifier and thus more than its materials, but it is also part of the 
materiality of the space itself, whereas AR applications are not. Virtual content within the live 
image seems to be part of the space, however, and in this way graphics and information appear to 
be present within the space being viewed in a live image, rather than simply appearing on the 
screen.22  
As the product of the camera view, the geospatial location of the device, networked 
information, computer processes, and the gyroscopic sensors and recognition software that 
‘attach’ images and information to space, these graphical bits are divorced from any traditional 
medium and not containable in any one aspect of the technologies that produce them, and thus 
they seem to float interstitially, existing in the connections between material and virtual space, 
                                                
22 ‘Augmented reality’ is sometimes also used to refer to any application that combines real world data with digital 
information, such as a map program. Here I’m specifically referring to those applications that use a live camera 
view. Google is currently on the forefront of furthering the technology with its Google Glass project, an AR head-
mounted display that operates as both a camera and a hands-free screen, worn by the user as a pair of glasses.  
 185 
embodiment, and technology, rather than localizable within any one of these multiple elements. 
The mobile device becomes an informational interface to the physical world. An augmented 
reality tour guide program, for instance, makes use of existing structures and locations to which 
virtual information and images are attached, allowing tourists to see both at the same time and 
experience a vision of the history of a place (although a history made representational and 
informational). Users thus encounter at the same time the presence of the space or object, its 
image in the mobile device, the informational overlay, and the presence of the device itself. 
Manovich asks, “Do these layers add up to a single phenomenological gestalt or are they 
processed as separate layers?”23 The answer is to a certain extent a matter of individual 
experience, but it is important to note that AR not only brings digital information and images to 
physical space but, perhaps more saliently, provides a way of seeing physical space with virtual 
elements that appear already to be there. 
At the same time, the intermediary device imposes its own presence on the scene. In our 
example of the AR-facilitated tour, for example, one might be viewing historical information on 
a window in a century-old mansion; the space within view includes both the window and the 
smartphone, representing two very different ways of seeing the world that, at the same time, 
share a number of similarities. Anne Friedberg’s work on windows as functional and 
architectural devices for light and vision, and metaphorical applications in the design of 
graphical user interfaces, traces the shift from the singular perspective in Alberti’s window to the 
multiple-screen and virtual ‘windows’ through which “we now see the world in spatially and 
temporally fractured frames.”24 The functionality of windows moved from the simple facilitation 
of light and ventilation to the architectural window that served to construct subjectivity by 
                                                
23 Lev Manovich, “The Poetics of Augmented Space,” unpublished article, manovich.net (2005), 1.  
24 Friedberg, The Virtual Window, 243. 
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framing the outside world, structuring perception not only through the delimited exterior but also 
through the juxtaposition of interior and exterior spaces. With AR the device is superposed over 
the view of the space the user wants to see virtually, obstructing it so that the superimposed 
image can be obtained through the screen; rather than multiple windows and a fractured viewing 
experience, virtuality is overlaid in a composite (non-)image that might be thought of as planar, 
with multiple planes of informational possibilities within a single view rather than multiple 
windows which separate photographic and virtual imagery. The device becomes a mobile 
window for seeing what is (presumably) ‘already there’ – just as the architectural window does 
not produce the external scene that is the object of the view, but only provides the frame. But 
what is already there is fluid and contingent, and indeed not inherent but projected – it is not the 
specific information of an object or space that coexists with it, but the informational derivatives 
and projections that produce, to recall Hayles, the notion that the material world is 
‘interpenetrated by information patterns’. The overlaid information is clearly recognizable as 
existing on a separate (visual) plane from the photographic image, and thus the closer encounter 
with virtuality might be effected when the user moves the mobile device out of view and looks at 
the object with a more specific conception of its informational possibilities. 
While Hayles understands virtuality in terms of information, I have used AR and 
superimposition as a way of thinking about a virtuality encountered in images. These are not the 
representational images delineated by Friedberg, but rather conceptual images, the afterimages 
and oblique sensations generated in the phenomenological reception of pictures, media 
transmissions, and interfaces. Digital imagery becomes spiritual or ephemeral relative to the 
physicality of the film or photographic image; as they do not exist the same way in historical and 
material instantiations, digital images can, in a sense, never ‘die’. A digital print becomes a 
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record of the image information at a particular moment within a history of modifications, rather 
than at the moment of capture, as digital images ‘live’ on screens – while their (quickly fading) 
prints become so many disposable corpses.  
The complex layering of digital imagery, the activity under the surface, the electricity 
that powers it – the vivification of the digital stems in large part from its many interlinking 
processes and its presence on a display. Time is not embalmed, but preserved behind glass – 
dormant, perhaps, but stirred at a mouseclick. It is in fact the quality of these images not being 
‘one’ (dependent on the device, with no body of their own) that at the same time brings them to 
life. Traditional images consolidate time and space within a single material instantiation, whereas 
our phenomenological experience of time and space is multiple, in present moments and memory 
of the past, and in subjective experience and objective views. The digital, while in a sense 
‘disembodied’, lends itself to human experience in its multiplicity and superimpositional 
layering; while it must be ‘framed’, as Hansen argues, in these ways the digital is already nearer 
human experience, while the erstwhile, mortal ‘body’ of the photograph finds its analogue in the 
human body subject to increasing virtualization, smothered by images. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DIGITAL ALTERITY 
 
 
Find a cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to the body. Use it to express the 
unmediated participation of the flesh in the image (whether ‘natural’ or mass-mediated). 
Find a logic for the corporeal (body and image) that does not oppose it to the virtual. Find 
a logic for the virtual (imageless and potential) that does not remove it from the real; for 
example by equating it with the imaginary. Dis-sever, instead, the imageless from the 
Ideal. 
Brian Massumi1  
 
“In cryo you don’t dream,” Jake says at the beginning of Avatar as he emerges from 
hypersleep in a coffin-like cylindrical pod. On Pandora – the verdant, digital biosphere created 
by James Cameron’s creative team and Weta engineers – Jake will have different dreams. Lying 
in a different cylinder, his eyes closed but active as in REM sleep, Jake sleeps in one place and 
awakens in another – sleeps in one body, and ‘drives’ a different one, an avatar body designed 
for infiltration of the indigenous Na’vi population. Pandora itself becomes the dream, a fantasy 
of digital creation and inhabitation realized in 3D. While The Lawnmower Man took the camera 
‘inside’ the computer, putting the otherness of computer space on display, and The Matrix shifted 
cyberspace to the world outside the computer, to the space of everyday life, albeit one with a 
green tint and a Baudrillardian uncanniness, Avatar inverts cyberspace completely – the 
electronic world is now the natural world, and the new cinematic bodies are not simply 
manipulated by visual effects techniques, they have become visual effects. 
Digital effects cinema in general is highly liminal, often combining and compositing 
digital and photographic elements in a way that makes their distinction difficult or even 
impossible. When the effects are pronounced, the technological virtuosity involved in combining 
                                                
1 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 66. 
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them becomes part of the spectacle, and their liminality a source of spectatorial pleasure.2 Live-
action footage becomes just one component in the many elements of digital cinema, as Lev 
Manovich notes, and thus while the camera continues to exist ‘virtually’ within the dominant 
mode of photographic seeing, the presence of the physical camera becomes ambiguous.3 The 
camera typically retains, however, a certain relation to the body, in that the human form, and 
particularly the face, have been the most difficult for digital technologies to reproduce 
accurately. This is not to say that human bodies are not digitally produced or altered in cinema, 
as in the highly realistic CG animation in films such as the videogame-inspired Final Fantasy: 
The Spirits Within (2001, Hironobu Sakaguchi), the digital retouching in Surrogates, which 
made actors more plastic for the surrogate bodies and added blemishes to the organic bodies, and 
digital suture that attaches a new face to a body, as in the young Jeff Bridges constructed and 
composited for Tron: Legacy (2010, Joseph Kosinsky). However, the difficulty and expense in 
producing CG bodies that are indiscernible from photographed ones has been prohibitive enough 
that the body of the actor has an added ontological connection to the physical presence of a 
camera. The face in particular becomes affective evidence: the poetry of the close-up, which 
Balázs described as the “most subjective and individual of human manifestations,” becomes 
another manifestation of the objective device of the camera.4 It is the digital faces, however, blue 
and therianthropic as they are, that drive the love story and provide the emotional anchor in 
Avatar.   
What are these faces, exactly? Who, or what, do we see when we view a motion-capture 
CG character? They are not simply animated figures, which can be discerned in the bodily 
                                                
2 Of course, poorly or cheaply done effects can produce spectatorial frustration, often as a result of their failure to 
fully integrate or meaningfully interact with photographic elements. 
3 Lev Manovich, “What is Digital Cinema?” in The Digital Dialectic: New Essays on New Media, ed. Peter 
Lunenfeld (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).  
4 Béla Balázs, “From Theory of the Film,” in Film Theory and Criticism, ed. Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 316. 
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movements and facial expressions that accord with our experience of real-world human activity, 
but they are also certainly images created rather than recorded. The semi-faithful resemblance of 
the avatar faces to their drivers/actors in Avatar further underscores the liminality of these bodies 
that are neither solely photographic or computer-generated. The film is structured around 
oppositions that emanate from the avatar bodies in the contests of nature and machine, alien and 
human, the digital and the photographic, following Jake in its oscillations between them. Avatars 
are not only a diegetic element in the film, but also functional devices for crossing thresholds of 
the body and the image. In The Lawnmower Man such oscillations proved untenable, with the 
anxiety of cyberspace threatening not only a loss of subjectivity, but also, as Paul Young argues, 
presented as a threat to cinematic form. Avatar, however, delights in lingering at the threshold, 
exchanging alterity for redemption and love in grand cinematic fashion. By the time Jake crosses 
over for the last time, the anxiety of the threshold has been nullified, the alterity of the digital 
rendered familiar, organic, beautiful. The troubling of the index is presented in this context as a 
source of pleasure in itself – both in its ambiguous but compelling relationship with the body, 
and in a ‘liberation’ of the image in its generative and visual potential to fully display, through 
the capacity of the digital. Cameron offers Avatar as the wellspring of a technological and visual 
modality in which film becomes other to the digital, and the digital presents itself as the 
fulfillment of the cinematic dream.   
 
Contested Territories 
 
Characters who are incomplete in some way are a cinematic staple, but in avatar texts the 
incompleteness of the characters tends to be tied to an encroaching sense of virtuality. Characters 
pass through an avatarial state, which they come to accept, manage to escape, or succeed in 
destroying as remedies for their self-alienation and attempts to find or regain wholeness. While 
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many of these characters are in one way or another trying to reconnect with themselves, the 
mentally disabled Jobe is, in comparison, already too close to himself (a generally feminine 
problem), incapable of abstract thought or dissimulation – a condition that has some interesting 
parallels with the Na’vi, who lack the objectivity of the human scientists and the emotional 
detachment of the soldiers. While Jobe is particularly susceptible within the avatarial state, 
however, failing to maintain a separation from his virtual self and thus ‘becoming’ his avatar, the 
Na’vi are framed as antidotal to the avatarial condition, helping Jake find his true or evolved self 
through avatarial fulfillment. In Avatar, Jake’s alienation from himself is strongly rooted in the 
body, and particularly the disabled body – an external manifestation of the body set against the 
will, and one that, not coincidentally, lends itself to a resolution through images (of a capable 
body replacing the broken one). Disability for Jake is not only the outward sign of physical 
incapacity but also the root for his emotional ruin, and the film uses the contrast in images of the 
disabled and avatar bodies as the backbone of its affective allegorization of competing imaging 
technologies.    
The disabled Jake, we might say, still has ‘legs’ in him, as the film works as a kind of 
visualization of phantom limb syndrome: through the avatar body he is able to ‘realize’ the 
missing part of his own body in a way that completes his character arc. In the beginning of the 
film, Jake is incomplete, a half, his former life as an able-bodied Marine at odds with his present 
crippled condition; the tension inherent in his disabled state in relation to what his body once was 
(and what it will be again) is summed up in the scornful reaction of one of the mercenary soldiers 
who, upon seeing Jake come off the transport in a wheelchair, remarks, “Now that’s just wrong.” 
As a particularly body-based occupation, the soldier’s primary tool or weapon is the body, with 
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the goal of destroying other bodies while preserving one’s own.5 Jake’s disability not only sets 
the stage for his new body, but it also carries some interesting implications within media theory, 
as the broken spine recalls McLuhan’s writings on media relative to the body and nervous 
system, in which overstimulation in modern society impels the amputation of the ‘disabled’ 
sensorial capability so that it might be extended artificially. Jake’s avatarial extension of himself 
allows him to incorporate a degree of mediation, in both the form of the avatar as well as the 
digital, and he meets his new body with exultant liberation, running out of the lab in his johnny 
to try out his new legs.6 Legs on online and videogame avatars are also what Katherine Hayles 
might call ‘skeuomorphs’ – design features persisting even when no longer needed functionally – 
as walking and running through virtual space are phenomenologically-driven rather than 
technologically necessary. Jake’s disability factors large in his assimilation into both a new 
culture and a new form of images. 
Jake is brought to Pandora not for the training or intelligence his twin brother had 
attained, but because his bodily information, his DNA, is compatible with the avatar body; his 
biological code becomes the access key for his entry into the digital biology of Pandora. At the 
same time, Jake’s avatar body and eventual transformation are counterposed by the prosthetic 
AMP suit (short for Amplified Mobility Platform) used by Colonel Quaritch (Stephen Lang) 
(Fig. 28). Visually and kinesthetically, the anthropomorphic exoskeleton driven by Quaritch 
                                                
5 Baudrillard and Paul Virilio have both explored the mediation of war, which becomes increasingly distanciated 
with video- and laser-guided bombs and the now-common aerial drones that routinely provide surveillance and 
bombing runs in hostile territory. However, Jake and the other mercenaries on Pandora are more representative of 
the bodily connections of the soldier to war and the use of the body as a weapon. Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War 
Did Not Take Place (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics of 
Perception, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1989); Virilio, Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light, trans. 
Michael Degener (New York: Continuum, 2005). 
6 McLuhan associates the extension of the human with the Narcissus myth, writing that “men at once become 
fascinated by any extension of themselves in any material other than themselves” (64); applied to the avatar, this 
association suggests that fascination with the digital body is not so much in seeing the self reflected back, but in 
experiencing the mediation of the self – seeing the medium through the self, rather than the self through the medium. 
Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Corte Madera, CA: Gingko Press, 2003). 
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corresponds to the body movements of its user through a mimetic master-slave interface, rather 
than the mental or oneiric interface used by the avatar drivers in repose, as demonstrated by a bit 
of shadow boxing Quaritch does when we see him first enter the suit. However, the AMP 
prosthesis remains distinct from the body, mimetic rather than integrated sensorially as the avatar 
body is, and thus can never produce the closeness to nature and the body that Jake experiences.7    
 
 
 Figure 28. Quaritch in the mimetic, anthropomorphic AMP suit. 
 
 Quaritch and his machine are alien to this world, not suited for it, as the AMP ultimately 
cannot protect him from Pandora, and his own status as a half remains unresolved by the 
machinic ‘double’ he inhabits. Jake’s strength is ultimately that he is able to move beyond the 
cyborg relation and become unified with his new body rather than existing at odds with it. Not 
                                                
7 The AMP suit is however closer in form to the human body than the cargo-loader exosuit used by Sigourney 
Weaver’s Ripley in Cameron’s Aliens (1986), as seen for instance in its dexterous hands with which it wields 
weapons like knives and guns rather than the pre-CGI clamp tools produced with mechanical movement in Aliens. 
Yet the pronounced anthropomorphism of the AMP comes off as more indicative of machine design that has reached 
its creative limits, only able to more closely mimic the human body, rather than the evolution of an especially 
advanced technology. 
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only has his sense of embodiment aligned with the new body, but his ‘virtual’ side – the 
unrealized wholeness within him that found expression through the avatar – is incomplete 
without it, as implicit in the disabled Marine body. When Quaritch attacks the pod that holds 
Jake’s dormant human body toward the end of the film, he endangers Jake specifically by 
violently projecting upon Jake his own weakness, the disjuncture of body and technology, which 
is manfiest as Jake tumbles out of his interface, gasping for breath. But by this point Jake has 
already transcended cyborg embodiment in every respect except the final physical transition, 
with which the film concludes. Abandoning the wheelchair and the promise of fixing his legs 
through medical technology, he returns to nature – a move away from the machine that is 
simultaneously regressive and forward-looking, anti-technology and fully embracing the digital 
image.  
Even as their depiction is largely dependent on the same CG imagery that produces the 
exotic flora and fauna in the film, machines are framed as part of a different technological era, 
relics of a Machine Age past relative to an idealized future of both ecological harmony and 
pristine digital imagery. Machines are ominous and antagonistic in the film, as excavators, battle 
vehicles, and AMP suits become exaggerated displays of the machine as destructive element, 
opposed to nature – and, implicitly, the feminine, as can be seen in Neytiri (Zoë Saldanda) as the 
main Na’vi character and the feminization of Jake as avatarial, imaginal, and close to nature. 
Jake’s wheelchair, in contrast, is a simple prosthetic machine minimized in form and function – a 
relatively primitive technology, and ultimately one easily detached and discarded. In addition to 
outsized machinery, the human interlopers also rely on virtual technologies in the command 
center, as seen in holographic displays of the Pandora terrain and Home Tree, and an image of 
Jake’s brain that can be manually ‘swiped’ from a large glass display to a mobile one. 
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Representations of a softer machine technology are more the domain of Grace’s (Sigourney 
Weaver) team, however, and the objects present in these images are those most closely 
associated with the virtual elements in the film: the natural landscape of Pandora and home of the 
Na’vi, and the organ with which Jake connects phenomenologically to the avatar body through 
the interface. His brain, along with the rest of his body, is eventually abandoned, while his 
‘virtual’ body, his embodiment, is essentially downloaded; as Hayles points out, the body may 
disappear, but embodiment persists, and thus this image of Jake’s brain early in the film comes to 
foreshadow the embodied mind (not just the consciousness, as it is his brain that is imaged) that 
will be transplanted into the new body already partly designed in his (that is, his twin brother’s) 
image. 
Machines and virtuality are parallel fascinations for Cameron, from his obsession with 
recreating the Titanic to his script for the Kathryn Bigelow-directed Strange Days (1995) in 
which virtual experiences are bought and sold on the black market, to the invasion of a hulking 
submarine base by a watery CG tendril that mimes the facial expression of a crew member in 
The Abyss (1989), and most notably in his juxtaposition of cyborgian hardware and fluid 
virtuality in Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1991). The liquid metal man in the latter, ostensibly 
an advanced machine, is perhaps better viewed as a progressive image form: his quicksilver 
machinic state is essentially a CG interstice between the performances of various actors, an 
amorphous image body through which one (photographic) body transitions into another. 
Although Schwarzenegger’s hard cyborg eventually triumphs, he must also be terminated, and in 
this film Cameron prefigures the demise of the on-screen machine in favor of the production 
technologies that would produce spectacles of biological life, as exemplified in Spielberg’s 
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Jurassic Park two years later.8 In Avatar the coffin-like chambers in which the avatar drivers lie 
presage the death of the physical/photographic bodies of both Grace, who is unable to transition 
to the imaginal/digital body, and Jake, who is. Grace and Quaritch are casualties of the border 
war between analog machine and digital body, and only Jake, who as a half is able to fully 
integrate with his virtual double by embracing his own virtuality, comes through successfully. 
Dana Fore, writing about representations of disability in Avatar, points out the way in 
which images of disability relate to fantasies of bodily control. Jake, through his courage and 
determination, fulfills the stereotype of what Jack A. Nelsen calls the ‘Supercrip’, in which 
disability is overcome by willpower and strength of character, and thus “what was once a 
prosthetic device [the avatar] is magically transformed into flesh and blood, leaving Jake 
unmarked and ‘normal’ in the larger society.”9 One can follow, as Fore does, the shift in 
emphasis from avatar as utility, with the avatar as an advanced biological tool for sociological 
integration and environmental adaptation (the latter sense actually somewhat analogous to 
Clynes and Kline’s conception of the cyborg), to a change in Jake’s sense of being, the body 
having become more than just a tool. Also, within Cameron’s allegory of competing imaging 
technologies, Jake’s disabled body is aligned with the photographic world of the humans, and his 
able avatar body with the digital world, and thus concerns about the physical body of the once 
strong marine coincide with unease about the disappearing materiality of film. What is ‘normal’ 
in Pandora is, at the level of the image, the all-encompassing digital, and thus the question can be 
posed: to what extent might the film itself be working to overcome its own photographic 
‘disability’? 
                                                
8 Although the Terminator’s ‘hardness’ is emphasized in writings about the cyborg aspects of the film, the liquid 
metal man brings into stark relief the Terminator’s pronounced fleshiness. His skin and organic matter are torn, 
burned, and penetrated throughout the film in what becomes a visual metaphor for his humanity, his ‘softness’ 
relative to the cold, fleshless metal of the new model. 
9 Dana Fore, “The Tracks of Sully’s Tears: Disability in James Cameron’s Avatar,” Jump Cut no. 53, Summer 2011. 
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Part of the mystique that surrounded the production of Avatar was its long delay; slated 
to follow Titanic (1997), Cameron pushed the film back because he didn’t feel the technology 
was available to tell the story. As has been demonstrated by fan-produced homages and parodies, 
along with several porn knockoffs, painting people blue and filming in a forest is certainly one 
way. What Cameron felt he couldn’t do with make-up, prosthetics, matte paintings or digital 
backgrounds, not to mention the visual effects capabilities he had just used to recreate the 
Titanic, implies that the story, as he conceived it, was not simply one with high technological 
demands (ground which had been well-traversed in the analog era with Star Wars and Blade 
Runner) or requiring elaborate fantasy elements (Peter Jackson’s Lord of the Rings trilogy would 
have been contemporary with Avatar had it not been delayed). Cameron seems to have had in 
mind a new era of filmmaking, which he indeed has helped usher in – an era that is to an extent 
opposed to the photographic image. As D. N. Rodowick observes, from Jurassic Park onward 
 
the major creative forces in the industry began to think of the photographic process as an 
obstacle to creativity, as something to be overcome, rather than as the very medium of 
cinematic creation. In a previous era of cinematic creation, the physical world both 
inspired and resisted the imagination; in the age of digital synthesis, physical reality has 
entirely yielded to the imagination.10 
 
 
Avatar, perhaps more than any other recent film, embodies the logic Rodowick puts forward, 
creating antagonism between the photographic and digital on multiple levels. In what amounts to 
an allegory of competing imaging technologies, the conflict between the humans and the Na’vi 
pits one world against another: the photographic humans from a dying planet, who come with 
machines to plunder the resources of Pandora, and the proliferative abundance of the digital 
world, which offers unlimited possibilities – including the creation, it would seem, of life itself. 
                                                
10 Rodowick, Virtual Life of Film, 28. 
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Besides improving 3D technology, developing a virtual camera system, and advancing motion-
capture and digital rendering techniques, Cameron and his many collaborators also meticulously 
developed a world of flora and fauna designed to be as biologically rich as their visual 
production – and indeed, the two seem to go hand in hand, as Cameron seems not so much 
focused on producing films about an imaginary world, but rather on creating an imaginary world 
in which films can then be made.   
The technology that created Pandora and the Na’vi bodies is rooted in the digital 
processes Cameron helped develop for Terminator 2, but the results are quite the opposite of the 
lifeless future and mechanical men portrayed in that film, for in Avatar Cameron’s project is the 
creation of life, and life in excess. The final vestiges of the photographic process, seen in the 
human desperation for Pandora’s ‘unobtanium’, poses a symbolic threat to the imaginative 
possibilities and digital vibrancy of the CG world – and the very future of cinema, if we follow 
Cameron into his mythical floating mountains. Here the dying photographic world makes one 
last push, “as if cinema were fighting for its very aesthetic existence. . . . wherein cinema 
struggles to reassert or redefine its identity in the face of a new representational technology that 
threatens to overwhelm it.” Rodowick is referring to films like The Thirteenth Floor and The 
Matrix, in which “the digital versus the analog was the heart of narrative conflict,” but it is 
important to note that in these films it is the digital that is positioned antagonistically to the 
photographic, whereas Avatar reverses the tension, making photographic encroachment the 
menacing element.11   
The final battle waged between the humans and the Na’vi, the photographic and the 
digital, collapses the geospatial and screen spaces that had for most of the film remained 
separate, producing the violent confrontation between the two worlds and imaging processes that 
                                                
11 Ibid., 4. 
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had formerly been bridged avatarially.12 Films like Jurassic Park keep the digital contained, as a 
spectacle in a cage that will thrillingly threaten to escape, but, as we all know, will ultimately be 
kept in its place as something for the photographic humans in the film (and the real humans in 
the audience) to subject to a fascinated and curious gaze. The military establishment on Pandora 
is positioned as the conservative center to the digital otherness of the Na’vi, and while we have 
grown accustomed to seeing digital characters in animation, digital bodies and elements in live-
action film are indexically destabilizing. Quaritch and his mercenaries fail to see what Cameron 
demonstrates for the audience – that the digital can be affective, sensuous, and vital.  
The avatar becomes the bridge between the two worlds, Cameron’s method for inducting 
us into a digital that is not simply ancillary to the photographic or an other to be destroyed, but 
an all-consuming digital that augurs the future of cinematic possibility. CG imagery is ‘safe’, as 
a fascination, when it is positioned as other, whether that be in its relation to photographic 
elements in a live-action film, or in animation, which as a genre has been typically assigned 
secondary status to live-action filmmaking. When it moves to the forefront, however, with CG 
characters as protagonists who not only defeat their photographic counterparts but also develop a 
sweeping romance, the digital becomes threatening; Cameron’s task is not only to counter the 
otherness of the digital, but to make it an acceptable and even desirable form of cinematic 
pleasure relative to the photographic, which Cameron facilitates with the avatar interface and 
eventually avatarial transformation. In order to contextualize these moves and establish a 
theoretical and practical basis for CG characters, I will briefly examine their role in a few other 
films that situate CG and animated characters within live-action settings, to one extent or another 
                                                
12 The production of each space was also separate, almost a world apart, with the Pandora performances captured on 
an L.A. sound stage and the human base shot on sets in New Zealand. 
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opposed to live actors. The tensions between these different kinds of images expose the implicit 
hierarchy of images that posits animated and CG imagery as other to the photographic. 
 
Native Images 
 
Animated characters, in their origins within and ontological attachment to the filmic and 
digital media which construct them, might be thought of, in certain ways, as native. With their 
profilmic existence instantiated on paper, glass, and screen, they are formed in the media of their 
production but are not in the conventional sense mediated, for they come to life in the very 
process of mediation. Spatially, they are residents of screens, confined to its borders – always 
elsewhere, but in some sense always in their place; temporally, they are products of the 
movement of film in a way distinct from that of live action filmmaking, as cinematic motion 
produces their respiring anima – not captured images reinvigorated after the passing of the 
original moment, but each time a birth, a nativity. 
 In their location and movement, animated images are other to the photographic, and 
further removed from the real world. In that they are other, they are also often othered in ways 
that produce cultural difference in tandem with the difference in imaging practices. This othering 
can happen diegetically and in performance in the way that animation has historically drawn on 
caricatures of race, class, and gender, but this is a case of one otherness coinciding with another, 
the difference of race and gender superimposed on the difference of animation from the 
photographic.13 Animated characters, these native bodies, are othered lest they encroach too far 
into the realm of the photographic. The ‘looniness’ typical of many cartoons becomes a sort of 
racial or classist quality in that it typifies the manner, appearance, and hierarchical place of 
                                                
13  For discussions of race, class, and sexuality in animation see Eric Loren Smoodin, Animating Culture: Hollywood 
Cartoons from the Sound Era (Chapel Hill: Rutgers University Press, 1993); and Karl F. Cohen, Forbidden 
Animation: Censored Cartoons and Blacklisted Animators in America (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2004). 
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bodies that fall into a certain category of images. The plastic cartoon body itself becomes a 
location for this otherness, and is compelled to accept and endure certain abuse as it is mashed, 
battered, and stretched to capacity – like the body in pornography, punished for being an image 
(or too much of one) in a playfully sadistic pseudo-iconoclasm. Even the ‘illusion of life’ 
aesthetic which came to dominate the Disney animated features almost invariably included 
elements of the monstrous, the grotesque, the gigantic and the miniature, in addition to inanimate 
objects, as embodiments of difference. Thus in looniness the othered image performs its 
otherness, often within the familiar discourses of racial, classist, and gendered difference, and is 
comically punished for being other. 
 Films that mix animation and live action underscore the way that the native figures of 
animation are generally contained in their own spaces, hermetically preserved within particular 
imaging techniques and the visual and narrative strategies that form their otherness. J.P Telotte 
shows how these films that combine cel animation and photographic cinema often reflect 
difference and separation diegetically. For instance, Disney’s The Three Caballeros (1945), 
featuring Donald Duck and live actors in South American locales, and The Song of the South 
(1946), with Uncle Remus (James Baskett) and Br’er Rabbit, play with borders and fences, 
cultural difference and racial prejudice, in ways that draw from and problematize the difference 
and separation between humans and cartoons. Similarly, if rather innocuously, in Warner Bros.’ 
You Ought to Be in Pictures (1940), Porky Pig, having had a difficult time on the Warners studio 
lot, “seems to find [its] reality a bit too much for him and rushes back to the relative safety – and 
visual simplicity – of his cartoon world.”14 The contrast between animation and photographic 
cinema brings the differences between classes of images into starker relief, and their 
juxtaposition in the same frame provides opportunities for an analysis of the tensions between 
                                                
14 J.P. Telotte, Animating Space: From Mickey to WALL-E (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 164. 
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them; when the screens that keep these worlds are breached, the defining differences between 
images are troubled. 
 W. J. T. Mitchell writes: “If pictures are persons, then, they are colored or marked 
persons” – and, I suggest, within the gradations of such stratification, animated images are 
hierarchically subordinate to the photographic.15 In Who Framed Roger Rabbit (1988, Robert 
Zemeckis), the photographic and animated worlds are physically separated by brick and mortar. 
There exists an enduring tension between the two worlds and a certain amount of prejudice 
toward the Toons, who are rarely taken seriously and are often undone by their own looniness. 
Telotte notes that the Toons are cast as a racial underclass: ghettoized in the human-owned 
Toontown, performing in the segregated Ink and Paint Club, and subject to an unfair disciplinary 
system which grants them fewer rights than humans. Telotte connects the lower social position 
of the Toons to their animated status, borrowing Jessica Rabbit’s line to suggest that they are 
‘drawn that way,’ as they are created to serve and entertain humans – their raison d’etre. The 
film begins with a studio set and the amusing conceit that Toons ‘act’ in cartoons, playing roles 
instead of being themselves, but the humor here is drawn from the absurdity of the idea that 
‘character’ can be abstracted from ‘cartoon character’.16 In animation, body and character are 
inextricable – another defining aspect of native figures which posits them as excessively close to 
themselves, unable to achieve an intellectual distance from their own embodiment and the loony 
world they inhabit (and a correlation with Mitchell’s theory that pictures are also gendered 
female, in addition to being raced).  
                                                
15 Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?, 35. 
16 Nick Park’s Creature Comforts series, in which interviews with “the Great British Public” are animated as talking 
animals, relies on a similar kind of humor, in which animated figures seem to have lives outside of the characters 
they assume. 
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 When animated figures breach the boundaries of their native spaces and enter the 
photographic world, they also often take monstrous form, and particularly as monsters existing to 
be slain by live actors. A cursory review of legendary visual effects creator Ray Harryhausen’s 
filmography is illuminating: in his fairy tale works which are entirely animated, such as The 
Story of King Midas (1953), the sympathetic animated characters exhibit human qualities; in his 
work creating visual effects for live action films, such as Jason and the Argonauts (1963, Don 
Chaffey) or Clash of the Titans (1981, Desmond Davis), his creations are mostly monstrous 
creatures who threaten and are eventually destroyed by the humans. It is no coincidence that the 
voyage to mysterious lands and islands is a common trope in these films, diegetically preserving 
the sense of separate spaces for the photographic and the animated, and the place of native 
images beyond the vitreous boundaries of sea, air, space – and screen. 
 Darkness and the grotesque characterize the chaotic, semi-animated locales of Cool 
World (1992, Ralph Bakshi). The Cool World is presented as a sort of dismal underside of Las 
Vegas (as if it needed one), its apparent counterpart in the Real World, but it seems more a droll 
nightmare from someone’s troubled unconscious. Where the Toons were preoccupied with their 
looniness, the grotesque ‘Doodles’ who inhabit the Cool World are consumed with relentless, 
senseless violence. An exaggerated parody of the already quite brutal antics of Wile E. Coyote 
and Tom and Jerry, the outright barbarism of the Doodles removes any sympathy for the 
characters and emphasizes the plasticity of the indestructible cartoon body through its continued 
abuse. The contempt for the Doodle body in general is countered by the fetishization of sexy 
Holli Would, voiced by Kim Basinger (Fig. 29). Her constant, sensual dancing draws the 
drooling, eye-popping gazes of everyone around her; she is clearly a Doodle of a different stripe, 
as her rotoscoped movement and realistic stylization set her apart from the other denizens of the 
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Cool World, in an “ill-fitting conglomeration of images that consistently proves both fascinating 
and puzzling, attractive and even repulsive,” as Telotte writes.17 Even within the animated Cool 
World, characters are othered differently, from Holli’s smooth gyrations, to the pliable grotesque 
of the cast of secondary Doodle characters, to the crude charcoal ‘ghosts’ that float periodically 
across the screen, not fully rendered.  
 
 
  Figure 29. Holli Would and Frank (Brad Pitt) in Cool World. 
 
Telotte notes that Holli’s desire ‘to be real’ is an appropriate one, given her realistic 
styling. We might go further, though, and note that in the style of her animation she is uniquely 
positioned to ‘pass’ as human, should she make the transition into the other world. Her sense of 
her own body and her seeming ability to mimic the human form make her embodiment nearly 
compatible with the bodies of the Real World. With the exception of some curiosity from the 
similarly-styled Lonette, she is the only character who desires to enter the normative, 
photographic ‘real’. She seems keenly aware of her otherness, of the social position Doodles 
inhabit relative to the Real World, and has aspirations for upward mobilization. This desire is 
                                                
17 Telotte, Animating Space, 195. 
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manifest in an interesting reversal of conventional spectatorship, as film footage of Marilyn 
Monroe is projected on the wall of her apartment – the native figure idealizing a photographic 
(and yet still largely constructed) ‘reality’. 
 The ‘oldest law of Cool World’ – no sex between Doodles and Noids (humans) – is a 
prevention against miscegenation, enforced by noirish human detective Frank Harris (Brad Pitt). 
The unthinkable result of such an affair is a breakdown of the physical (that is, cultural) 
boundary that separates Doodles and Noids, allowing Doodles to enter the Real World and 
become human. (Although humans are somewhat out of place in the Cool World, there is no 
equivalent prohibition against their entry, which further establishes the lower class status of 
animated characters.) Holli seduces Jack (Gabriel Byrne), the artist whom she has summoned 
into the Cool World, into having sex with her, and she transforms into a human (that is, into Kim 
Basinger, already ‘contained’ in Holli). They travel back to the Real World, but soon find their 
transition to live-action to be false or incomplete – as if the photographic had been inadequately 
superposed on their animated forms – in a curse of bastardization that disallows them from 
entering the photographic ‘real’. Jack's hands turn into puffy cartoon hands, causing him to 
nearly crash his car, and Holli flashes with increasing frequency into a buffoonish clown – a very 
different image from her original form which proves that while she may have been queen of the 
Doodles, she is a Doodle still, and among humans her Doodle-nature manifests in the grotesque 
body.  
Holli seeks to obtain the Spike of Power in order to fully join the real world (placing her 
hope in a particularly clichéd fiction and overdetermined phallic image), but instead it releases 
the Doodles into the human world en masse, turning Holli, Jack, and a number of casino 
denizens into Doodles, and infecting the photographic world with baser behavior and bodies 
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(though hardly a step down for the barely sentient beings at the slot machines). Once the Spike is 
returned, forcing the Doodles back to the Cool World, forbidden desires that once crossed 
imaging technologies are resolved by downgrading the status of the Cool World humans (Frank 
and Jack both become Doodles), while returning the rest of the Doodles to their place. 
 That the denizens of the Cool World consider the human world the ‘real’ demonstrates 
their acceptance of their othered status in a hegemonic consciousness drawn directly into their 
character-bodies. Their abjection positions the animated Cool World as the other that the 
photographic Real World needs to constitute its place as subject and center of the imagistic 
universe. Characters and bodies of a certain disposition and plasticity are required to fulfill the 
call to bear the violence of images – that is, the violence directed toward images for being 
images. These whipping boys (or ducks, coyotes, dogs, cats, mice, bears, hunters, sailors, and 
park rangers – though almost always ‘boys’) of the golden age of cartoons, and their 
contemporary counterparts in SpongeBob, Ren and Stimpy, and the like, seem positioned as the 
dark shadow of photographic imagery. “The image is usually spoiled of its own existence as 
image, devoted to a shameful complicity with the real,” writes Baudrillard in his essay “The 
Violence of the Image.”18 Animated characters, and cartoon characters in particular, can be seen 
as the scapegoats for this complicity which both too nearly touches the real and simultaneously 
threatens to replace it. Confined within the otherness of the screen, as ink-dipped ghosts with no 
earthly referent, they are available for this violence, and their bodies designed for the violence 
they are called to sustain. The second class status of animated images not only protects the 
privileged status of the photographic, but also masks or tempers anxieties surrounding the 
photographic replacement of the real by offering up living images less real and more imagistic – 
                                                
18 Jean Baudrillard, “The Violence of the Image,” presented at the International Symposium attached to ‘media-
city’, Seoul’s 2002 Biennial. European Graduate School website, 2002 (accessed January 2011). 
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/the-violence-of-the-image/  
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a relation that helps preserve notions of the photographic as part of reality rather than its 
replacement, reinforcing the index through difference. 
 
Bodies Colonized 
 
 CG images are not othered the same way that animated images are, as their otherness 
tends more toward the hyperreal and fantastic. The combination of cel animation and live action 
filmmaking, while not entirely unusual, is somewhat rare; CG imagery, however, has widely 
permeated live-action filmmaking as a visual effects component. Although CG effects are 
commonly used ‘invisibly’ to produce backgrounds, remove unwanted elements, and enhance 
visual style, it is the spectacle of their visible presence that sells tickets and most saliently 
pertains to issues of contemporary representation. Sympathetic CG characters, who can be 
differentiated from the digital monsters and creatures that fulfill roles of subjugation and 
difference, represent the new frontier of CG technology. Though often discussed primarily in 
terms of technological achievement, CG characters are intriguing and problematic in their fusion 
of imaging technology, character elements, actor contributions (such as voice and movement), 
and visual styling. These figures in many ways embody the anxiety and fantasy surrounding our 
fascination and identification with imageness, as they so neatly reproduce the human body as an 
image within the technological body of the image. 
 In Gollum can be found a figure of the other who also functions as a creature of fantasy. 
Multiple tensions and conflicts exist within his emaciated body: in addition to his troubled 
psyche and his existence on the margins, he is a hybrid figure existing between the photographic 
and non-photographic worlds, a body in which two spheres of production are restlessly joined, 
reflected in his strangely split personality. It is the One Ring that holds him together, that forms 
his identity within the structure of his single-minded desire for the Ring itself. The influence of 
 208 
the Ring is strong – those upon whom it has exacted the greatest toll become digital figures, 
while those whom it begins to influence are implicitly threatened with the same fate. Frodo’s 
(Elijah Wood) attempts to resist the power of the Ring are attempts to keep the digital at bay, lest 
the protagonist himself be infected (as Wikus is in District 9, discussed below), as have been 
Gollum, the Ringwraiths, and the evil Sauron. Tom Gunning, in his comparison of Gollum and 
the Golem, sees the runes on the Ring as analogous to the mythical combination of letters and 
numbers that bring the Golem into existence, and the equivalent of modern computer code in “an 
allegory for the ultimate in technological control . . . equating magic with previously unseen 
degrees of technological development.”19 It is the Ring that disembodied Sauron, and which he 
seeks for the formation of a new body; the flaming vaginal eye – all that is left of him – makes 
visually potent the look within his lack, the privileging of the eye relative to the absence of the 
body. 
 As CG imagery has become capable of producing photorealistic bodies, the ‘presence of 
an absence’ dichotomy that characterizes the film image is inverted. Gollum, a fantasy creature 
produced using motion-capture technology, marks the presence of something that never was, 
hung on an actual body we can’t see. Rather than the conventional arrangement of a presence (an 
actor before the camera) which became an absence (in the image), Gollum is an absence (an 
unreal creature, a missing actor) manifest in a presence (the photorealistic body on the screen).20 
Presence and absence play out on the screen as a drama of images, and CG is used to visually 
create diegetic transformations of a drastic sort – not only from one appearance to a very 
different one, but from one image state to another. Ultimately these narratives are a 
                                                
19 Tom Gunning, “Gollum and Golem: Special Effects and the Technology of Artificial Bodies,” in From Hobbits to 
Hollywood: Essays on Peter Jackson’s Lord of the Rings, ed. Ernest Mathijs and Murray Pomerance (Amsterdam: 
Radopi, 2006), 340. 
20 Not so for traditional animated images, for their presence is of a different sort – they remain always in a separate 
sphere from the live actors, sharing space within the frame but not a similar imaginal ontology. 
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dramatization of the transformative capacity of digital effects, to not only transform bodies but 
also filmmaking or the film image as a whole.   
Gollum’s transformation from photographic to digital takes place in a flashback at the 
beginning of The Return of the King (2003). In an idyllic scene we find Andy Serkis 
(photographically) as Sméagol, who kills his cousin Déagol and retreats into seclusion, becoming 
increasingly malformed and greyish before finally turning into the figure of Gollum we have 
come to know. The short sequence of transformation is accomplished mostly with make-up 
effects, which are distinctly unimpressive relative to the striking visual image of the digital 
Gollum. The last stage in the transformation is accomplished with a morph effect, in a close-up 
of his face, that marks the final transition into his digital form. The close shot on the face makes 
the change personal and intimate – both for Gollum in his becoming, and for us in our experience 
of this transformation.21 
 The brevity of the transformation sequence (compared especially to the hundreds of years 
implied in the books) emphasizes visual alteration over character transformation, with the latter 
reduced to a minimum. The gap between make-up and digital effects is also notably bridged by a 
morph effect, which was one of the most visible early manifestations of CG imaging, and which 
itself visualized the transformative power of digital effects. For the few moments that Gollum is 
a product of latex and paint, he is part of a history of visual effects that echoes back through the 
annals of cinema, and which still constitutes the primary method for producing Orcs in the Lord 
of the Rings trilogy (at least in close and medium shots – in the large battle sequences they are 
                                                
21 Dan North discusses the authenticity associated with the close-up within digital cinema, which conveys ‘real’ 
information and emotion, in comparison with the long shot, which is more often the domain of special effects in a 
CG-driven film.  
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mostly digital). Gollum's body provides a stark point of contrast with actors in make-up, who 
appear in comparison as, well, actors in make-up. As Mark Wolf writes, 
 
when we see the orc characters, we know that they are just actors in costume; but when 
we see Gollum, or the Balrog, it is just the character we are seeing, not an actor playing a 
character. The digital character exists on a separate plane, but it exists wholly on that 
plane, rather than being one kind of being attempting to be another, as in the case of the 
costumed actor.22  
 
 
The difference between Gollum’s body and those of the Orcs engenders the threat of replacement 
in the particular way that Gollum’s body is a point-for-point (or joint-for-joint) visual 
replacement of a human body, and the fantasy of replacement in the superiority of CG over 
traditional make-up effects in its transformation of the body, in merging body and character, and 
in representing the body digital. 
 Wolf’s observation ties CG characters to traditional animation, situating them as screen 
natives. While the aesthetic lineage of the CG character has its roots in animation, there is 
perhaps more to ‘see’ than only the digital image on the surface. “Gollum is Gollum,” as Cynthia 
Fuchs writes about his lack of place and self-awareness, but he is also Andy Serkis and Weta 
Digital.23 The motion-captured movements and facial performances of Serkis that were converted 
to data, as well as the rotoscoped scenes from which Serkis was ‘painted out’, imply a referential 
relationship in which the ‘trace’ of Serkis’s performance can be seen in Gollum’s movements. 
An implicit indexicality informs this process, but it should be remembered that motion-capture is 
never purely or simply indexical. Dan North points out that motion-captured figures “are 
frequently pieced together from attributes gleaned from a variety of human referents – the 
                                                
22 Mark J.P. Wolf, “The Technological Construction of Performance,” Convergence Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 2003), 
56-7. 
23 Cynthia Fuchs, “Wicked, Tricksy, False: Race, Myth, and Gollum,” in From Hobbits to Hollywood: Essays on 
Peter Jackson’s Lord of the Rings, ed. Ernest Mathijs and Murray Pomerance (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 252. 
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motion capture data of one performer, the voice of another, facial features based on aggregates of 
beauty or anatomical studies, for example,” in addition to the ways in which the original motion-
capture data is manipulated by the animators in the final collaborative ‘performance’.24 The 
‘stick figure’ produced by motion-capture becomes the skeleton for the animated figure, but this 
trace can be easily molded and reworked into altered performances, existing as it does as data no 
longer inextricably tied to the body that produced it or the datastreams in which it was captured. 
The trace is hidden, masked by layers of digital frameworks and textural skin, and often 
augmented with key frame animation (as Gollum’s face was, drawing from facial reference 
material provided by Serkis).  
Serkis’s invisibility in a sense undermined the work of the studio to promote him as a 
performer, for Gollum was not only a hybrid of digital and performative techniques, but Serkis 
effectively disappears within Gollum through the ambiguity of the indexical connection – he is 
there somewhere, but where does he begin and end? North writes “What is more interesting [than 
how Serkis was taken out of the frame] is what remains of Serkis in the finished film, and the 
lengths taken to ensure that the horrors of a digital character are tempered by an injection of 
‘humanity.’” North identifies these remains in a list of Serkis’s contributions, but, interestingly, 
in a way that disarticulates Serkis in terms of his ‘input’ into Gollum,“providing motion capture 
information, lending Gollum some of his motile inflections, leaving traces of some of his 
features.”25 Serkis himself becomes the input, the raw data then recombined into a new body, a 
new entity comprised partially of elements of Serkis. The ‘humanity’ which Serkis injects into 
Gollum is not simply a person or performance per se, but an abstract human element that is the 
product of the human as information.   
                                                
24 North, Performing Illusions, 156. 
25 Ibid., 175. 
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Animated and CG characters in live-action films are commonly relegated to the positions 
of either fantasy creatures (who often also serve as helpers to the human characters) or 
monstrous others to be destroyed, which make their existence permissible within the realm of the 
photographic.26 Gollum moves at different points into both positions in his personas as the 
malformed Gollum and the erstwhile hobbit Sméagol. Gollum resists easy classification, and 
when he cannot be easily classified as either a fantastic or monstrous other, his ambiguity 
becomes further pronounced, shifting him toward the center, closer to the human protagonists 
that anchor the film. In the end, however, he is unable to complete the transformation, and, 
chasing the Ring, falls into a pit of CG lava – the final destruction of his monstrous form, 
dissolved in the molten digital sea from which the One Ring (the one technology) to ‘rule them 
all’ was formed. 
 The ‘horrors’ of the digital character are partly located in the consuming aspect of 
motion-capture, in the swallowing up of an actor into the character so that we get a hint that the 
actor was once there and might be vaguely discerned, but has been replaced to the extent that the 
actor disappears. We know that Serkis is the basis for Gollum, but this knowledge fails to fully 
account for either the body of Gollum or the character tied to this body (another way in which 
Gollum is Gollum). Gollum as a native figure is a body colonized, moved from the inside by a 
now invisible body and its ambiguous, even ghostly, trace. Motion-capture acutely typifies an 
anxiety of bodies replaced by images because of its closeness to the human body that animates it. 
                                                
26 Clash of the Titans is a good example of a film containing both. The monstrous creatures include giant scorpions, 
the giant Kraken, and the serpentine Medusa, but Perseus (Harry Hamlin) is also assisted by fantasy creatures such 
as Pegasus and the mechanical owl Bubo. These latter figures are domesticated, however, which helps minimize 
their otherness as animated figures: the clockwork construction of Bubo renders it a tool that can be subject to 
human control, and the wild Pegasus is broken and tamed by Perseus.  
     The hooved Calibos (Neil McCarthy) is, like Gollum, somewhat of a hybrid character, shown in close-up as an 
actor in make-up and in long-shot through animation. This liminal status accords diegetically with his character, as 
the once handsome son of a goddess, punished with deformity and hideousness by Zeus, becomes partly relegated to 
animated status. 
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Whereas the traditional animator keeps the native body at a distance, the body in motion-capture 
is subsumed – not simply ‘captured’ after all (for only its motions and information are, its place 
on a grid, the expressions it can make), but extracted, processed, composited, manipulated, 
painted over, animated, degraded with film grain and blur, and finally presented as a photograph 
that isn’t one.27 
 
Fantasizing the Other 
 
 Transformation – both the horror of it, and the fantasy – is central to District 9 (2009, 
Neill Blomkamp), as it is also to Avatar. The interspecies transformation depicted in District 9 
presents the horror of trans-image mutation couched in an alien invasion film which combines 
live-action with CG characters. Released four months before Avatar, Blomkamp’s sci-fi allegory 
of xenophobia and racism depicts a refugee alien population confined to a shantytown in South 
Africa. Wikus van de Merwe (Sharlto Copley), an Afrikaner administrator, is charged with 
facilitating the relocation of the aliens to a government camp further from the city (Fig. 30). 
While serving eviction notices he becomes infected with an alien substance, which begins his 
transformation into an alien – or ‘prawn’, as the aliens are derisively called in the film. 
Blomkamp uses a documentary style for the film, underscoring its agenda as a thinly veiled 
allegory of apartheid South Africa, while at the same time increasing the tension between the 
realistic filming style and the CG aliens that populate the film.   
 
 
                                                
27 Gollum’s troubling of the demarcation between the photographic and digital worlds can be contrasted with Jar Jar 
Binks, the CG character in the Star Wars prequels, who never really challenges the divide between imaging 
technologies. Jar Jar is more ‘at home’ in his raced and hybrid status, and instead of transformation or destruction he 
receives a superficial ending in obtaining the improbable position (because of his bumbling nature) of general and 
senator; subject to neither ostracism nor destruction, he notably fades into irrelevance and has all but disappeared by 
the last film. 
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  Figure 30. Wikus and a prawn in District 9. 
 
 
 Wikus’s transformation begins with illness and black fluid leaking from his nose, 
signaling the internal effects of the alien matter. Externally, the transformation is manifest in his 
hand, which had sustained a previous injury and is thus more vulnerable to being overtaken; the 
transformation is mostly limited to the hand until the final shot of the film, when we see that 
Wikus has become a prawn (or at least it is implied that the prawn we see is, or was, Wikus). The 
alien appendage acts as a metaphor of sorts for our interaction with other digital bodies that stand 
in for our own, in the form of avatars and videogame characters for which the hand is the point 
of connection at the keyboard or game controller. In the film the hand enables Wikus to operate 
alien technology that is only compatible with alien DNA, making him very valuable to both the 
corporation that has been exploiting the aliens and the Nigerian gang that operates a crime ring in 
District 9. Wikus’s alien hand is thus both enabling and stigmatizing, though for most of the film 
he is focused on the latter aspect – the rejection by his wife, the corporeal transformation into the 
thing he hates, and his mulatto status (which, in a smear campaign, is attributed to infection from 
interspecies sex).   
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 The isolation of the mutation to the hand allows Wikus, and the audience, to keep it at 
somewhat of a distance – literally at arm’s length, as self but not self (“if thy hand offend thee, 
cut it off” is the Biblical advice, which Wikus attempts, but only manages to remove the tip of 
what seems to be his thumb). His mental faculties remain human; it is the body that threatens 
him, the otherness of both the alien and the visual effect, which has begun overtaking him. At the 
end of the film he is shown making small flowers for his wife out of junk as an indication of 
some lingering humanity, but it is not exactly clear what is left of Wikus. This final shot of him 
semi-hunched amidst the garbage and refuse, exhibiting the vaguely animalistic quality that 
characterizes the aliens, is ominous in its indeterminable association of the colonized body and 
the embodied consciousness that is produced in the body colonized – as if this chapter in the life 
of the organism formerly known as Wikus is too dark and inaccessible to show because he is 
now an alien, an other, and no longer a character. 
 Whereas Gollum is mostly presented post-transformation, with the character transition 
and CG morph shown only in brief flashback, Wikus’s metamorphosis is diegetically central to 
District 9. The horror of the transformation is intensified by the fact that once his hand has 
changed, Wikus can only find refuge in the alien slum, emphasizing his place as an outsider even 
as the alterations to his body only affect a small percentage of it, and evoking historical formulas 
for determining the status of mixed-race individuals. However, the transformation is also 
tempered by Wikus’s and the film’s growing sympathy for a certain alien, Christopher Johnson 
(Jason Cope, who also plays one of the minor human characters), who is the rare parent of an 
alien child and is presented as smarter and more capable than the others. The irony of the name 
‘Christopher Johnson’ applied to an inhuman creature clearly recalls colonial and slaveholder 
naming practices, which work to remove history and culture from the colonial subject in the 
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application of a name that itself becomes ahistorical and generic in the process. In a sense, the 
name brings to light the CG body’s lack of history and culture, even perhaps an ‘unconscious’, as 
Barbara Creed argues, in contrast with the implied historical and cultural aspects of the 
character.28  
 When Wikus later risks his life to give Christopher Johnson a chance to get to the mother 
ship, he notably does so in a mechanical exo-suit designed in the form of an alien body. In an 
inversion of the (internalized) alien DNA that has become a part of his body system, and in a 
foreshadowing of his impending (external) transformation, Wikus becomes the internal 
mechanism that guides the external alien body. He takes on the image of the alien, but only 
superficially, and thus the problem of images remains. Confined to the hand, the exo-suit, and 
the unseen internal reconfiguration that has altered his DNA, Wikus’s ‘alienation’ from himself 
is threatening but marginalized. His social alienation is portrayed as unfair as he is condemned 
despite the fact that his human psyche apparently remains intact – socially he gives off the wrong 
‘image’, and hence is presented by the film as unjustly ostracized. The aliens, however, are not 
given this same consideration – their CG status is intrinsic to their characters. Christopher 
Johnson generates pathos in his plight and sympathy for his worthy objectives (to get his son to 
safety, to get back to his home planet, to rescue his people), but doesn’t quite become a 
sympathetic character. Like Gollum, he approaches the racial boundary but can’t cross it. James 
Zborowski notes that the aliens, while certainly mistreated, are more social problem than society, 
characterized as uneducated slum-dwellers of the xenophobic imagination for whom “progress 
and integration are rendered unimaginable.”29 They are not positioned as potentially 
                                                
28 Barbara Creed, “The Cyberstar: Digital Pleasures and the End of the Unconscious,” Screen 41(1) (Spring 2000), 
79-86. Creed cites the lack of an unconscious as the reason audiences fail to identify with digital characters.  
29 James Zborowski, “District 9 and its World,” Jump Cut 52 (Summer 2010), accessed December 2010.  
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transformable or even assimilable, but are contained within the fixity integral to the colonial 
construction of otherness.  
 Avatar is a text particularly intriguing for its superimposition of racial otherness and 
digital alterity within a narrative of ostensibly positive (rather than negative) transformation. At a 
time when digital effects have become commonplace in cinema and the spectacle has given way 
to the simulation, Cameron’s film manages to impress and awe with its plenitude, as a sort of all-
consuming digital effect that envelops the viewer, takes over the space of the film, and either 
consumes its photographic bodies or diegetically expels them. In a blog entry on the film, Jeffrey 
Sconce writes that Avatar is most interesting as an allegory of the cinema, “in the warring 
production paradigms the film so conveniently spatializes within its diegesis.”30 This conflict, as 
I have mentioned, is a salient aspect of the film’s technological mythos, and one firmly rooted in 
racial discourse. Avatar positions the (photographic) humans as alien intruders within a pristine 
(digital) landscape and a population of natives in an anti-colonialist fantasy aligning Western 
hegemony with photographic realism, and (without any sense of irony from Cameron) digital 
image production with nature and a prelapsarian idyll. The conflict of imaging technologies is 
also a conflict of images in which one might say that native figures must endure the ‘trespass’ of 
the photographic, which has long claimed the space of the screen as its own. With the indigenous 
Na’vi, native images are cast as, and played by, native people, and the Na’vi bodies are 
integrated into the film in a way that reduces or eliminates the otherness often present in initial 
appearances of special effects creatures.  
Vivian Sobchack writes that science fiction films “present us with a confrontation 
between and mixture of those images to which we respond as ‘alien’ and those we know to be 
                                                
30 “Avatard,” Ludic Despair, January 2010.  http://ludicdespair.blogspot.com/2010/01/avatard.html. 
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familiar” – a confrontation that is only partly dependent on content, as style and representational 
forms also construe visual objects as familiar or strange.31 Cameron’s use of alluring bodies 
instead of monstrous forms, along with the film’s sympathetic positioning of the beleaguered and 
outgunned Na’vi, shift audience sympathy toward the digital figures. The Na’vi bodies were 
designed and modified to make them more available for audience identification, eliminating 
alien protuberances to create a humanoid form mixed with familiar animal elements, privileging 
the exotic over the alien. Also, by the time we first meet Neytiri, the lithe blue Na’vi bodies have 
already been introduced to us through the avatars that Jake, Grace, and Norm (Joel David 
Moore) drive – seen first in laboratories, then on a training ground that includes trainees playing 
basketball, and continuing in the mission to collect samples, during which Jake becomes 
separated from the others and ends up meeting Neytiri.32 The contemporary clothing, trash talk 
on the court, and Jake’s exuberant acclimation to his new body (and the capabilities it affords 
him in giving him legs) serve as a prelude to seeing the Na’vi; thus when we first see Neytiri, it 
is not her blue body or the effects processes behind it that stand out, and hence her character and 
her particular body are foregrounded.   
These strategies make the CG aliens less alien to us, but it is still unusual for an animated 
character to be the protagonist in a live-action film. Cameron’s use of the avatar as a device 
diegetically central to the film eases and facilitates Jake’s gradual transition into the CG body. 
As Jake learns to use and accept his new body, the audience comes along for the ride, moving 
from the difference between Jake and his avatar, to Jake’s enjoyment of and preference for the 
new body, to Jake as the new body, cemented by his permanent transition at the end of the film. 
                                                
31 Vivian Sobchack, Screening Space: The American Science Fiction Film (New York: Ungar, 1987), 87. 
32 As with the villains, aliens, and monsters in many films, introductory scenes for CG creatures often emphasize the 
menace of the other, as in Gollum’s spider-like descent toward Frodo and Sam in The Two Towers, and the 
alienating news footage of the prawns in District 9, clearly shot from a safe distance to emphasize danger and 
otherness.  
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The fictional Na’vi culture comes along with the body, and the film spends more and more time 
in the digital realm of Pandora, so that the world to which the CG body belongs becomes the 
world of the film. After the victory of the Na’vi over the humans, and just before Jake leaves his 
photographic body behind, Pandora reclaims the space of the screen for those native figures, 
characters, and images for whom screens are their sole territory, while the photographic invaders 
are driven out, off-screen. The motion-capture performer has in this respect ‘gone native’, given 
his or her body over to the animators and computers that will render it as an image indigenous to 
the screen. 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 31. Jake in ceremonial costume in Avatar. 
 
 The avatar device thus permits the colonization of the body to be positioned antithetically 
to the colonization of the planet, even as it evokes the colonial White Messiah. Jake’s 
assimilation into Na’vi culture is facilitated by his avatar body, which affords him both a visual 
fit into their society and a functional compatibility in being able to form the ‘bond’ (Fig. 31). 
Although he is immediately perceived to be one of the ‘sky people’, he was marked by the digital 
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world (in the sign from Eywa) as different from the other humans, which allows his entry and 
enculturation. Unlike the others whom the Na’vi have tried to teach, he is pliable and teachable 
exactly because he has given up on the ‘reality’ of his own world and he seeks an escape into an 
alternate reality. Jake’s inhabitation of the avatar is distinguished from the human presence in 
Pandora – the avatar works as an acceptable colonization, while the human invasion is presented 
as an atrocity. Avatar bodies are ‘empty’, and hence available for and even needing to be filled. 
The human colonizers had initially taken this approach to the Na’vi, trying to educate and build 
roads for them, but the film presents the Na’vi as comparatively ‘full’, receiving no benefit from 
human intervention. They do need Jake, however, and his military skills and rationalism to save 
them from the human invasion and fill the hole in their own society that makes them vulnerable. 
The White Messiah comes wearing blue skin, with the digital body inhabited by the 
photographic one which disappears in it, re-emerging periodically as a reminder of the 
consciousness that drives the digital body before the final transition into the paradoxical figure of 
the permanent avatar.  
 Ultimately, then, Cameron seems to attain the ‘unobtanium’ he seeks in pushing digital 
effects into a realm that allows them to be characters and bodies available for audience 
identification, and in this sense the widely seen Avatar represents a symbolic and technological 
victory for native images. In the conflict between ‘warring production paradigms’, the violent 
return of the index is put down not only by the motion-captured Na’vi and the avatarial Jake, but 
by the digital animals that populate Pandora as well. Initially constituting a monstrous threat, 
Jake learns to respect CG fauna, and with the bond joins them in communion with the digital 
stuff that embodies the future (and present) of images. The triumph of the digital over the 
photographic, framed within the libidinal rush of fantasy filmmaking, displaces fears of the 
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disappearance of the real manifest in the threat to the physical body, and its ally in the 
photograph, with digital plenitude and enviable ‘imageness’ – the fantasy of the transcendent, 
disembodied image qua image, no longer constrained by the camera nor contained in the picture. 
The existential implications of this contest are brought into relief at the end of the film, as the 
photographic humans are driven out of the cinematic space which has already become 
increasingly submerged in the proliferative digital overgrowth. The final shot of Avatar closely 
parallels that of District 9 as each of the new image-bodies, the aliens we have come to know, 
look directly at the camera. In District 9, however, the look is one of fear and depersonalization 
in the face of a digital takeover; in Avatar, unabashed acceptance and irrefutable presence.   
Like Neo, and Jobe before him, Jake makes a final avatarial transition. He has sloughed 
off the connection at a distance espoused by the avatar and made his connectivity permanent. Is 
he still avatarial, then? The avatar and CG character as two different image bodies each inform 
our reading of the other in this film. The avatar might be thought of as horizontal, a spatialized 
connection made across bodies, and the CG character as vertical, with layers of representative 
(the character) and actual (the actor) embodiment super(im)posed into a composited image body. 
I use the parenthetical here as a caveat regarding superimposition, for we may at times only see 
or notice the final image as a manifestation of character, especially once the action gets going 
and we have acclimated to Cameron’s techniques with the Na’vi, and at other times become 
aware or consciously engage the imbricated layers incorporated in the CG body. Where body, 
technology, and images intersect, we find the virtual, encountered in the shifting and 
interpenetrating instantiations of each so that we are aware of all three but can’t quite tell where 
one leaves off and the other begins. Thus what we ‘see’ when we view these bodies, I suggest, 
can be something much deeper than what lies on the surface – a composited emblem of 
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embodiment in digital culture, where disembodied film images seek a new materiality, and 
human embodiment, caught up in a world of images, seeks a livable body that can be enworlded 
in such an environment. The othered image, vis-à-vis the portentous demise of the photographic 
body (the body of the photograph, the body in photographs), sloughs off its ghostly attributes as 
a non-image and assumes the mantle of self-existence in its native status, as the pure image. In 
the avatarial switch, we become the ghosts – rather than understanding ourselves as the bodies 
that produce spectral images, we deign to inhabit and possess the images that constitute presence 
in our wired, image-driven world. 
 What is missing is Jake’s distance from himself that the avatar provided. Cameron works 
to extinguish the alterity of the digital, and while he is successful in doing so to the extent that 
the increasingly digital Jake can occupy the role of protagonist rather than monster, as we see 
Jobe become, we have noted how this is carried out within discourses of otherness.33 Jake joins 
the screen natives, and this indigenous body will inhabit the two sequels to Avatar already in 
production. Jake has become feminized as well, drawn into Neytiri’s world and undergoing 
bodily changes that bring him closer to nature, to his new body, and ultimately to himself (the 
‘wrongness’ of the disabled Marine sets this course early in the film, as his status as a male is 
already compromised). Jake also becomes situated as an image – a conspicuously feminine act 
                                                
33 Another way in which the CG body is avatarial is that it can be played by different bodies; however, in most CG 
productions, one actor plays a single body – an aspect due in large part to the Hollywood star system in which 
animated characters are attached to celebrities. In traditional animation, it was not uncommon for a single performer 
to voice several characters. Motion-capture need not be constricted the way it typically is (i.e. a stunt performer 
could easily fill in for action sequences, or a dancer could be used for musical sequences, as Jenine Jennings 
provided the rotoscoped dance moves for Holli Would in Cool World), but it typically is. The quasi-indexical 
‘proof’ of the bodily connection between actor and character can often be found in DVD appendices, where bits of 
the capturing sections can be viewed.  
     Where voice was once the sole connection between the work of actor and animator, digital technologies have 
permitted the incorporation of the body into this relation; the index of the CG body is always indeterminate, 
however, as we have seen, and thus the voice, while ‘invisible’ and perhaps marginalized relative to the attractions 
of CG, still provides the strongest trace of the body. In virtual worlds as well, voice evokes the real, as it is “widely 
assumed to be irredeemably actual” – sometimes too powerfully actual, as the vocal index can break the fantasy the 
images supply (Boellstorff, Coming of Age in Second Life, 114). 
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which Jobe has to ward off with excessive masculinity and violence – and thus occupying the 
paradoxical state of being both image and body, it seems that Jake’s final transformation was not 
a move toward transcendence, in the uncoupling of mind and body for the cognitive download, 
but rather one toward immanence and inhabiting one’s body more fully through acclimating to 
the interimplication of materiality and the virtual that defines embodiment. In the next chapter I 
take up the contradictions of femininity relative to avatars and the potential for a medial 
embodiment that the figure of the female avatar suggests. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
PRECARIOUS LIMINALITY 
 
 
The magic and most powerful effect of women is, to speak the language of the 
philosophers, action at a distance, actio in distans: but that requires, first and foremost – 
distance! 
Nietzsche1 
 
The female avatar is a duplicitous figure. In virtual environments, male users have 
traditionally outnumbered female users by significant numbers, and while ‘gender-bending’ goes 
both ways, the numerical disparity between the number of women playing in a virtual world or 
MMO and the number of female avatars means that, from the outset, a female avatar is more 
likely to be male than vice versa – according to one study, seven or eight times as likely, with 
roughly half of all female characters played by men.2 This situation induced paranoiac behavior 
among some male players, inducing suspicion of any female avatar until it could be proven that 
the user was indeed female; Julian Dibbell argues, however, that “such outright paranoia was 
really just a deviation from a far more nuanced norm, in which players generally took for granted 
the marked fluidity of gender in VR, yet at the same time also tended to take at face value the 
virtual gender of whomever they were interacting with.”3 Reactions to female avatars thus tended 
to be either subject to investigation to discover their ‘true’ gender, or accepted only with a 
                                                
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 71. 
2 As part of his Deadalus Project, Nick Yee surveyed World of Warcraft players in 2005 and concluded that “1 out 
of every 2 female characters is played by a man,” while “1 out of every 100 male characters is played by a woman.” 
In a hypothetical pool of 1000 players, there would be 348 female characters of which 193 (55%) would be played 
by a male player, and 652 male characters of which 5 (< 1%) would be played by a female player. There are 
multiple reasons why players gender-bend, not all associated with sexuality, but Yee notes that female players have 
as many reasons and still do it much less frequently. http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/001369.php  
3 Dibbell, My Tiny Life, 130. The frequent refrain “If it’s good, don’t look under the hood” implied that the 
acceptability of manifest (female) gender was more dependent on whether the performance was convincing or 
satisfying than if the player was actually female. 
 225 
compensatory investment in the ‘face value’ of their gender, relegating femininity to a taken-for-
granted performance.  
 In a general sense, however, the argument could be made that all avatars are feminine to 
some extent, especially in contrast with the disembodied FPS non-avatar, represented onscreen 
by a hand or a gun. In the third-person perspective common in most virtual world interfaces, the 
avatar is a body ‘to-be-looked-at’ – to evoke Laura Mulvey’s classic formulation – always in 
view. This view is triangulated between an avatar’s user and other users in shared space. Women 
are often theorized as viewing themselves more externally than males do, seeing themselves 
from both the perspective of an outside (male) look and from their own embodied positions as 
objects of the look. The avatar facilitates this kind of dual gaze, as the user looks at his or her 
avatar from the outside while also identifying with the position of the avatar as the object of 
another’s look.4 Avatars have no look of their own, but indicate or mark the presence of the look 
of another, and no voice of their own, but are spoken through. Such a position, as the object at an 
intersection of gazes, evokes the place of the the woman in classical Hollywood film, particularly 
as theorized by Mulvey.  
 In their conflation of images and bodies, avatars are analogous with the feminine in that 
within the avatarial relationship they occupy the space of the screen and the technologies of the 
virtual, relative to the off-screen user; the crisis of the masculine in avatar texts is often the result 
of male characters finding themselves in the (feminine) avatar position rather than (masculine) 
user position. Avatars are also feminine in that their gender is a product of signifiers, not 
necessarily tied to actual embodiment but at the same time taken at face value. The site of 
simulation is feminine, as Sadie Plant writes: “The computer, like the woman, is both the 
                                                
4 There is a male-coded element here as well – since users are ‘invisible’ in the virtual environment, they are in 
some sense voyeurs. However, the voyeur’s gaze is always preceded and announced by the presence of one’s avatar, 
as one must first produce a body in order to look, and that self-representative body is always in view. 
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appearance and the possibility of simulation. [According to this logic], woman cannot be 
anything, but she can imitate anything valued by man: intelligence, autonomy, beauty. . . . 
Indeed, if woman is anything, she is the very possibility of mimesis.”5 In contrast with Donna 
Haraway’s feminist appropriation of the cyborg’s associations with machines and information 
technologies, the avatar exhibits a femininity coded as organic to the simulational (rather than 
computational) capability that emerged as computers became increasingly imbricated within a 
digital culture that has been moving toward the production of the image. 
 This is not to say, however, that the avatar as feminine is a wholly disempowered figure. 
While avatars are by definition subject to control, they are also enviable figures in the 
intercorporeality of their image bodies (they are not simply bodies subjected to a gaze within an 
image regime, but bodies already incorporating images into themselves, and images have 
power), and in the phenomenological immersion in the fantasy of virtual environments, while the 
user is at some remove from what the avatar seems to experience. Relative to Mulvey, the 
distinction between the empowered and disempowered feminine can be drawn out with one of 
her own examples, read through the lens of the avatar.  
 In the voyeuristic classic Rear Window (1954), Hitchcock, in a key moment of the film, 
sets the force of the look in opposition to an immersion in space. Jeff (James Stewart), trying to 
gather evidence for what he suspects to be a murder by the tenant across the courtyard, Thorwald 
(Raymond Burr), wonders what might be buried under a patch of flowers. Jeff’s girlfriend Lisa 
(Grace Kelly) volunteers to find out, and while Jeff gets Thorwald out of the apartment with a 
phone call, Lisa, with Jeff’s home-care nurse Stella (Thelma Ritter), enters the courtyard and 
digs up the flowers. In this moment, Jeff’s relationship with Lisa becomes somewhat avatarial, as 
                                                
5 Sadie Plant, “The Future Looms: Weaving Women and Cybernetics,” in Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist 
Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace, ed. Jenny Wolmark (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 112. 
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Lisa bodily carries out Jeff’s wishes, his desire to find out what is buried (a desire she has come 
to share). An avatarial relation is implicit in Mulvey’s understanding of cinema in general as 
well, in which “the power to subject another person to the will sadistically or to the gaze 
voyeuristically is turned on the woman as the object of both.”6 Lisa steps into the space of Jeff’s 
gaze and the scene of his investigation, working almost as an extension of the apparatus – the 
camera – which he uses (along with the aural instrument of the telephone) to exercise his 
command over the investigation. This commanding position has its limits, however; finding 
nothing under the flowers, Lisa decides to sneak into Thorwald’s apartment, and at this point 
Jeff’s lack of control is manifest, evident not only in her independent action against his wishes, 
but as well in her bodily entry into the space of the apartment rather than through the ‘portable 
keyhole’, as Stella calls it, of the camera. As he gestures in vain and then watches helplessly, she 
subjects herself to risk and assault in order to locate the damning evidence of the missing 
woman’s wedding ring.  
 Tania Modleski sees Lisa, juxtaposed against Jeff’s passivity and confinement, as an 
empowered woman. In Jeff, the voyeuristic gaze is associated with his immobility in such a way 
that the gaze is itself disabled; when Lisa enters Thorwald’s apartment, Jeff’s helpless look is 
fully dissociated from the scopophilic objectification and control that earlier characterize his 
voyeuristic exploits, calling into question his position of power. Lisa takes over the investigation 
at this point, and while she still to some extent executes Jeff’s will to see into the apartment, she 
does so on her own terms. As she does, we remain in the position of voyeur as Hitchcock plays 
the scene from Jeff’s confined perspective, which only allows Lisa’s bodily engagement of the 
space of the apartment to be viewed through the windows, as reiterative screens. 
                                                
6 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” in Feminist Film Theory: A Reader, ed. Sue Thornham 
(New York: New York University Press, 1999), 66. 
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 Even when Lisa does not submit to the controlling male gaze, however, she is avatarial in 
a different way: she sees what Jeff cannot, and goes where he cannot go – he does not share her 
view, only gaining a sense of the space secondhand through the information she gestures to him 
(Fig. 32). Also, she not only enters the screen space of the windows he previously gazed into, but 
the off-screen space between windows as well. Her presence there, including what she sees and 
finds, dominates the scene even as it is withheld from us or kept at a distance, while Jeff’s 
helpless gaze produces only paralysis and frustration – we want to go with Lisa, but must remain 
with Jeff. In a sense, this is not so different from immersion in a virtual environment, in which 
only the avatar is ‘immersed’, while immersion is vicarious for the user. 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 32. Lisa’s ‘hands-on’ approach, through Jeff’s lens. 
 
 
 Female characters in avatar films occupy various roles that mostly adhere to the 
conventional positions of women in Hollywood cinema, but are interesting and problematic for 
their associations with the virtual.7 These characters are aligned at various times and in various 
                                                
7 For the sake of convenience I allude to the various allusions and representations of virtual space in these films 
simply as ‘virtulized’ or ‘virtual’. This is not meant to imply that these are images of the virtual, but rather that those 
spaces posited as alternative or oppositional to the real are drawn from cultural notions of technological virtual 
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ways with both the imaginal body and virtual technologies, and in these conflations come to 
stand in for virtuality itself. Oliver Grau, in his study of immersive spaces in art history and new 
media, defines virtuality as “the relationship of humans to images” (which, for Anne Friedberg, 
are already themselves virtual); avatars, CG characters, and women in film all incorporate 
images into bodies, to one extent or another, or are the objects of perceptual modes that make of 
bodies images.8 Female characters in avatar films thus epitomize the imaginal embodiment I 
have explored in this study, as it is characterized by the feminine.  
 
Playing the Image 
 
In their depictions of virtual environments and the rendering of virtualized existence, 
avatar texts commonly present male characters in transition: escaping or defeating the virtuality 
encroaching on their lives, harnessing it to become monstrous villains, or passing through it on 
their way to a transcendent virtuality. For male characters, the avatarial position is a problem to 
be resolved or overcome; for female characters, it is more likely to fix them ontologically. They 
do not find themselves as alien in the virtual as male characters do, and they are often depicted as 
having an intuitive or even intimate connection with it. 
 The Guild, for instance, begins with Codex being cut off by her therapist for failing to 
extract herself from the Game. While all of the characters can be seen as overinvolved, it is 
Codex and another woman, Clara (Robin Thorsen), a neglectful mother of several young 
children, who are presented as most vulnerable to the lure of the game, and Codex’s problems 
                                                                                                                                                       
space, even if the spaces depicted are not themselves technological (as in Avatar, where the ‘virtual’ is a natural 
space, albeit an alien one inhospitable to humans, accessed through interfaces and avatars, and produced through 
digital imagery). Thus my use of the term ‘virtual’ here is an extension of that in ‘virtual technologies’ or ‘virtual 
worlds’ rather than implying the virtual as the cultural and phenomenological aspects of the material world, although 
the latter certainly permeates this discussion, as noted. 
8 Oliver Grau, Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion, trans. Gloria Custance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 5. 
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begin when the virtual world permeates her real life – when she is unable to ‘turn it off’.9 Angie, 
in Gamer, is unable to extract herself from Society and must be rescued by Tillman, who has 
managed to overcome his avatarial status. Angie’s avatarial functioning is different from 
Tillman’s, in that while he must act as dictated by his player, he retains a conscious sense of his 
surroundings; when he notices an enemy attacker behind him that his player Simon doesn’t see, 
for instance, he gruffly whispers “turn me around.” Kable’s success is dependent more on their 
collaboration than on him completely relinquishing control (as Tillman observes, “that don’t 
work so good”), and eventually Tillman is able to communicate with Simon and persuade him to 
give up control. Angie, however, has no such rapport with her player (although, given his 
sadism, she may not want it), and she seems to be subject to a more complete mind control, as 
indicated by the blank stare that persists even when Tillman has come to her rescue. This is not a 
complete absence, however, as she remains conscious of the degraded experiences she 
undergoes, but rather a lack of agency that characterizes her participation in the virtual world. 
The Lawnmower Man’s Marnie is thrilled with the cybersex she has with Jobe in the virtual 
world, and entry into the virtual is for her a liberating and enjoyable experience. The virtual has 
been made deleterious for Jobe, however, and when he lashes out Marnie is victimized, never 
fully returning from the virtual world. 
Classic feminist theory sheds some light on the particular way that these characters are 
aligned with the virtual. Joan Riviére’s theorization of womanliness as masquerade posits that 
femininity is something worn as a mask, a behavior women are expected to display. This 
approach to femininity as alter ego implies a connection to the virtual, but Riviére complicates 
what might be thought of as the avatarial nature of femininity, for in the question of drawing the 
                                                
9 Felicia Day created the series after deciding to make something useful out of the actual two-year addiction to 
MMOs she experienced during off-time from acting roles, adding an additional associative layer to both the creation 
and reception of the show. 
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line between the masquerade and genuine womanliness she concludes that they are same thing. 
Where the avatar inheres distance and an oscillation between connection and disconnection, the 
woman wears a mask (an image) she can’t remove. Mary Ann Doane reconfigures the 
masquerade as a mode of resistance, by which femininity is held at a distance, denying its 
production as “closeness, as presence-to-itself, as, precisely, imagistic,” while simultaneously 
reproducing the signs of femininity.10 In Doane’s view, womanliness can be worn or removed, 
but she neglects to define a feminine identity outside of its relation to men, for the alternative to 
the masquerade is the transvestite, “in which the woman becomes a man in order to attain the 
necessary distance from the image.”11  
 To assume or ‘play’ the image of femininity in the masquerade thus presents 
womanliness as a form of distanciation which nevertheless produces little distance, at least from 
the male perspective; the performances that are transparent to women, notes Riviére, work for 
men, who take the masquerade at face value even if they recognize its performative aspects. The 
woman is presumed unable to achieve an objective distance from herself (too close) and is at the 
same time abstracted from herself through her performance of femininity (but having no other 
clear identity to retreat to), and thus embodies a paradox – she is self-distance without 
separation, halved and doubled. Female characters are also often ensnared in a virtual which is 
presented cinematically in terms of images and performance, as in the duplicate bodies in 
Surrogates and the mind control of Gamer. The paradox of femininity comes to typify the 
paradox of the virtual as both real and not real, as an alluring and deceiving world. In the 
inequality of cinematic images, those nearer the index are privileged and those further away are 
marginalized, as I have discussed; female characters in avatar films have a strained relation to the 
                                                
10 Mary Ann Doane, “Film and the Masquerade: Theorising the Female Spectator,” in Feminist Film Theory: A 
Reader, ed. Sue Thornham (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 138. 
11 Ibid., 139. 
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index, and as the virtual in cinema is most often represented as excessively imaginal, the 
feminine is associated with both. Women may be victims of the virtual in need of rescuing, as I 
explore in greater detail with Maggie below, or they may use their complicity with the virtual, as 
the femme fatale uses her sex, to manipulate male characters for their own benefit or pleasure. 
 Feminine duplicity is pronounced in the semi-animated films of Cool World and Who 
Framed Roger Rabbit?, as the liminality of Holli and Jessica motivate the action of the films’ 
male characters to temper or discover their transgressive behavior. Jessica is a Toon who plays it 
both ways, as her supposed affair (and subsequent flirting) are at the center of the scandal that 
puts the Toon and human worlds at odds.12 Holli Would’s desire to become human inflicts near 
disaster on both the Cool and real worlds, yet she is always on the margins of her own story, as 
Bakshi hangs the film’s sympathies on Jack and Frank. From Holli the drawing to Holli the 
Doodle, to Kim Basinger and back, she drives the fantasy for boundary transgression before 
being fully reinstated and contained as an ‘image’.  
In the French avatar film Black Heaven, Gaspard (Grégoire Leprince-Ringuet) is drawn 
into dangerous intrigue by femme fatale Audrey (Louise Bourgoin), who plays the sexy avatar 
Sam in the Black Hole, a virtual world. Audrey’s real-world brokenness (Gaspard first finds her 
attempting a double suicide with one of her online flings) reinforces her seductiveness in the 
virtual environment, as her enigmatic duality is central to her enchantments. Black Heaven is one 
of the few avatar films to depict the virtual world with a videogame cutscene aesthetic, as it 
would be in the real world – another paradox, that realism should appear so blatantly digital.13  
                                                
12 Judge Doom is the far more duplicitous character in the film, as a Toon wearing a rubber suit to appear human, 
while Jessica is exonerated in the end. However, Doom’s duplicity is the surprise reveal, whereas Jessica’s 
coquettishness drives the story. 
13 The problem of the indexicality of voice is here dealt with in the casting of a second actress to do voice work for 
Sam, while Gaspard himself uses a modulator to disguise his own.  
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Other examples abound: in Virtual Girl (1998, Richard Gabai), a cybersex program 
becomes a sentient and possessive black widow, entrapping and killing the men who enter her 
cyberspace lair, while in Ghost Machine (2010, Chris Hartwill), the female victim of military 
rendition returns as a dark spirit, haunting the VR military simulation set up by brash young 
soldiers in an abandoned prison. And in the world-within-a-world-within-a-world enigma of The 
Thirteenth floor, in which Hall is involved in the production of a VR simulation before realizing 
that he is already an avatar in a larger one, it is a woman, Jane (Gretchen Mol), who manipulates 
the virtual world from both inside and outside, as an avatar and a user. Jane enters to shut down 
the simulation, while Hall tries desperately to figure out what’s happening to him and whether he 
can trust her. However, Jane becomes a victim in the end, as her husband David (on whom Hall 
was based, also played by Bierko), attempts to rape and murder Jane while operating Hall’s 
body. When David dies in the virtual world, Hall’s consciousness fills the void in David’s 
physical body; again it is the male character who transforms and transcends. 
In representing the virtual cinematically, avatar films seek concrete ways not only to 
depict virtual technologies, but also to evoke the virtual as an embodied, enworlded existence in 
materiality, and the feminine is the frequent device for doing so. At one point in Surrogates, as 
Greer and his partner, Agent Peters, enter the headquarters for surrogate production they are 
engulfed in advertisements for surrogates that closely mirror the kinds of ads common in real 
world media culture. The ads feature no robotics or specific technological information, but rather 
focus on images of attractive bodies coupled with promises of better living, including the ultra-
generic, all-encompassing “Life. Only Better.” Most prominent among these is the all-too-
familiar image of an eye-catching woman emerging from the water in a bikini, and by this point 
the message is clear: photogenic bodies are attainable, but only through the acquisition of a new 
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body – a synthetic body, or an image body that permits the operator/consumer entry into a world 
of images.14 Interestingly, the ads in the film are directed at a populace that has already bought 
into surrogacy (ninety-eight percent live through surrogates), with detractors abstaining on 
ideological grounds, unlikely to be swayed by advertisements. The ads then work to uphold the 
consumerist (rather than utilitarian) rationale that surrogacy plays in the film, resulting when the 
functional robots became more photogenic (their original intention was to facilitate full-bodied 
experience for the disabled), and providing insights into the campaigns that apparently helped 
make surrogacy nearly ubiquitous.15 
 Greer’s wife Maggie is presented as a woman caught up in the consumerist impulse that 
insists on the inherent inadequacy of the physical body and the need for a new one more in line 
with fashion imagery. Maggie refuses to be without her surrogate, even at home (reflecting the 
increasing commodification of domestic space), driving Greer to question the role of surrogacy 
in their lives. Maggie is unable or unwilling to accept his arguments for spending time together 
in their biological bodies, and seems much more content at the salon where she works than at 
home. Salon work on robots is an odd amalgamation, juxtaposing feminine primping with 
something like a computer repair shop. A face-peeling scene (or face-lift, perhaps) reveals the 
                                                
14 This point is uncannily reinforced through Mostow’s creation of living photographs, or perhaps human statuary, in 
the surrogate models on display in a corner store; filmed using real actors that are digitally stabilized to appear 
perfectly still, the bodies exists as dimensional, embodied images somewhere between portrait photography and a 
wax museum. 
15 Three different advertising campaigns attended the Surrogates film and comic. The comics featured print 
advertisements on the back of each issue, each with muted images of men and women in rather generic poses and 
variations on a tagline, such as “Recharge Yourself” and “Share Yourself,” much like the video campaign depicted 
in the film. The ads provide an insight into the diegetic world, but simultaneously make a direct, extra-diegetic 
appeal to the reader. The print campaign for the film included cyborg imagery, with male and female models in 
alluring poses or in the act of taking off a shirt, depicted with skeletal mechanical torsos. Again, the emphasis is on 
young, attractive bodies, with the tagline “Human Perfection. What Could Go Wrong?” The endoskeletons are 
clearly intended as the implicit answer to the question (as in, something here is not ‘right’), but the shiny metal 
combined with traditional sex appeal and the allure of the digital compositing that produces the images results in a 
cyborg and digital sexiness. An accompanying website, ostensibly for Virtual Self Industries (the company that 
makes the surrogates) acts like a company site, again addressing viewers directly with promotional information 
about the bodies, downplaying simulacral aspects of surrogate living in favor of the features of new models.   
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metal skeleton underneath in a clear allusion to the iconic visage of the Terminator series, but 
with its impact and meaning shifted: rather than laying bare the “forceful masculine image of a 
technological human,” as Claudia Springer refers to the Terminator android, the exposure of the 
metal underneath is contextualized within a situation of women tending to women, where 
appearances and the secret of what lies beneath the artificial flesh (the foundation, so to speak) 
can be exposed in the process of constructing themselves and each other as imagistic (Fig. 33).16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 33. Peeling away the image in Surrogates. 
 
 
The ‘masculine’ machinery underneath the feminine flesh evokes constructivist and 
cyborg perspectives of femininity as something manufactured and worn, producing gender 
                                                
16 Springer, Electronic Eros, 108. 
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difference on the surface through appearance and behavior while revealing a ‘non-identity’ 
underneath (or an implicitly masculine one), again recalling the masquerade. In the salon scene, 
the removal of the face produces feminine appearance quite literally as mask, or more precisely 
the image of a face, as the special effect in the shot uses not a rubber prosthetic, but a 
photographic image composited with a latex peel. It is this cinematic image that the surrogate 
operator seems to ‘wear’, while the vacuous, bulging robotic eyes underneath, framed by a blond 
bob, convey a blankness much different from the red glowing light of the Terminator – lost, 
rather than penetrating. 
 Faces are not the only masks, for the body itself becomes a front for the operator, as the 
woman “uses her own body as a disguise.”17 In one of the more interesting aspects of the film, 
Maggie, until the final scene, is shown only in her surrogate. While Bruce Willis oscillates 
between the two versions of Greer, we only get to know Maggie as a character through the body 
she wears, knowing that there is another body, a woman, behind a closed door, and so it seems 
“there is a certain over-presence of the image – she is the image.”18 She is always already 
doubled, yet unable to achieve a critical distance from herself. Further, the film makes a strong 
association between the pain pills Maggie keeps beside her bed and her dependence on her 
surrogate, with both situated at the level of addiction. The film half-heartedly connects her 
dependencies to grief over her dead son, a plot point that does lend itself to a psychoanalytical 
reading (her inability to possess the phallus in the male child fixes her in her lack), but the 
character motivation of the lost son is weak in the film (and absent in the comics by Robert 
Venditti upon which the film is based), and thus her motivation is more closely aligned with a 
desire to be young and attractive, and to ward off ‘reality’ in general.  
                                                
17 Michèle Montrelay, quoted in Doane, “Film and the Masquerade,” 139. 
18 Ibid., 135. 
 237 
 Thus Maggie hides in plain sight, playing the image in the form of a body, and at the 
same time nowhere to be found, hollow underneath the surface. In the end, Greer is only able to 
unmask her by destroying surrogacy altogether. The surrogates fall, and gradually their operators 
stumble out into the world beyond their apartments and stim chairs, squinting in the sunlight. 
The final scene depicts Maggie’s emergence from her room, standing at a window next to Greer, 
looking out on the brave new world of better living through plain old biology. Greer’s arm 
around Maggie is a tender but ultimately feeble signifier of the return to the real, while the film 
spends much more time exploring the real as it is manifest in the reservation where the Dreads 
are sequestered, depicting it as decrepit and impoverished – a poverty, it seems, of the smooth 
bodies and Hollywood production that characterizes the rest of the film, a poverty of the image 
as defined in mainstream cinema. On the other side of the imaginal world, the film seems to say, 
one finds only non-image.   
 
Enablers and Inamoratas 
 
Female characters also act as facilitators for their male counterparts, with the implicit 
logic that the feminine position is already part of the virtual, and thus they are acquainted with its 
processes and able to guide and support the male protagonists into and through a virtuality that is 
more foreign to them, not so near a part of their ‘nature’. When Sleep Dealer’s Memo is looking 
to become a node worker, he gets duped by a man in a back alley who promises him a good deal. 
His money gone, Memo is helpless in the big city, unable to make the bio-connections that will 
allow him to work. Luz feels sorry for him, and, in a tender, intimate scene, implants the nodes 
in his body herself. The process of helping the male character enter the virtualized realm also 
works to bring him closer to the feminine; the image of Luz penetrating Memo’s body with a 
gun-like device, and the resulting sockets in his body, mark his removal from the cohesive sense 
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of embodiment emblemized by the milpa (a similar scene between Allegra and Pikul in eXistenZ 
inducts Pikul into the virtual). In the city Memo is no longer one with the land, but fluid like Luz, 
a point in a network, a body to be exploited. 
In The Matrix, Trinity is the first character we encounter, and the last person the blind 
Neo ‘sees’ before his death. Her femininity, along with that of the Oracle, is aligned with the 
Matrix itself, in contrast with Morpheus, who is primarily connected with the predominantly 
black Zion, and even Smith who, by the end, wants out of the Matrix. (In Avatar, Neytiri, who in 
many ways parallels Trinity, is the first of the Na’vi we meet as well, and is next to Jake at the 
end of the film.) Trinity is also the one who makes the first face-to-face contact with Neo at the 
dance club, and her cool embrace there prefigures the relationship that develops between them. 
Her love for Neo becomes a subjective indicator for her, as foretold by the Oracle, in discerning 
the One, thus granting her an overtly emotional impetus distinct from Morpheus’s quasi-religious 
belief. This aspect further feminizes Trinity, who, despite her dominatrix wardrobe and mostly 
affectless demeanor, becomes subject to her emotions, allowing her to become the ‘heart’ of the 
virtual, as well as to become further subject to it, as it is her inner femininity (despite the external 
masculinity of her short hair, cool comportment, and kung fu skills) that binds her to the virtual.  
Trinity is positioned as Neo’s double, or perhaps his shadow, as an inherently doubled 
character whose intuitive aspects do not permit her to become the One. Trinity and Morpheus 
instruct Neo on how to maximize his virtuality (in contrast with being unknowingly, passively 
virtual, as are most denizens of the Matrix), but only he meets the conditional subjectivity to be 
sufficiently inside and outside the virtual at the same time. They share with Neo their closeness 
to the virtual, but it is this same proximity to it that prevents either from becoming the 
transcendent One; while the One is iterative, as we have seen, its iterations move toward 
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abstraction, while those coded as closer to their bodies are unable to extract themselves. The 
double-consciousness here, that women are both abstracted from and too near their bodies, is one 
that is shared with raced characters, who also act as facilitators, and one that problematizes the 
situating of embodiment relative to the virtual. Rather than a simple dichotomy of real and 
virtual which a character cycles through (even though it is very much that way on the surface), 
sexual and racial difference in the Matrix trilogy point to a third space, an interstitial center 
between real and virtual which marginalizes both. 
 Lisa Nakamura notes that in The Matrix and other films involving computer interfacing, 
access to digital information is racialized in depictions of “white and male users experiencing 
‘direct’ or immediate relations with computer interfaces, while users of color are relegated to the 
background,” with access only through bulkier or more highly mediating interfaces. “These users 
are visible reminders of the necessity of human objects to support and underwrite others’ sublime 
experience of ‘transparent’ and direct interactions with digital technology.”19 White male 
protagonists are assisted both by women and people of color whose particular gifts and 
perspectives help the protagonist achieve his goals. Morpheus locates, trains, challenges and 
protects Neo, supporting him with unflagging faith and willingly stepping aside to allow the 
Neo-phyte to battle for Zion, even though Morpheus has much more experience. As the One, 
Neo has the potential already in him (i.e. he is a white male in big-budget, Hollywood film), 
whereas Morpheus does not.20  
                                                
19 Lisa Nakamura, Digitizing Race: Visual Cultures of the Internet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2008), 96. 
20 Nakamura points out that the human conflict with the machines pits Morpheus’s heterogeneous crew against the 
homogeneous, corporate Agents, and argues that Keanu Reeve’s multiracial heritage (white and Hawaiian/Chinese) 
embodies the hybridity that the film envisions as the salvation of the future of humanity. However, we must 
recognize that audiences may be unfamiliar with Reeves’s racial make-up, and that, juxtaposed against Trinity and 
Morpheus, Neo does fill the role of  the white messiah. 
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 The role of the black hacker/sage is perhaps epitomized in the Oracle, whose cryptic 
advice and homegrown wisdom guides characters obliquely in their quest to defeat the (logic of) 
the machines. Nakamura argues that “her authority and power as a black woman and a source of 
knowledge are undermined by her depiction as a woman baking cookies, wearing an apron, and 
living in a housing project;” however, it is her gender and working class status that give her 
pronouncements authenticity, and which, in the simulated world, are in some sense the source of 
her wisdom.21 Indeed, “the presence of people of color in the film,” writes Nakamura, “lets us 
know that we are in the realm of the real.”22 Nakamura also, as noted previously, contends that 
they are virtual, and here again the paradox is manifest. In this duality of being excessively ‘real’ 
and excessively ‘virtual’, women and people of color are granted an additional capacity for 
knowing their way through these worlds that are troubled by an influx of virtuality. In this they 
evoke the native guides on whom white explorers, colonists, and militias have traditionally 
relied, both for their closeness to the land (an ear to the ground) and their pronounced 
spiritualism, which gave them something of a second sense (when it wasn’t being ridiculed as 
superstition). The natives, simultaneously earthy and mystical, were in their dualism never able 
to occupy the middle, never able to gain an objective distance. The white men profit from their 
connections to the earth and spirit realm, but themselves maintain such connections at a distance, 
through the mediation of the native body. Both Trinity and Morpheus oscillate between the real 
and virtual worlds as Neo does, but only Neo is positioned to successfully occupy the middle and 
manage the relation between the two. Subsequently, the antithesis of the real and the virtual is 
not resolved through eradication of the ‘false’ virtuality (which is allowed to continue at the end 
of the trilogy), but through a synthesis achieved in the white body. 
                                                
21 Nakamura, Cybertypes, 81. 
22 Ibid., 75. 
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The black hacker/sage appears in other avatar films as well, as in Humanz Brother, 
played by Chris ‘Ludacris’ Hodges, who hacks telecom systems in Gamer to inform the hapless 
citizenry about Castle’s mind-control plan. Brother orients Tillman once he has escaped the 
Slayers game, and later deactivates the mind-control cells in Angie’s brain. In Surrogates, Ving 
Rhames plays the Prophet, leader of the anti-surrogate Dreads, who in voice-over begins the film 
with a sermon lambasting listeners for “living a lie” and exhorting them to “wake up” (Fig. 34). 
It is as significant as it is obvious that neither of these characters have real names, but are given 
titles indicating their roles in the film as, essentially, Rastafarian seer and streetwise black man. 
While each has a certain vision regarding the virtualization of their respective societies, like 
Morpheus they are not permitted to fully act on their vision directly, but only indirectly through 
the white protagonist. Brother is eventually killed by Castle’s henchmen, and the Prophet, it 
turns out, was himself a surrogate, puppeted by none other than an old white man, the ‘father’ of 
surrogacy who is attempting to undo his own work. Not only is the voice of the black man 
silenced after its utility has been extracted in Surrogates, but in the end it is revealed that it was 
never even his voice to begin with. 
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  Figure 33. The Prophet (and secret surrogate) in Surrogates. 
 
 
 These sagacious characters comport with the wise black man or magical African-
American friend that appear elsewhere in film and literature, but their inclusion in avatar films is 
notable for the compatibility of this trope with virtuality as the characters both caution against 
the deceptive dangers of an encroaching virtuality, and are expert at moving within it, as if it 
comes naturally to them.23 In this, Neytiri is different. She only knows the world of Pandora and 
the Na’vi, and is willfully ignorant of human culture and technology except to acknowledge their 
clumsiness and deride their half-hearted attempts to educate the Na’vi; she has learned English 
well enough to make communication with Jake convenient, but otherwise her place is clearly 
away from the humans with whom she wants nothing to do, and she only begrudgingly takes on 
the assignment to teach Jake the ways of their culture. 
 As with Trinity and Neo, and Luz and Memo, an emotional bond between Neytiri and 
Jake develops and then grows into love. She becomes the connecting link between Jake and the 
Na’vi, or rather a key component in a chain of connecting links, including Jake’s avatar body and 
its network-ready tendril with which bonds are formed, as well as the technological interface 
Jake uses to drive it. As Neytiri helps him ‘bond’ with his avatar body, teaching him what it 
means to truly inhabit the body he has inherited, she becomes part of the medial chain that results 
in his eventual transformation. She is perhaps part of what Bernadette Wegenstein refers to when 
she argues “that the notions of body and image have come together in what can be called an 
epistemological shift from a body emphasis to a medium emphasis.”24 Neytiri, Trinity, and Luz 
                                                
23 Examples of the wise black man abound, ranging from Sidney Poitier in The Defiant Ones (1958) and Scatman 
Crothers in The Shining (1980), to Morgan Freeman in Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves (1991) and Will Smith in The 
Legend of Bagger Vance (2000). 
24 Wegenstein, Getting Under the Skin, 119. 
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fulfill medial roles in their facilitation of male characters into and through the virtual (whether 
telepresent labor, all-encompassing simulation, or a digital planet accessed by avatars), but the 
technologies that produce Neytiri’s CG body ‘organically’ channel the embodied actions that for 
Jake require a technological interface. Each of their Na’vi bodies convey the performance of an 
actor, but whereas Jake’s is diegetic, Neytiri’s is hidden and implicit; his doubling is on the 
surface, hers is intrinsic, her mediality doubled.  
 The mediative function of these facilitating women is integral to the interweaving of real 
and virtual in the worlds for which they are guides. In Avatar, the ‘natural’ world is also the 
world of digital imagery, and that which is presented as most ‘real’ is the same that is an almost 
total digital construction, while in The Matrix, the deceptive simulation is patterned after a U.S. 
city circa 1999 – a familiar scene – while the real world of 2199 is a dark dystopia plagued by 
machine overlords and CG sentinels. Even in the quasi-futuristic world of Sleep Dealer, the 
‘virtual environment’ is a job site in San Diego. In Avatar and The Matrix especially, the virtual 
– and the feminine – are uncontained, even profuse or all-consuming. For the satirical S1m0ne, 
Hollywood cinema itself becomes the virtual world, sustained by practices of inflated self-
representation and a celebrity frenzy that feeds on its own hype, while cinematic realism wanes. 
The insertion of a digital actress into this mix counterposes the irreality of the dream factory with 
a computer simulation in which the virtual woman remains contained on screens, while the 
screens proliferate. Rather than the digital contagion of The Lawnmower Man and the digital 
warfare and gritty game space of Avalon, Simone typifies digital purity in a corrupt world (of 
analog media), presented as feminine ideal. 
 
Vestal Virtuality 
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In her influential essay, Mulvey points out the ways in which the female body is made to 
be more imagistic within a cinematic form in which all is image – the ways in which women 
have been made to play the image in addition to being imaged, by being styled for the look and 
subject to a cinematic gaze that lingers on the body or spies voyeuristically.25 Ann Kibbey 
however argues that Mulvey contributed to the reified symbiosis of woman and image: 
 
Mulvey’s filmic woman was, and meant, Cinematic Image. This was much more than an 
association between woman and image, much more than an analogy. The core idea might 
be expressed in this way: The substance of woman is image. Mulvey accepted the 
misogynist precepts of psychoanalysis about the nonexistence of women. The empty 
token, the bread of the sacrament, morphed into the ‘structuring lack’ of female sexuality, 
to be filled by a new kind of spiritual presence, image-ness itself. The compensation for 
the extinction of women – women as empty tokens – was the survival of 
Woman/Cinematic Image. What the camera recorded was the image-ness of women.26 
 
 
Kibbey argues that Mulvey’s theoretical approach empties the woman and leaves only her 
‘image-ness’. What, however, might this image-ness implicitly contain? Kibbey’s language, even 
in its somewhat hyperbolic critique of Mulvey’s theorization, suggests that there is more to the 
positioning of the woman in cinema than simply being styled and presented for the look – that is, 
she is situated not just photogenically, but consubstantial with the images in which she appears.  
Mulvey described the three ‘looks’ of the cinema as the look of the camera, the look of 
the audience, and the look of “the characters at each other within the screen illusion. The 
conventions of narrative film deny the first two and subordinate them to the third,” so that the 
intratextual look incorporates all three.27 Facilitating the scopophilic desire Mulvey finds in 
narrative cinema, these looks synchronize a curious, controlling gaze, with male characters 
                                                
25 Some recent films have deliberately flipped this convention to a focus on the male body, as in shower scenes in 
Sex and the City (2008, Michael Patrick King) and Australia (2008, Baz Luhrman) in which the camera lingers and 
the body is presented for the look, while women watch from hidden vantages.  
26 Ann Kibbey, Theory of the Image: Capitalism, Contemporary Film, and Women (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005), 40. 
27 Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” 68. 
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acting as surrogates for the presumably male viewer, and the woman the object of all three. At 
least she is so occasionally, when the three coincide, but of course cinema does much more than 
simply stare at women. Still, in Mulvey the cinema is generally defined by man’s relation to 
women, as we are primed for the objectifying look before it actually settles on a female body. 
Male characters become surrogates for the audience in apprehending the shifty ontology of the 
image, and, one can extrapolate, the mystery of the virtual, the inscrutability of the digital; 
investigating the woman and mastering her enigmas become symbolic measures for preserving 
the index and the integrity of (male) embodiment.28 S1m0ne paints a Mulvyesque picture in its 
characterization of Viktor’s (Al Pacino) relationship with a simulated actress, Simone (Rachel 
Roberts), for whom body and image are literally of the same substance. 
 Viktor is a Hollywood producer whose latest film is stymied when his lead actress walks 
out on the production. Frustrated with having to rely on other people, Viktor’s self-centeredness 
is serendipitously rewarded when a one-eyed man (evoking the camera’s monocular gaze) slips a 
disk into his hand. Viktor runs the program and finds Simone (short for ‘simulation one’), a 
digital actress who can be easily manipulated through a microphone and a camera by which she 
mimics Viktor’s words and expressions, and who also comes packaged with a database of 
performance enhancements. Viktor replaces his erstwhile actress with Simone, completing his 
film and creating a new star, who quickly becomes the object of obsession by paparazzi and 
studio head Elaine (Catherine Keener), Viktor’s ex-wife.  
Viktor puts Simone in another production, and as media demand becomes frenzied he 
puts on more elaborate charades to perpetuate the ruse, including teleconferencing, body 
                                                
28 This implicit strategy seems particularly germane to avatar films. Cinematic representations of cyborgs have 
predominantly privileged the masculine, and in the symbiosis of man and machine, the cold steel, hard machine 
body, and straightforward algorithmic logic are all things that can be known, and thus the threat can be apprehended. 
Images are deceptive, however, and a virtuality displayed in images (in the ‘image-ness’ of women) produces 
epistemological uncertainty. 
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doubles, and lingerie left in a hotel room for a private investigator to find. As the demand for 
Simone becomes overwhelming he tries to temper her popularity with an art film credited to her, 
defacing her image by having her wallow in the mud with pigs and questioning her artistic 
sensibilities at the same time, but it only ends up adding to her credibility. Eventually he tries to 
kill her off by dumping the software in the ocean and holding a funeral for her, but when the 
coffin is opened under suspicion of foul play, only a life-sized cardboard picture is found. Under 
interrogation Viktor tries to convince the police that Simone was only ever a program, but they 
don’t believe him. He is saved when Elaine and their daughter resurrect Simone from a disk he 
neglected to throw out, and the film ends with a scene in which she and Viktor appear together in 
a green screen composite – Simone apparently happy to be back, while Viktor, now positioned in 
the image world outside of his control (and in the hands of women), seems quite unhappy with 
her return. 
 Simone is a rather vaguely defined digital construct who appears as a woman but has no 
sentience or agency of her own (to the extent that the program is a ‘she’). Simone is an avatar 
that can be composited into films or video feeds, and is also put to personal use in Viktor’s 
relationship with her, or rather his relationship with himself through the woman and the image. 
Since Viktor works in secret to maintain the charade that Simone is real, he spends a lot of time 
alone with her, quickly becoming comfortable at the computer interface through which she is 
accessed and performed. “I can be myself around you,” he sighs contentedly in one of several 
solipsistic exchanges in which he speaks simultaneously to and through her. She becomes not 
only his avatar in the films in which she stars, but in his ego-boosting relationship with himself 
as well, and with his self-serving ventriloquism he heaps praise on himself while avoiding his 
deep-seated issues with women and need for love. As an aspiring Hollywood producer, he is also 
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desperate to be seen and acknowledged, and the Pygmalion in him that produces the woman to 
be looked upon soon appropriates her look for his own vanity. As he has trouble pleasing the 
other women in his life, she becomes a means for him to love himself, which he can only 
accomplish through Simone’s docility and avatarial interface.  
 A clear parallel here is another object of Mulvey’s scrutiny, Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958), 
in which Scottie (James Stewart) “follows, watches and falls in love with a perfect image of 
female beauty and mystery.”29 Not only is Madeleine (Kim Novak) presented as such an image, 
she is also connected with a painting, another image (and another woman), with which she has a 
mysterious relationship. Scottie fails to solve this mystery (which ultimately conceals that there 
is none besides deception), but later encounters the subject of his investigation again when he 
runs into Judy. Scottie (mis)recognizes Madeleine in Judy (having failed to see the Judy in 
Madeleine), but she doesn’t quite fit the image he has in mind, and he reconstructs the image of 
Madeleine in Judy as she is compelled to take up the performance, to again play the image. 
Mulvey argues that “her exhibitionism, her masochism, make her an ideal passive counterpart to 
Scottie’s active sadistic voyeurism. She knows her part is to perform.”30 However, while Judy 
complies with his wishes, she does so reluctantly, and this reluctance is an important part of the 
drama between them. Having once been turned into a ‘perfect image’ in a process we don’t see, 
Judy’s subsequent liberation and hesitance to re-enact it demonstrate her displeasure, as a 
woman, to become image. Part of this is Hitchcock (briefly) allowing her to ‘see’ rather than 
simply be seen, as Modleski understands the flashback from Judy’s point of view (dismissed by 
Mulvey) as a key visual element in Judy’s active and resistant role. In Scottie’s efforts to break 
her down and expose the image as false, Judy admits to the ruse, but in the chasm between the 
                                                
29 Ibid., 67. 
30 Ibid. 
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destruction of the image and the possible non-identity behind it, she presents herself to him as  a 
woman – a Judy to take the place of the lost Madeleine. Scottie’s iconoclasm breaks the spell of 
the image, but not his obsession; if the woman is punished in the end, as Mulvey argues, she at 
least dies as a woman rather than an image of one. Scottie, on the other hand, is left broken and 
hollow, having failed to gain either; occupying the voyeur’s position, he becomes nothing when 
his gaze is emptied. 
While Judy relinquishes but resists, Simone is fully docile as a preconstituted image of 
femininity and the avatar body; rather than a discursive and performative construct imposed on a 
body, Simone is a body made for the purpose of compliance and visuality, needing only to be 
vivified or enacted (Fig. 35). While Judy can never fully become the imagistic Madeleine, 
Simone is always and fully the image for which she is created. Even when control of Simone 
shifts to Elaine and her and Viktor’s daughter, Simone is still Simone, an image body available 
for use. The influence of the digital is clear; Viktor changes Simone’s wardrobe with a few 
mouse clicks, with none of the cajoling required of Scottie. Rachel Roberts plays the 
programmed image of a woman, or, in Simone’s capacity as a digital body for cinematic 
productions, a visual effect that hides its programmed construction in the body of Rachel 
Roberts. With the exception of some stylistic pixelation at startup, Roberts’s image undergoes no 
digital treatment, as the digital is expressed as feminine ideal, in the face and body of a model 
(which Roberts also is).  
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  Figure 35. Viktor and the docile Simone. 
 
 As a story about the infiltration of the digital into Hollywood filmmaking, and more 
broadly addressing a general disconnect with reality, the film undermines its own intentions by 
resorting to conventional forms – photographic images, an actor playing a role – to represent that 
which it finds subversive. It is not strange to view Simone acting in a film, since Simone is only 
Roberts acting in a film. While this is partly due to Niccol’s over-reliance on traditional 
filmmaking to explore new cinematic territory, it also demonstrates a failure to understand the 
fascination of difference. As Dan North points out in his work on ‘synthespians’, the thrill of the 
digital illusion is not just photorealism, as “visual illusions have always depended upon a kind of 
doublethink on the part of the spectator – we need to recognise the illusion as such before we can 
engage with it meaningfully at a semiological level.”31 While Simone passes for human in her 
films, she does not pass as digital for us, and unconvincingly plays the kind of image called for 
in the role, embodying none of its coded mysteries.  
 In one scene, Viktor dips into Simone’s database to retrieve a performance by Audrey 
Hepburn in Breakfast at Tiffany’s, attempting to integrate some essence of the film (Holly 
                                                
31 North, Performing Illusions, 12. 
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Golightly turning, saying demurely and with a hint of desperation, “How do I look?”), as well as 
Hepburn herself. The result – Roberts flatly mimicking the line – is unconvincing to say the 
least, though the allusion is to some extent apt. Audrey Hepburn stars in films in which she is 
constantly remade, replaying the construction of femininity in My Fair Lady, Sabrina, and Funny 
Face, among others. Simone, however, comes prepackaged; she doesn’t need to be inducted into 
femininity because it programmed into her – it is her (her image-ness, constructedness, docility). 
But as a picture of femininity she is empty, a construct with no mystery. Viktor’s possession 
stops short of Scottie’s obsession, as Scottie attempted to possess what he could not have (a 
condition ultimately shared by the male spectator) – Viktor has too much control, and is thus a 
flaccid ‘victor’ over her, having demystified her when he turned her on.32  
 While Simone seems to ‘appear’ everywhere, she only inhabits screens – the computer 
display with which Viktor accesses her, and the television and cinema screens through which she 
appears to others. Contained as she is, the screen becomes her body – a restricted visuality that 
recalls Max Headroom, the corrupted and reconfigured digital copy of Edison Carter (both 
played by Matt Frewer). In the television film Max Headroom: 20 Minutes into the Future 
(1985, Annabel Jankel and Rocky Morton), Carter is knocked into a coma and his consciousness 
is downloaded, although it at first seems to malfunction. Carter survives, and with some 
tweaking the digital copy becomes operative as well, taking on a life of its own as television 
personality (literally) Max who alternately vexes and assists Carter. Whereas the mischievous 
Max travels through the network and resists control, Simone never gains agency or self-
                                                
32 An interesting correlative to the digital construction of femininity is the lack of success experienced by media 
personality and model Tila Tequila and women from the alt-porn site Suicide Girls in Second Life, which, despite 
many followers and fans outside of Second Life, both performed dismally. One article on the topic asks, “in an 
online world already beset by sexy female avatars, is there a place for actual sexy women?” The instance seems to 
point to an overdetermination, as the constructed femininity of the avatars amounts only to an attempt to faithfully 
recreate the constructed femininity the women already exhibit; the oscillation of wondering who the avatar hides (its 
mystery, its femininity) and taking the avatar at face value is lost. Wagner James Au, “What Tequila and Suicide 
Teach Us,” New World Notes, May 14, 2007. http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2007/05/what_tequila_te.html. 
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awareness, and thus never becomes a character. She is part of a computer system, but the 
technology is minimized and simplified (Viktor’s custom keyboard makes control a single-touch 
effort). Max Headroom is essentially a program-based character without a body, while Simone is 
a program-based body disallowed from becoming a character – a non-character, who as an avatar 
is still performed. Max’s appearance on screens is often invasive and unpredictable; Simone 
waits quietly for instructions, her head down slightly, her expression blank – perhaps even 
somewhat sad.33 She exhibits none of the video noise or signal corruption of Max, who, while 
maximizing his televisual presence, seems never quite content with it. Rather than a video 
agitation, the imaginal and picturesque Simone is a digital star. 
 In S1m0ne, the digital is presented as virginal. She is unavailable to the paparazzi who 
seek a body from which to steal images, and from the private investigator who sniffs the lingerie 
and rolls in the rumpled bed sheets planted by Viktor in a hotel room. She is also unavailable to 
the (commercially) impotent Viktor, ever shielded behind the prophylactic screen. Her 
desexualization implies a promiscuity of the analog that ‘touches’ its object indexically. Allegra, 
on the other hand, as the game designer in eXistenZ exudes a strange sensuousness and tactility 
that permeates the game, through the pods that wriggle when stroked, the touch of the BioPort, 
and Jennifer Jason Leigh’s languorous sexuality. The pristine Simone is fully manipulable but 
completely untouchable; divorced from the index, prevented from being a character, and played 
by a model, Simone’s virtuality, despite Niccol’s attempt to humanize her, is presented in 
idealized feminine terms as a play of attractive surfaces in which there is nothing to see, but it 
looks very nice. 
 
                                                
33 This pose seems drawn from the standing sleep state common among avatars, including those of Second Life, in 
which the avatar’s head nods to indicate that it is inactive. In this state it is an avatar body waiting to become 
avatarial. 
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Afterimage 
I’m sure I’m going to look in the mirror and see no one, nothing. People are always 
calling me a mirror and if a mirror looks into a mirror, what is there to see? 
  Steven Shaviro, as Andy Warhol34 
 
In this dissertation I have attempted to trace a path from the fragmentation of the mirror 
to a body of connections, and from an alterity dividing bodies and images to an affinity between 
them. The avatar has served in multiple capacities as a digital body that represents an embodied 
user in a virtual environment; a type of ‘image body’ in which imaging and informational 
technologies meet in the form of the body; a metaphor for a body in connections through the 
‘avatar’, linking two bodies (biological and digital) in a phenomenological circuit; a cultural 
figure appearing in popular films and other media texts, situated at the juncture between a 
slippery hold on material reality and the evolution of cinematic imagery within digital culture; 
and a model for navigating through a world of images, screens, computer technologies, the 
digitization of everyday life, the replication of bodies through images, and the difficulty or 
impossibility of encountering ourselves and our bodies outside of the images (or image-ness, the 
vague quality of the image outside of specific instantiations) of which the world in digital culture 
is increasingly comprised. 
 I have used the mirror less for its psychological implications (although these are implicit, 
as noted) than for the relational and technological aspects of being present to oneself through a 
sense of images and layers (the mirror’s surface, the ‘virtual’ space of the reflection, the image 
body staring back at you, which you already inhabit across the distance to the mirror). 
                                                
34 34 Steven Shaviro, Doom Patrols: A Theoretical Fiction about Postmodernism (New York: Serpent’s Tail, 1997), 
167-8. In this book, Shaviro examines postmodernity through a number of well-known figures, from Walt Disney to 
William Burroughs, occasionally speaking in their (fictionalized) voices. The avatarial implications of this quote are 
intended. 
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Technologies of the virtual are new mirrors, and new media have made our connections to media 
and images more frequent, more interactive and hands-on, more immediate and tactile. Although 
in certain ways our media have lost their bodies, they have moved closer to our own through an 
increase in the framing function of the body, in the way we touch images and they respond, in 
the imaginal worlds and interactive interfaces that respond to our embodied interactions, in the 
abundance of functional image bodies in videogames and virtual environments, and the digital 
production of cinematic bodies that combine human data, image layers, and complex 
computational processes.  
 I have not intended to deny the materiality or the body – far from it, if my attempts have 
been successful – as I concur with media theorist Pierre Lévy when he states, “I am convinced 
that a major element of our morality consists simply in the acceptance of being in the world, not 
in fleeing it, in being there for others and for oneself. . . . For the actual is so precious that we 
must, and at once, attempt to recognize and acclimate to the virtualization that destabilizes it.”35 
My project here is about acclimation, about recognizing and navigating the virtual that not only 
exists within the material world, but inevitably forms it. I have attempted to delineate various 
aspects of virtuality in order to demonstrate that to engage the virtual is to engage the material, 
the biological, the ‘real’ – in addition to recognizing the ways in which that ‘real’ world has 
shifted toward increased virtualization, in the evolving relationships and connections between 
materiality and immateriality, and especially bodies and images, which it necessitates.  
 Insights into these connections and the ‘layers’ of imbricated virtuality and materiality 
that constitute our world are increasingly presented in, and problematized by, the discourse of the 
digital, the interface, the videogame, as well as the cinema (in both its stories and its 
                                                
35 Pierre Lévy, Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age, trans. Robert Bononno (New York: Plenum Press, 
1998), 183. 
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technologies – and perhaps especially in the ways these two converge). Bernadette Wegenstein’s 
conception of a ‘corporealization of the image’, in which, “far from witnessing a gradual 
disembodiment of information and images, the age of new media constitutes the current moment 
in a process of embodiment or corporealization,” suggests an embodiment outside the physical 
instantiations in which visual media have traditionally been embodied.36 This corporealization 
coincides with her view that the body itself has become mediative: 
 
The body constitutes mediation and vice versa . . . [in] a body concept that oscillates 
between holism and fragmentation. . . . The body – ‘the fabric into which all objects are 
woven’ – is thus not a mere intermediary, in-between the subject and the world, but 
rather a unifier of a holistic subjectivity and a fragmented objectivity that effectively 
undermines the existence of these very categories.37 
 
A holistic subjectivity is that which makes sense of a fragmented objectivity through the 
connections and mediation for which, I suggest, the avatar provides a multifaceted model. This is 
a holism that appears only in connections, and only through multiplicity can any sense of the 
‘body’ exist. It is medial not simply in its function as intermediary, but in its capacity to frame, 
channel, and process images and information – to develop affinities, to engage with the body, to 
flow with the virtual.  
 In the media texts I have explored here, this particular ability falls within the sphere of 
the feminine. While women in avatar films are most often relegated to conventional female roles 
and often presented as ensnared by the virtual, they are also the ones who are best able to 
navigate it. The double-consciousness of the feminine position – simultaneously primitive and 
abstracted – becomes, in this view, not a paradox, but the dualism necessary for navigating a 
world in which unity and bodily integrity, and a ‘real’ apart from images, projections, 
                                                
36 Wegenstein, Getting Under the Skin, 147. 
37 Ibid., 33. 
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imagination, and information, in layered interweaving and imaginal composites, is a hollow 
fantasy pursued by white men. 
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